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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SUBJECTIVITY AND HEALING: ONTOANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

by

© DENNIS SEAN O'CONNELL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled SUBJECTIVITY AND HEALING: ONTOANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY submitted by DENNIS SEAN O'CONNELL in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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External Examiner

Date June 17, 1980

DEDICATION

To my parents,

Who gave me necessities;

To Sieglinde,

Who gave me possibilities.

ABSTRACT

The position is advanced that traditional psychology and psychological treatments are reductionistic, thereby precluding the establishment of a distinctly human psychology. Such a psychology would include an empirical description of all those properties which are both necessary and sufficient for inclusion in the category 'human', an undertaking called ontoanthropology serving as the basis for a modernized psychology. The groundwork for such a psychology is laid in a thorough critique of reductionism. Supplanting the reductionist outlook is a new model called emergent hierarchicalism, which establishes developmental levels of property, method and law. Each level is an evolutionary system of novel properties, ordered on a hierarchic scale. Each level introduces a new environment for the entities composing it. A set of principles governing the hierarchy of levels and environments is formulated.

Emergent hierarchicalism posits the level of 'person' and its cultural environment as the appropriate level of inquiry for a human psychology. The defining properties of this level are outlined and its systematic nature is described. The point of departure for a complete analysis of the person-level is given in a new reconstruction of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of subjectivity. A subsequent section attempts to show how the properties described in a Kierkegaardian anthropology have historically emerged ontogenetically and phylogenetically.

A final section applies the findings of the first four chapters to the practise of psychotherapy. An offshoot of this application is

a suggestion for further work on the hierarchic paradigm, which may lead to a unification of all existing theoretical perspectives in psychology, as well as all existing treatment models, within a hierarchic-holistic framework.

If mine prove a castle in the air,
I will endeavour it shall be of a
piece and hang together.

John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding

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INTRODUCTION

Behavioral science, with all its methodological and theoretical commitments, is a modern tragedy: its framework does not allow the human subject to know itself. In its desire to achieve scientific status, psychology is precluded from investigating and comprehending human nature in its essence. Adhering to a philosophy of science which is already superannuated in the discipline psychology has sought to emulate methodologically, namely physics, the "science of behavior" now provides no significant insight into the unique properties of human being. Yet it is psychology, due to its privileged position in the total scheme of western thought, which must create the conditions for doing this.

Somehow, norms and purposes must be isolated which concurrently validate, guide, and unify psychology as an intellectual enterprise. The selection of such norms and ideals, assuming there would be general assent to them by contemporary and future psychologists, might profoundly modify the chracter of the discipline to the point that it could assume a regnant position in future intellectual and scientific endeavour, a position which was held for two and a half thousand years and then abdicated by philosophy. And perhaps the clue to psychology's possible future lies precisely in its past. Indeed, an understanding of its bequest from history may show psychology that it falls specifically to the developmental psychology of personality to formulate and pursue a comprehensive science of man. That is to say, the loosing of psychology from its ancient moorings may not have been a catastrophe: its future could be determined by its historical roots and, at the same time, by the nature of the break it has made with them.

Essentially, psychology was absorbed within the wider concerns of philosophy until its gradual differentiation after Wundt established his Leipzig laboratory in 1879. The original purpose for psychology can accordingly be delineated by reference to traditional philosophical goals. Among these, the foremost was a depiction of the fundamental structures of "human nature" and the relation between these structures and other non-human dimensions of reality. Although philosophy began as a crude effort to describe the fundaments of material reality, it gradually became apparent that it first needed to approach and resolve certain epistemological questions, since truth could not be stated until after the conditions for acquiring knowledge were stipulated. From this it was not a long step to the remarkable attempts by Plato and Aristotle to comprehend the nature of the knowing instrument, the human mind or psyche.

The critical observations to be made here are three. First, psychology,(insofar as it could be identified as a field of inquiry) was given over to the broader purpose of comprehending human being in its totality. It was one aspect or expression of human nature's desire to know itself. Hence Aristotelian psychology culminates in a description of the rational soul, which differs essentially from the vegetative and sensible souls animating all species distinguished from human being. Second, by virtue of the first point, psychology was continuous with all other inquiry, since it too was subsumed within philosophy and its general purpose. Unintegrated knowledge would have been unthinkable. Third, in addition to its humanistic concerns and its integration with all other forms of inquiry contained within the

panoply of philosophy, psychology was subservient to the prevailing methods employed by it. By and large, these methods were oriented around abstract, rational, conceptual thought. Even Aristotle gave biological and meteorological phenomena their ultimate explanations in metaphysical modes of discourse. It was not until after philosophy elaborated an empiricist epistemology that the foundations for an experimental psychology could be laid.

Current goals for western psychology can be discerned in the noble tradition from which it was engendered and through a realignment with those aims which have become lost in the resolute pursuit of scientism. Paradoxically, psychology will become more scientific precisely by virtue of such realignment, coupled with a restructuring of philosophical methods along radically empirical lines. It is now being argued that it falls to nothing other than personality theory---conceived on a developmental model---to undertake the restructuring of traditional inquiry into human nature: a developmental-personological theory is the natural heir to philosophy's long-standing intention to formulate an encompassing, fundamental anthropology.

The first purpose for psychology is accordingly given in its past. It needs to lead the attempt to elaborate a descriptive, comprehensive, and fundamental outline of human existence in its totality. The second purpose is concurrently given: a philosophical anthropology necessarily must provide a unification and continuity for all those disciplines contributing to it. These two purposes together make psychology the science <u>par excellence</u> insofar as it aims at being a clearing house for the consolidation of a distinctly human anthropology, focused in

the historically new intention to describe the nature and development of a person.

A preoccupation with the construction of a dynamic psycho-anthropology, however, does not merely arise for psychology by virtue of its intellectual inheritance, or by virtue of the inherent concerns of developmental and personality psychology (even though these two considerations might prove sufficient). It arises because no other science occupies its unique position in western thought; psychology inherited the unifying, human concerns of philosophy, but at the same time it revolted against the methods used by philosophy to discharge these concerns. So psychology was bequeathed philosophy's problems but not its manner of solving them. The rebellious young discipline wanted to be a science, laboring under the constraint to verify its conclusions by reference to experience. It sought to replace verbal abstractions with concrete experience, logical deductions with inductive inference, and pure reason with the duplicable evidence of the senses. In the move from metaphysics to experimentalism, however, it lost sight of the very problems with which it began. The history of psychology's childhood, dating from Wundt's laboratory, is a story of its deepening, dehumanizing obsession with the measurement of public behavior.

One hundred years later, we are in a position to correct the natural abberance and idealism of youth: the maturing discipline is now able to establish its own identity, taking counsel from developments in philosophy, the hard sciences, and the humanistic trend within its own field. It is now obvious that humanistic concerns about the nature of a person are not inconsistent with the desire to relate

those concerns to observation, when the notion of observation is expanded beyond that of the laboratory or controlled observation of organisms responding to artificial stimuli. Curiously, psychology is now in a position to realize some of the aspirations of its founder. Wundt was "far from wanting to destroy the interconnection between psychology and philosophy. He regarded psychology as the common basis for all scientific and cultural knowledge and the bond uniting all the individual sciences (but) the unity of all sciences through psychology and the development of philosophy out of psychology remain as transient theoretical postulates unrealizable and unrealized since his death" (Wellek, 1972, p. 350). As a coda, it should be said that the postulate is realizable, in a science for which there is not yet a real title, but which can be described as a unification of developmental and personality theory. It appropriates the purposes of traditional philosophy and contemporary philosophical anthropology, redirecting them within the empirical limits of organismic psychology.

In addition to the considerations above, there is another equally disheartening fact to be countenanced. Psychology today---apart from being unconcerned with human being---is in many pieces, like a jigsaw puzzle nobody can put together, encompassing everything from the physiology of the amygdala to Tibetan mysticism.

Psychological science may be explained from a multitude of perspectives and the activities of its adherents may be subsumed within a diversity of purposes. Many theoreticians and practitioners within this nebulously defined discipline may even dispute that psychology can properly be described as a science, or that if it can be conferred with

such a status, that it has a clearly isolated object of inquiry. Lacking a uniform methodological determination, uncertain about the ultimate goals toward which it aims, without general consent about the aspects of reality it seeks to know, and disoriented in its relatively fledgling existence in the overall direction of western thought, psychology is accordingly a composite discipline, without a centre.

The composite and disconnected morphology of psychology as a discipline is reflected into the various subdisciplines which constitute it, including developmental psychology and personality theory. Not only are the subdisciplines divided within themselves over methodological loyalties and theoretical commitments, but each of them, with few exceptions, seems to be isolated from and uncommunicative with the others.

Nevitt Sanford's commentary on the state of contemporary personality theory can be read almost word-for-word as a depiction of current developmental psychology, if not the entire field of psychology itself: "The trend of the discipline...is toward a disconcerting sprawl. The field of personality has expanded in all directions, and none of the many voices heard from that field can be called dominant. The present is not a time of grand theory...This is an age not of treatises by one man but of the symposium and the collection of essays on a single, specialized topic" (Sanford, 1970, pp. 131-132).

In light of this perplexing variety and evident lack of consolidation, what is the neonate psychologist to conclude, and how can he or she get some bearings? And how is the applied psychologist to draw any inferences for teaching and healing whose legitimacy is ensured?

There are, then, two monumental problems facing contemporary psychology. It gives us no essential understanding about ourselves and it is a disunified enterprise. The intention of this dissertation is to propose a solution to these two problems. The procedure will be to start with a critique of the prevailing philosophy of science which precludes the use of a language and method appropriate to a psychology of human being. The task then naturally becomes that of constructing a paradigm which demands an analysis of the unique and essential aspects of human nature. Happily, this paradigm also provides a conceptual instrument for consolidating and unifying all psychological inquiry. Since the paradigm demands an analysis of essential human properties, two chapters of the investigation are given over to precisely this undertaking. Finally, the application of this analysis to the author's own professional field, psychotherapy, is done in the final chapter.

In light of the west's disorientation in a post-religious, post-philosophical era, and considering the amount of hope now being invested in psychology for solutions to the confusions wrought by the breakdown of central traditions, it would seem that psychology is not only qualified but obliged to develop new understanding. This investigation is motivated by the desire for such "new understanding", and for this reason can be described with a new name. It is not psychology, but a reformation of psychology, to be given the name 'ontoanthropology'.

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CHAPTER ONE

TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY ONTOANTHROPOLOGY: CRITIQUE OF REUCTIONISM

The fundamental metaphoric conception which provides the framework for the formulation of a new science of human nature is that of levels of reality, ordered hierarchically by reference to their order of emergence. This "new science", to be called ontoanthropology (onta= 'being' or 'essence'; anthropos= 'human'; logos= 'science' or 'principles') depicts human beings as hierarchies of systems ordered developmentally in an environment. Structure and evolution cannot therefore be disassociated, and ontoanthropology is, therefore, a convergence of personality theory and developmental theory.

The emergent-hierarchic framework which makes a comprehensive ontoanthropology possible posits developmental levels, on both the cosmic and personal scales, at which qualitatively novel properties and structures emerge, neither present nor predictable at preceding levels. One level, that of subjective consciousness, is the highest level of investigation for ontoanthropology. Currently, experimental or scientific psychology---by virtue of its methodological and philosophical allegiances---cannot establish itself on this tier of the hierarchy, and generally undermines any attempt to do so. The incapacity of scientific psychology to conceive of a level of subjectivity beyond the level of animal mentality (which is itself endlessly complex and rich) is due to the discipline's fixation with an outmoded metaphysic and epistemology. The methodological and epistemological canons of conventional scientific psychology, most of which form an unconscious assumptive structure for

investigation and research, do not allow discussion about subjectivity, the very thing which makes our nature human. It is therefore necessary to expose these canons as defeasible, and the allegiance to them unreasonable, if not dehumanizing. By doing this the elaboration of the emergent-hierarchic framework may proceed; if the epistemological axioms of conventional experimental psychology (including cognitive and personality theories) are correct, then emergent hierarchicalism, and the ontoanthropology to be constructed from it, are automatically false. Analysis and abandonment of the orthodox philosophy of science is accordingly necessary as a propadeutic to the synthesis of a hierarchic ontoanthropology, because with the former still intact, the latter cannot be generated.

Unity of Science

1. Of the five variants of unity-of-science dogma, the first kind is methodological: it says that scientific knowledge of any event or state of affairs is possible only by using objective, empirical methods of inquiry, modelled on the paradigms of physics and chemistry. Methodological unity-of-science is engendered from the axiom that only those conclusions which are publicly, quantitatively, and experimentally verifiable are acceptable to science, and physics and chemistry are the exemplary sciences in this respect. It is claimed that the phenomena investigated by physics and chemistry are the only ones acceptable to pure science, presupposing they have been brought within the orbits of operational definition and control. Hence, insofar as psychology---or any other inquiry---wishes to be <u>scientific</u> it must emulate the methods of physics: operational definition, public verification, experimental and statistical control over data, and the development of predictive

control.

2. A second unity-of-science ideology could be called ontological. In this form, unity-of-science stipulates that processes or states of affairs are real only to the extent that they are physico-chemical systems, and science is unified only to the extent that it restricts its investigations to these systems. This thesis is strictly metaphysical, in the tradition of the Greek atomists, Hobbes, de La Mettrie, and the modern materialists, and it directly entails the methods of quantitative physics as the procedures for unifying science. Everything, on this view, is ultimately constituted from atoms and molecules. It its extension from the physical sciences, ontological unity-of-science is elaborated into a pervasive metaphysical postulate which is perhaps one of the most profound errors in western scientific and intellectual history. It says that every phenomenon, mutatis mutandis, is real only in terms of its constituent elements. The metaphor of ultimately real atomic unit (in Greek, 'atom' simply means 'not further divisible') can be found in all physical, life, behavioral and social sciences.

3. Nomological unity-of-science, in alignment with the methodological and ontological variants, is represented in the notion of a single set of laws for all disciplines. Unsurprisingly, these laws are the quantitative laws of the physico-chemical sciences. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of the physical and chemical laws operative in any phenomenon, and nothing but these laws.

> The position holds that there are basic and common laws that govern all events and phenomena in the natural world...Neither biology, sociology,

> psychology, nor any science for that matter has its own special laws; rather, in a basic sense, all sciences...are controlled by a common set of principles...The laws of chemistry and physics---the rules that depict the mechanisms by which atoms and molecules function---are the basic fundamental laws of the real world. (Lerner, 1976, pp. 23-24)

Nomological unity-of-science has probably never come closer to complete fulfilment than in mid-nineteenth century physics, when all laws were thought to be formulable or derivable from Newtonian mechanics. Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) propose an even stronger version of nomological unity-of-science in which the laws of diverse sciences are not only expressed as physical and chemical laws but in which these laws are themselves "unified" or "connected" in some "intuitive sense".

4. The fourth variant of unity-of-science can be described as the semantic version, in which it is propounded that all the terms and languages of science can be expressed in the terms and language of some one discipline. Reminiscent of Leibniz' characteristica universalis, a universal language unifying all areas of disciplined investigation, the semantic variant idealizes a single conceptual depiction of reality, formulable, as one would expect, in the language of physics. Carnap (1938), the leading spokesman for semantic unity-of-science, adopts the position that the "protocol sentences" of science can be expressed as quantitative descriptions of definite space-time points. All sciences, including the life and psychological sciences, accordingly consist of sentences equivalent to sentences of the physical protocol language.

5. Less relevant to contemporary concerns in theoretical psychology, is a final variant called epistemological unity-of-science. The use of 'epistemological' merely denotes the dogma's appearance in an early twentieth century theory of knowledge known as logical atomism. Its epistemological position, first expounded by Russell (1918) and the early Wittgenstein (1961), stipulates that the world is a composite of simple, indivisible objects which are mirrored into language. The ultimate simples, or logical atoms, are the points of origin for all knowledge: all complexity is only a configuration of simple epistemological elements.

Pervading the five unity-of-science variants are a number of common themes. These themes are themselves expressions of an intellectual tradition or assumptive framework, extending as far back as classical Greek rationalism, which has never been systematically articulated as such. This tradition assigns psychology to the investigative mode of natural science, an assignation which became explicit exactly one hundred years ago when Wundt founded his laboratory in Leipzig. This event is clearly in the lineage from metaphysical materialism and its associated epistemology, empiricism.

Lerner (1976) summarizes the "basic characteristics" of the unity-of-science position by saying it was a natural science viewpoint, a reductionist viewpoint, a continuity viewpoint, a mechanistic viewpoint, a quantitative viewpoint, and an additive viewpoint. These are the common themes uniting the variants of unity-of-science, each of the themes and each of the variants being implicitly submerged in a traditional metaphysical and epistemological Weltanschauung. The

explication of this world-view cannot be undertaken here; its analysis and critique have already been attempted by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The principal concern at present is to dissemble the nodal unity-of-science dogma, rooted in this tradition, which operates as the guiding theoretical presupposition of scientific psychology.

Lerner's "basic characteristics" are relatively self-explanatory. I take one of them to be foundational for the others: if the reductionist component is acceptable then the others are derivable. For one thing, psychology began as a reductionist enterprise when structuralism undertook to reduce the contents of consciousness to its simplest elements and to reduce the methods of psychology to those of natural science (Schultz, 1969). More significantly, reductionism is the logical support and fulcrum for the unity-of-science framework: without it the doctrines of continuity, mechanism, and additivity would collapse. Without an "ultimately real element or unit" of analysis to which everything else reduces, the continuity-mechanistic-additive outlook would lack a methodological and ontological basis, thereby allowing the complete unity-of-science position to crumble. Hence, a critique of reductionism provides a kind of prolegomenon to the synthesis of an alternative paradigm for psychology. The critique of reductionism will complete itself with some general comments about unity-of-science as an inferior heuristic dogma for psychological theory.

Reductionism

The reductionist hypothesis is not an abstract esoteric doctrine for the entertainment of armchair philosophers of science. Such a conception is drastically at odds with theoretical and pragmatic

realities. Reductionism is one of the most profound, but unacknowledged, postulates of contemporary psychological theory and research. To rigorously criticize it is anything but flailing at a strawman, and therefore any attempt at post-traditional theorizing cannot by-pass it. Anderson (1972), for example, claims that "the reductionist hypothesis may still be a topic for controversy among philosophers, but among the great majority of active scientists I think it is accepted without question" (p.393). Nagel (1961) agrees, pointing out that the "phenomenon of a relatively autonomous theory becoming absorbed by, or reduced to, some other more inclusive theory is an undeniable and recurrent feature in the history of modern science. There is every reason to suppose that such reduction will continue to take place in the future" (pp. 336-337). Hempel (1966) argues that the dominant fixture in modern psychology is essentially reductionist:

> Behaviorism...in all its different forms, has a basically reductionist orientation; in a more or less strict sense, it seeks to reduce discourse about psychological phenomena to discourse about behavioral phenomena. One form of behaviorism, which is especially concerned to ensure the objective public testability of psychological hypotheses and theories, insists that all psychological terms must have clearly specified criteria of application couched in behavioral terms, and that psychological hypotheses have test applications concerning publicly observable behavior. (p. 108)

It can be argued that all forms of contemporary psychological inquiry---with the exception of the transpersonal and existential psychologies---are reductionist. Cognitive psychology and

psychoanalytic theory are two prominent examples. The first reduces cognition to the mechanistic organization of 'information bits', while the second reduces consciousness to biology.

Consonant with the five variants of unity-of-science, an analysis and critique of reductionism must distinguish its different meanings. The are usually suffused, rendering critical effort relatively impotent. There appears to be a consensus among theoreticians that reductionism is either nomological or semantic. Oppenheim and Putnam's important theoretical paper (1958), for instance, argues for a unity-of-science position be positing a (1) Unity of Language, in which "all the terms of science are reduced to terms of some one discipline" and (2) Unity of Laws, in which the laws of science "become reduced to the laws of some one discipline" (pp.3-4). Pap (1962) discusses reductionism in terms of "primitive concepts" and "laws"; Hempel, in the passage quoted above, refers to reduction of "discourse"; Nagel (1960, 1961) flatly states that "the reduction of one science to another is not possible unless the various expressions occuring in the laws of the former also appear in the premises of the latter" (p.304); Carnap (1938) argues exclusively for semantic reductionism.

Nomological and semantic reductionism are generally isolated as the fundamental variants of unity-of-science. The actual history of science does not support this conclusion,however. Psychology, as the case in point, is historically grounded in methodological and ontological reductionism. This being so, the argument shall take two forms, one against the official position in philosophy of science and one against the actual position in psychology.

1. Oppenheim and Putnam perhaps provide the most exemplary argument for the semantic and nomological hypothesis, and it shall form the basis for critique. Their principal argument is as follows: Given two theories, T_1 and T_2, T_2 is reduced to T_1 if and only if:

(1) The vocabulary of T_2 contains terms not in the vocabulary of T_1.

(2) All observational data explainable by T_2 are explainable by T_1.

(3) T_1 is at least as well systematized as T_2. And moreover, a branch of science B_2 is reduced to another branch of science B_1 as follows:

(1) Take the accepted theories of B_2 at a given time (t) as T_2, then

(2) B_2 is reduced to B_1 at time (t) if and only if

(3) There is some theory T_1 in B_1 at time (t) such that T_1 reduces T_2.

The reduction of B_2 to B_1 is called a micro-reduction. At this point, unity-of-science is adopted as a "working hypothesis", attainable through "cumulative micro-reduction", apparantly on the basis of the preceding statements. The question of what to make of these statements is vexing, however. Plainly, they do not constitute an argument; if anything, they form a rigorous definition of the word 'reduce', hinging on the notion of explainability. What needs to be established, apart from an explanation of 'explainability', is whether or not there are, for any two theories T_1 and T_2, observational data in T_2 explainable by T_1. This is precisely the issue, and it awaits establishment by argument. Examples, such as those given later in the paper, are not arguments.

It must be asked, first, what is meant by 'explain'. An earlier paper by Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956) stipulates that T can explain a part of observational data, O, if there are two "non-overlapping parts," O_1 and O_2, such that $T\&O_1$ implies O_2. An associated theorem then says that T_2 is reducible to T_1 if and only if

(1) the Vocabulary of T_2 contains terms not in Voc (T_1).

(2) Every observational statement implied by T_2 is also implied by T_1.

(3) T_1 is at least as well systematized as T_2.

The move from explanation to implication is dubious, raising more questions than it answers. The implicative criterion is, in fact, empty if the normal philosophical usage of logical implication is intended here, since $Q\rightarrow(P\rightarrow Q)$ is a formal tautology: any observational statement, Q (O_2) is implied by any theory-statement P (T_1, T_2), so that O_2 is implied by any T_1 or T_2. Additionally, if T_2 implies O_1, then whenever O_1 there is a T_1 which also implies O_1, that is, $(P\rightarrow Q)\rightarrow (Q\rightarrow(R\rightarrow Q))$ is a tautology.

If the implication of O_2 by both T_2 and T_1 is not meant to be a strictly logical implication, what is it? Is it to be suggested by T_1? Entailed by T_1 in some non-formal sense? But these terms merely beg the question. Perhaps explained is a more felicitous term after all. Assuming this to be the case, one can use Biology(T_2) and Physics (T_1) as terms of analysis, since they clearly meet requirements (1) and (3). Now let O_2 be the proposition "X is perceiving'. This is "explained" by T_2, a set of statements comprising Biology. If T_2 is reducible to T_1, then Physics can "explain" 'X is perceiving'. Can it do so?

Again, this is precisely the issue. It is clearly relevant to observe that this is the issue only for a theoretician: no contemporary physicist would attempt to explain perception using the vocabulary of mechanics, field theory, particle theory and so forth. Still, how can the reductionist give a sense to 'explain' such that physics could be said to unarguably explain 'X is perceiving' as can the appropriate branch of Biology? This now becomes an issue of language use, and the normal usage of 'explain' dictates that if there is one set of concepts incapable of explaining perception it is that of physics.

The same difficulty presents itself for other forms of nomological and semantic reductionism. They either beg the question of reductionism or they distort the meaning of otherwise unproblematic terminology. Hence Nagel (1960) does not advance any argument when he stipulates that one science is reducible to another if an expression in the secondary science is "logically related, either by synonymity or entailment" to some expression in the premises of the primary science. He merely stipulates what would count as a reduction. The only example he gives is the reduction of thermodynamics to classical mechanics, which really amounts to the operational re-definition of terms like 'temperature' and 'entropy'.

The overall attempt to reduce either the vocabulary or laws of psychology to those of a more fundamental science like physics is doomed to failure for reasons quite independent of the invalidity of particular arguments. Even granting that any argument similar to the one propounded by Oppenheim and Putnam is sound, there would still be considerable difficulties in applying the laws or language of the primary science to phenomena within our normal range of experience. How,

after all, would the phenomena of consciousness be formulable in terms of such concepts as Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, or Bohr's Law of Complementarity? Even more discouraging would be the attempt to describe consciousness with such concepts as charm, spin, time reversal, dimensionless particles, anti-matter, quarks and black holes. One of the greatest achievements of the latter half of the twentieth century in physics, the discovery that parity of left and right is not always conserved (Gardner, 1969), has no functional or theoretical application to the analysis or description of consciousness. Quite simply, the laws and language of the micro-world are discontinuous with those of the macro-world.

2. Most practicing psychologists are unconsciously guided in their work by methodological unity-of-science. The majority have perhaps never read philosophy of science, or thought extensively about nomological or semantic reductionism. Rather, they uncritically accept the dictum that the only reliable knowledge is <u>scientific</u> knowledge, and science is, above all, a method. Again, the method is essentially the method which produced monumental advances in the <u>natural</u> sciences. Its central components include such notions as empirical observation, statistical generalization, experimental control, predictive capacity, public replication, hypothesis testing, and so forth. Psychology, from its inception, has proceeded (by and large) on a methodologically reduced basis: insofar as it seeks to be scientific it must emulate the methods of physics and chemistry.

Any application of methodological reductionism to psychology, however, is superannuated if psychology continues to regulate itself

by the classical methods of the physical and chemical sciences. The very methods psychology is still struggling to adopt have already been rejected as effete by physics (Brown, 1974). If psychology were to pursue the methods of modern physics it would become highly speculative, quite mystical, and totally at odds with the common world view. This is particularly true of sub-atomic physics, which reads more like poetry than science. The paradigm so cherished by behavioral science has broken down, and it has done so of its own accord; psychology is accordingly modelling itself on a Newtonian methodology already rejected by the science psychology methodologically imitates. For example, the ideal of objective observation is obsolete in sub-atomic physics. For one thing, the act of observation changes the object of investigation. For another, most sub-atomic phenomena (e.g. dimensionless energy points) are in principle unobservable, unreplicable, and unpredictable.

Suppose, however, that the methods of physics had remained intact, and that they had been refined to the point where predictability and control of nature had become totally realized. How much of the universe is thereby explained, and what is the net result for understanding? Surely it would be negligible, for the methodological ideal dictates that science divest itself of all subjectivity, limiting itself to the manipulation of operationally defined phenomena. Carried to its extreme, methodological reductionism could not comprehensively describe what it manipulates, because description occurs within an interpretive framework. In studying gravity, for example, a mechanistic physicist is forced to resist any talk of gravity as a "force" or "attractive tension between entities" since such talk exceeds methodological limits; gravity or

force cannot be observed: only an ensemble of effects can be observed. A fully objective operational description of gravity (consistent with methodological ideals) would then be something like: phenomenon A interacts with phenomenon B, with effect C, under circumstances D, with frequency X. In order to remain faithful to methodological reductionism, psychology would be in the same position. Under similar methodological restraints, its protocol observations would be of the form: occurrence A correlates with state of affairs B, in organism C, under circumstances D, with frequency X. It could understand or explain no more than this. It could not even define or describe the constants A,B,C,D, and X without instigating a vicious circle or infinite regress of operational definitions.

Methodological reductionism, consistently employed, removes the knower from a context of language, values, interests, affect mythology, and culture into the disinterested, objective, context-free realm of the theoros, to the point that the knower is fully impotent to say anything or believe anything. That is, it requires, qua scientist, that the knower divest himself of subjectivity and humanity. But then, of course, he would no longer exist as the kind of being which could pursue science.

3. The modern mind, in some important respects, is Greek in its metaphysical outlook. One of the major mythic conceptions of Greek metaphysics, the metaphor of indivisible cosmic elements, remains intact in modern thinking in all but a few minds. In psychology, the metaphysical metaphor of atomism persists in ontological reductionism, which holds that psychological processes and structures are

decomposable into ultimately real units or bits. Only these elements are real; everything else is epiphenomenal.

The central image of atomism is pretty well the same today as it was when Leucippus and Democritus contrived it almost two and a half millenia ago: reality is the totality of configurations of simple, indivisible units (atoms) aligned in space (the void). The atoms---simple, material, and indestructible---are the building blocks of everything, and reality therefore has only a quantitative aspect. Even sensation is explained in atomic terms. Ontological reductionism, in its two psychological forms, is submerged in this unconscious metaphor. In one form, mental processes reduce to physical processes; mental processes are nothing but the molecular processes described by physics and chemistry. The second (more pervasive) form presupposes that all psychological processes ultimately reduce to some discrete element which qualitatively, additively, and mechanically combines with ontologically similar elements to produce behavior, knowledge, sensation, and so forth. Locke began modern associationist psychology with this image: the mind is a series of connections and associations of simple ideas given in experience. Behaviorists posit an ultimate unit in the stimulus; cognitivists require the information bit or sense datum.

The best refutation of atomic models is contemporary atomic theory itself. Writing in 1960 Whyte describes mainstream physics as "A movement, evident from about 1700 onwards, away from Democritean-Newtonian dualism of occupied and empty space towards a monism of structural relations, still awaiting definitive formulation" (p.86). Capra (1975) has clearly outlined the recent decline of corpuscular

thinking in atomic physics, as well as its replacement with a field-theoretical position which, in effect, denies individuality and independence to atoms. Bohm (1975) goes even further, arguing that localized elementary particles do not exist. Recent thinking along these lines is adequately summarized by Beynam (1978).

It will be crucial to the development of my position that the methodological and ontological versions of reductionism be abandoned. The position demands that the reduction of one level of thinking to a lower level and the reduction of one level of essence (or properties) to a lower level be precluded from the outset. These two species of reductionism are incommensurate with the hierarchic theory to be constructed. With this in mind, the critique of reductionism can continue along broader lines.

Further remarks concerning reductionism

Clearly, some properties are reducible to other properties; a pound, for example, is, in some sense, reducible to sixteen ounces. Some criterion must be formulated, then, which permits legitimate reductions---which turn out to be trivial---but prohibits illegitimate reductions. The unwarranted reductions will turn out to be the putative reductions from one methodological level to a "lower" one and from one ontological level, or property-level, to a "lower" one. The notion of 'level' is central here, and must be preserved. At this point, however, the analysis of 'level' is undertaken only for the purpose of conceptualizing a criterion for reducibility; there is much more to be said about methodological and property levels, to the point that an entire subsequent section will be reserved for such a discussion.

What meaning can be given to 'level' such that the question of reductionism is not merely begged? If we say, for example, that a level is defined as complexity of organization, then the reductionist hypothesis is not affected, since whatever is organized may be nothing but properties at a "lower" level. And what meaning can be given such that an anti-reductionist position is not already presupposed? If we define a level by reference to novel or emergent properties, then the reductionist hypothesis is not undermined but simply ignored. Let us say, then, that a property level is a function of discourse or language. An area of discourse has appropriate reference to an area of properties; if a number of broad discourse regions are assembled it will be found that some of them require no reference to some others, that is, some of them are able to function without recourse to the vocabulary of others. As a case in point, the properties of atoms are discussed in the language of nuclear physics and the properties of living cells are discussed in the language of cytology. On the other hand, the language of cytology requires some of the language of nuclear physics. So the properties described by each of these languages can be said to occupy different levels, because the languages themselves are at different levels. The principle for distinguishing levels is: Property X is at a lower ontological level than property Y only if the language X_1 requires none of the vocabulary of language Y_1 and if language Y_1 requires some of the vocabulary of X_1. According to this principle, atomic behavior is at a lower level than cell behavior, cell behavior is at a lower level than mental behavior, and so forth.

Now that a criterion for stipulating property levels has been

laid down, a few additional aspects of level differentiation can be discerned. First, any property satisfying the criterion for level designation is temporally and logically prior to the properties at the level above it. Atoms temporally precede cells, and are logically presupposed by them. The converse is not true. And second, Level Y is always dependent on the prior existence of level X for its existence. These are additional identifying factors for a property level, and some of their ramified implications will be pursued later.

With the preceding definition for levels of property in mind, it can not be asked whether one level, at any point on the scale, can be reduced to the lowest level on the scale (the point of atoms and molecules). That is, are properties at levels $x^i...x^n$ nothing but complexifications of properties at level x.

A viable principle for stipulating the reducibility of one property level to another is as follows: level Y is reducible to level X only if the properties of level Y can be predicted solely from the properties of level X. This principle asks only that reducibility be made reversible; if it is not reversible there is no reason to suppose it is possible. This is not similar to the constructivist demand that level Y is reducible to level X only if it can be constructed solely from the properties of level X. The structural properties of a house are not predictable from the structural properties of a pile of bricks, because the house has architectural and organizational properties not found solely in the architectural and organizational properties of its elements, but it can certainly be constructed from them. It can be taken apart and put back together. Only in this sense is a house "reducible" to a collection of bricks; according to the predictability

criterion it is not. Similarly, the property of 'life is not predictable from the properties of atoms and molecules, although it is conceivable that life properties can be constructed from atomic and molecular elements. The properties of level X may be deduced from those of level Y, but the converse inference is impossible.

It can now be seen, by way of example, what important consequences follow when the criterion of reducibility is violated. A simple example from geometry generates such consequences (Frankl, 1969). Imagine two different cases where three dimensional objects are projectd onto a two dimensional plane. Consider this also as a reduction from one level (N) to another (N-1). In the first case it is a cylinder projected onto a horizontal and vertical plane:

Insert Figure One about here

In the second case, there are three objects projected onto the same horizontal plane:

Insert Figure Two about here

It is already required that (1) the description of properties at level N-1 requires none of the vocabulary of level N, but level N requires some of the vocabulary of N-1, and (2) the properties of level N are not predictable from level N-1. Both these requirements are met, and so they are indeed two different levels. Now, using the first



Figure One



Figure Two

example, given that level N is reduced to level N-1, it follows that the attempted reduction results in a contradiction. Plane geometry does not allow the simultaneous existence within a single boundary of an elipse and a rectangle. They are geometrically inconsistent in two dimensions, as when they are different in area. In the second example, the attempted reduction from three to two dimensions results in ambiguity. The figures in N-1 can be projected in three ways (or more) onto the next highest level, but how they are to be so projected is an open-ended question. Without the admission of properties at a higher level the properties of the lower level remain undetermined. Only the higher level can define them and dissolve their ambiguity.

The most general consequence attendant upon unwarranted reduction is this: Whenever level N is reduced to level N-1, the essential properties of level N are either OBSCURED or LOST. So in addition to creating contradiction and ambiguity at level N-1, property reduction annihilates the unique properties of level N.

Medawar (1974) also uses geometry to demonstrate the undesirable consequences of reductionism, and suggests but does not iterate another insurmountable difficulty entailed by it. In dealing with topology, projective geometry, affine geometry, and Euclidean geometry, it can be seen that each geometry fits some level by virtue of the principles of vocabulary and predictability. Here, and N-dimensional geometry, reduced to an(N-1)-dimensional geometry, produces paradoxes. For example, the shortest distance between two points in a three-dimensional space is a curve; on a two dimensional plane it becomes a straight line. To describe the three-dimensional phenomenon with reference to two-

dimensional properties, which is what the reduction necessitates, now becomes impossible; not only are the N-properties lost, but now (in reduction) they become incoherent. As a contemporary example of this, Chomsky (1959) has analyzed the incoherence to which Skinner is allegedly subject when he reduced "language" to "behavior".

The consequences of illegitimate reduction can now function as informal indices of unwarranted attempts to decompose properties into a lower ontological level. A reductive attempt can be said to be unwarranted insofar as it yields (i) ambiguity, (ii) contradiction, (iii) property annihilation, (iv) incoherence. These indicies, together with the formal criteria of predictability and semantic level distinction provide the grounds for rejecting any attempt to reduce psychology to physics and chemistry, either methodologically or ontologically.

Behaviorism, for example, enables no understanding of the "variable" which intervenes between a stimulus and a response in, say a moral situation, and this "variable", the person, is precisely what a science of human nature wants and needs to comprehend. An operationally-bound behaviorism does not even permit the formulation of what a moral situation would be: there is only reactive behavior to a regulating environment. What the interior structure of the behaving organism must be such that it can "respond" the way it does, with the meanings and intentions it has, is an inconceivable question for both behaviorism and experimental learning theory. It is inconceivable because, for behaviorism, an interior moral "space" cannot be observed, controlled, or quantified; instead it is reduced to a

manipulable level cherished by methodological and ontological unity-of-science, and in the reduction the moral agent loses properties, becomes ambiguous, cannot be described coherently and, possibly, becomes contradictory when projected into different environments.

There are, in addition to the moral sphere, other spheres of which we have direct, subjective awareness. The immediate experience of these spheres (cognitive, affective, erotic, political, etc.) convinces us they are centrally connected to our human nature, and when reductionists stop being reductionists, in spite of themselves, they seriously inhabit these spheres like almost everyone else. From the standpoint of reductionism, however, they don't exist except as confounding interventions between the environment and measurable behavior. Reductionism must, on that account, be abjured as a possible framework for providing an explicatum of human nature.

The intention for this thesis is to develop a unifying paradigm for a science of human nature having implications for clinical practise. This paradigm, to be constructed from a standpoint called ontoanthropology, incorporates two working assumptions about human nature. First, following Scheler (1961), it is assumed that human reality is singularly unique, differing not only in degree but also in kind from all other realities. Second, it is assumed that the essence of human nature is historically conditioned, i.e., that it develops. These two views are coordinated in the contention that human essence is continuous with its evolution: structure is developmental. Accordingly, ontoanthropology commences from the dual framework of developmental

theory and personality theory. The ontoanthropological requirements for an adequate developmental and personality theory are irreconcilable with the unity-of-science philosophy.

Personality theory: requirements

It is to be expected that the general requirements for an adequate theory of personality will overlap, to a certain extent, the criteria for adequacy in developmental theory since the two fields are being viewed here as indissociable. The most extensive coincidence of requirement is that which demands that a theory of personality account for essential factors in the person, as opposed to accidental or contingent features of the human dimensions. Moreover, it must take into account all those factors which are constitutive of the human being.

An initial terminological distinction will provide some leverage for deciding what those factors would be. There is a generally accepted difference between the structure of something and the various modes in which it comports or manifests itself. For example, a melody is an invariant musical structure expressible in many ways: it can be whistled, hummed played on a piano or violin; it can be written on a musical score or transposed into mathematical equations obeying systematic laws of physical harmonics; it can be played quickly or slowly, passionately or lethargically; and so forth. Yet through all these variations in expression and manifestation it remains structurally the same; its essence, the structure, is invariant, but its contingencies and accidents, the expression, are variable. A logically similar distinction needs to be made between the structure of persons and the

endless variety of expressions possible for that structure, and this distinction is that which opposes the person to his or her personality.

There are many variables, factors and elements of a person which, though necessary to the existence of persons, do not make persons distinctly human. That is, they may be present in persons and in other organisms as well, and thus do not constitute the essence of persons. For example, humans have a perceptual system, as do other organisms, without which they could not be persons; but having a perceptual system is not itself to ensure that they will be persons, otherwise all percipient creatures would be human. The essential elements of persons, then, are those elements which guarantee the existence of distinctly human beings. Another way to say this is that the essence of a person is the sum of sufficient conditions for being a person. In the case just mentioned, the presence of a perceptual system would not guarantee the existence of a person, since there are many cases of perception in non-human organisms. On the other hand, the presence of a perceptual system is a necessary condition for the existence of a person, since without it the person would not exist. The logical formulation of these two important concepts is a follows:

(1) p is a necessary condition for q whenever q implies p.

(2) p is a sufficient condition for q whenever p implies q.

In other words, p is necessary for q on the condition that if p does not obtain then q does not obtain, and if p is sufficient for q then whenever p obtains, q must obtain.

The second general requirement to be imposed on a personality theory, in addition to the one entailed in the essence-accident

distinction, is that it describe both the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person.

The final general requirement is double-edged. It stipulates that an adequate description of the person will allow for the dual observation that a person is continuous through time and unified in various dimensions. That is, the person is at any one moment an identity of divergent functions---at least logically distinguishable--- and a continuity of temporally disparate sequences. These sequences or stages may or may not be continuous with preceding and subsequent sequences, but they are clearly undergone by a person which subsists continuously. The third requirement says, then, that any adequate theory of the person must both accommodate and explain the persistence of the same person through development.

Developmental theory: requirements

The paradigm for developmental psychology, as Charlotte Bühler (1973) has pointed out, is the longitudinal study of sequences undergone by an organism in time. This view of development specifies the changes in the organism as it passes from one state to another. Implicit in this view is the assumption that if the organism exhibits no qualitative transformation it is not developing; if it is not developing it is merely an enduring, homeostatic system or state.

It might be argued that no state of affairs is exempt from qualitative alteration, and thus all entities and their qualities are subjects for developmental inquiry. In a trivial sense this is true: rocks and stars constantly emit radiation, making it possible to carbon-date them. Similarly, human organisms are said to replace their

ectodermal tissue every seven years. Yet in these two cases we would not wish to say that such phenomena are fitting subjects for developmental investigation, at least from the standpoint of a developmental psychology of the person. Correspondingly, there are conceivable contexts in which we wish to say that rocks, stars, and persons are not developing, even though they may be trivially changing. So a criterion is required which allows us to isolate and describe those alterations in an entity which are somehow essential to its constitutional nature, and the way its nature either evolves or remains arrested.

The requirement for a criterion which enables developmental inquiry to distinguish between essential and trivial change is satisfied, in psychology, in the demand that developmental psychology restrict its investigations to those domains which are distinctly human. It must describe the evolution of those human properties which, so far as we can detect, are not shared by other entities. This requirement merely ensures that we have a psychology of persons. Development in other domains (biological, chemical, etc.) may be a condition or presupposition for human development, but it does not provide sufficient explanation within a developmental psychology of persons.

Restricting interest to the essentially human dimensions obviates one kind of triviality, but even within the distinctly human dimensions there can be inconsequential inquiry. For example, language is essentially human, but a developmental study of phonemic organization would not reveal its character. Consequently, the requirement stated

above should be refined by adding the provision that only those sequences and developments within a distinctly human dimension are to be described when, if they were not present, the dimension would thereby cease to be distinctly human.

The first general requirement for a developmental theory demands that we know what is developing, as well as its progressive sequences. It is not enough, however, to know only that the person evolves through stages within specified dimensions. The demands of a comprehensive ontoanthropology are not met unless it is known why changes occur. The second general requirement demands that the dynamics and operative laws of ordered change in the human being be made known.

Finally, a third requirement stipulates that relations between various points on a developmental scale be understood. For a developmental psychology of persons, this means specifying the criteria for knowing that developmental sequences are changes in the same person. How are "stages" related such that they simultaneously reflect modifications and continuity of the person. To answer this question, one must first clarify the character of an independent "stage" or "level" of development.

With the proviso that developmental psychology is concerned only with the evolution of a person, the three-fold requirement placed on it basically accords with Werner's view that it has two basic aims: "One is to grasp the characteristic pattern of each genetic level, the structure peculiar to it. The other, and no less important one, is to establish the genetic relationship between these levels, the direction of development, and the formulation of any general tendency

revealed in developmental relationship and direction" (Werner, 1957, p.5). Developmental inquiry is thus not only the evolutionary history of entities (descriptive) but equally a theory of evolution(theoretical).

The requirements enunciated in the two preceding sections clearly preclude the unity-of-science position from playing a theoretical role in the construction of an ontoanthropology. Obviously, an investigation seeking the "distinctly human" structures, properties, and processes must remain militantly anti-reductionist. On these grounds alone, unity-of-science can in no way be accommodated.

The developmental and personality models to be developed each require the other for comprehension. The full effect of the ensuing chapters will hopefully be the realization that what a person is, is the way it comes to be. At this point it is enough to realize that the requirements for adequacy pertaining to each model interlock in the critical notions of 'distinctly human' and 'person'.

Coda

The evolutionary model to be generated here has theoretical status; it has been given the title of Emergent Hierarchicalism in order to underscore this point. Consistent with the organismic position it embodies, the model intends to be a unified whole, and for this reason it represents a theory of a certain type.

As theory, Emergent Hierarchicalism is not intended as an empirical hypothesis to be tested, but as a perspectival, interpretive system within which hypotheses can be formulated; it is intended as a tool for organizing thought and experience in a total way. Thus it cannot itself be either true or false; it is an interpretive framework

in which facts either correspond or fail to correspond with each other, but which itself does not correspond with anything. Theory, at this level, is accordingly the framework by virtue of which experiences and facts become systematically coherent. The test of this type of theory is not in terms of its truth or falsity but in terms of its pragmatic efficacy as a unifier and organizer of experience, as an instrument for organizing a world conceptually and acting within it. So theory has, at this level, the function of a hermeneutic scheme, and as such cannot be considered either true or false.

The word 'theory' has a religious etymology. "Theoros" was once the name for the holy representative sent to the public festivals by Greek cities. In theoria, he witnessed the proceedings in the role of impersonal spectator. The notion implicit in this role of the theoretician is at the core of western science and rationalism: it is that the theoretician-philosopher is able to impersonally observe systems of thought from a position of omniscience and choose between them on the basis of their truth or falsity, without himself participating in any of them. The modern pedestrian understanding of "science" still adulates this superstition, but since Nietzsche's critique (and critiques by "radical" philosophers of science like Kuhn) the view collapses into untenability. Only God could perform such a function, and God---the omniscient, absolute knower---is either dead or not talking. All we can do in these circumstances is adopt a relativist, perspectival stance and construct total views, finding "truth" or "knowledge" within them. The image presented in Emergent Hierarchicalism---the metaphor of a person as successive stratifications of emergent properties, systematically

organized---is a theory in the modern, post-philosophical sense.

Summary

1. The doctrine which precludes the development of a distinctly human psychology of personality and development, reductionism, has been rejected. The insufficiency of this doctrine, both in its conceptual foundations and in it practical consequences has been explained.

2. The requirements for a developmental psychology of human personality have been stated.

3. The next chapter will outline a non-reductionist paradigm which permits the statement of a developmental personality theory meeting the stated requirements.

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CHAPTER TWO

ONTOANTHROPOLOGY I:

EMERGENT HIERARCHICALISM

In some ways, the paradigm to be expounded constitutes a further argument against reductionism; in some other ways, it is entailed by reductionism's defeasance; in still other ways the principal theses of emergent hierarchicalism are simply obversions of reductionist points. Above all, the emergent-hierarchic position makes it possible to formulate a personality theory without fearing reductionist critique. In effect, the traditional reductionist psychologies are preempted by a sound hierarchic position.

The point of departure for constructing the paradigm to which the name emergent hierarchicalism is being given resides in the conception that various clinical methods---and the theories supporting them---all have limited validity and applicability, defined with reference to a level of functioning on a hierarchic scale. Hence there is very little inconsistency across all therapeutic approaches, a fact which becomes apparent once their appropriate level of application is discerned. This notion, guided by the metaphor or image of a scala therapeutica, was the initial stimulus for this inquiry. It soon became a scala ontologica with the realization that levels of healing and levels of discourse are aligned with the structure of Being: reality is structurally stratified over time. It was not a long step to another hierarchy, a scala humana, which pictures the person as a developmental hierarchy incorporating the levels of Being within it. For any given level or stratum of human nature there is an aligned therapeutic methodology and ideology; conversely, for each methodology

and ideology there is an appropriate level of application at some level of human reality. Each level is defined with reference to the novel, emergent properties constituting its essential nature. The theoretical position formulable from such concepts as "hierarchy", "level", "emergent", and "nature" is, as one would expect, resolutely anti-reductionist: any effort to epistemologically, methodologically, or ontologically decompose anthropological levels to "lower" or "simpler" levels is to be consistently disavowed.

The concept of natural hierarchies goes all the way back to Aristotle, but a hierarchic anthropological theory has not yet been systematically articulated as such. The closest approximation in general psychology is found in the current work of Dabrowski (1977). Maslow (1962, 1971) suggested but did not elaborate the idea. Hierarchy theory, as a defined disciplinary field, is now predominantly in the hands of mathematicians, philosophers, biologists, systems analysts, and cyberneticians (Pattee, 1973; Weiss, 1971; Whyte et al, 1969). Brody (1973) has applied the theory to medicine in a provisional manner. Its most recent appearance in Wilber (1977) provides some verfication that its fundamental concepts are beginning to infiltrate contemporary thought about the structure of consciousness. Its application to psychotherapy and personality theory is still being awaited.

Emergent hierarchicalism has its intellectual origins in a particular evolutionary theory, in modern theoretical biology. and in general systems theory. Contributions to the paradigm are found in

Morgan's doctrine of emergent evolution (Morgan, 1923], which depicts the universe as a stratified structure whose levels of being have evolved out of previous levels. The process of evolution, he says, has resulted in successive emergences of novel properties, irreducible to previous properties and unpredictable from those properties. In opposing the classical Darwinian view that development is gradual, incremental, uniform, and linear, emergent evolutionism holds that genuinely new properties arise in the course of cosmic development which did not exist in the set of properties from which they emerge. These properties are discontinuous with precursive conditions, and when they abruptly appear for the first time they create new levels which are not decomposable into previous levels. These levels represent emergent properties, structured in a hierarchy, which originally meant "grades of authority or rule", a sense to be retained here.

Emergent evolutionism is a cosmological model which attempts to account for and explain the descriptive fact that the universe is a stratified structure, or series or levels. The model simultaneously interprets (organizes) the cosmos architecturally and dynamically with reference to its structure and development. Emergent evolutionism can be seen as a framework describable as both cosmological and cosmogenic: the order of development in the universe determines its structure. The model is readily applicable to the structure and development of persons; the emergent-hierarchic view of human ontogeny and phylogeny is really a transformation of cosmic principles to the human sphere.

In opposition to the mechanistic-reductionist view that "new"

properties are due to "nothing more" than the operations of physico-chemical laws or the reshuffling of certain fundamental units which themselves remain unchanged, the concept of emergence implies that novelty (and complexity) is an irreducible, cumulative feature of the creative advance of nature and psyche. The novel property at one level, indiscernible in the level beneath it, is called the emergent property. Not all properties are emergent. The combination of eight ounces with eight more ounces results in a pound, but 'pound' does not designate an emergent property. It does not even designate a new level because no new vocabulary is required to describe it. The pound is on the same level as, and irreducible to, its constituent ounces. Morgan calls this a "resultant" property. Resultant properties are generated by the algebraic summation of a series of uni-levelled properties, that is, resultants are functions of quantity.

Emergent properties are generated by the reorganization of precursive properties into a system which possesses novel characteristics not predictable from the precursive properties. For example, a block of salt is a resultant of the addition of many molecules of sodium chloride, but the sodium chloride is an emergent property from the bonding of sodium and chlorine. It is a new molecular system. When the chlorine, having certain properties, combines with sodium, having other properties, there is not just a mixture but a synthesis, some of the properties of which are not those of either component. The chlorine alone is toxic, but non-toxic in union with sodium, for example. The weight of the compound is an additive resultant; the property of salinity is an emergent. Resultants can be terminologically

identified as combinations, while emergents can be identified as syntheses.

Every genuine emergent introduces new levels of novelty into the world. To say that an emergent characteristic is novel means that (1) it is not just a collection or rearrangement of pre-existing elements, even though such a rearrangement may be presupposed by it, (2) it is qualitatively and not quantitatively unique, and (3) it was unpredictable not only on the basis of all knowledge prior to its appearance, but on the basis of ideally complete knowledge prior to its appearance. Now the kind of emergence discussed on so grand a scale as emergent hierarchicalism is of a type quite different than the countless emergents distinguishable within a limited order of events. There are levels of levels, some of which are expansively broad and others of which are negligibly narrow. Care must be taken here in defining 'level' and 'emergent property' so that equivocation does not occur across different contexts. Bunge (1960) has done some relevant conceptual work in delineating nine meanings of 'level' of which some can be incorporated here. He analyses 'level' this way:

1. Degree: levels are grades or intensities of a continuous property, determinable in discrete units. Examples are height, velocity, temperature, and intelligence quotient. N is at a lower level than N+1 when it is quantitatively less than N+1 on some scale of measurement.
2. Degree of Complexity: levels are defined according to the number of parts in a system and the number of relations into which each of these parts is capable of entering. Thus, an electronic calculator is at a higher level than an abacus but at a lower level than a human brain.

3. Analytical depth: level N accounts for fewer general features than level N+1. For example, the predicate calculus is at a higher level than the propositional calculus.

4. Emergent whole: "A level in this sense is a concrete or ideal whole, a self-contained unity---such as a cell or proposition---characterized by qualities of its own and, if complex, by a strong integration of its parts. The lower wholes are the building blocks of the higher order ones...An emergent whole arises from lower-level units and/or gives rise to higher order emergent wholes" (pp. 399-400). Bunge's fourth definition is the one usually employed by biologists and psychologists, as in the typical cell-organelle-organ-organism-society hierarchy.

5. Poistem: A level a defined by the quality resulting from the overlap or interaction of related systems. An example would be the properties generated by the interaction of plant and animal eco-systems.

6. Rank: A level is determined by the status or tier in a natural or artificial chain of command. Institutional administrations and military ranking systems provide examples. This sense of 'level' is close to the original meaning of 'hierarchy' in ecclesiastical usage.

7. Layer: Layers are a "section of reality, characterized by emergent properties" and they are "superposed strata arranged according to the order of emergence in time and/or their logical precedence". A level in this sense represents a stratum of essence. An example is a crystal, which is an emergent from molecules and which gives rise to crystalline aggregates.

8. Rooted layer: rooted layers not only emerge from earlier levels

in a lineal sequence but they also retain all the qualities of the former. Bunge mentions levels of language (syntax, grammar, etc.) as an example.

9. Level: Bunge's preferred sense of 'level' is a "grade of being, ordered in an evolutionary series" or a "section of reality characterized by a set of interlocked properties and laws, some of which are thought to be peculiar to the given domain and to have emerged in time from other (lower or higher) levels existing previously" (p. 405). Examples are those of emergent hierarchicalism, i.e., matter (N), life (N+1), psyche (N+2).

For the purposes of personality theory the fourth and last three definitions most need to be considered. The usual definition, number four, is explicitly restricted because it badly misconstrues the anthropological hierarchy, leading to damaging conceptual confusions. For one thing, it cannot account for the emergence of such ontological properties as mentality and personality (Cf. Oppenheim and Putnam's hierarchy, op. cit. Persons do not appear in it). For another, it usually confuses a level of Being with a level's environment (Cf. Brody, 1973, who places culture at a higher level than persons, whereas persons presuppose culture.) Using Bunge's suggestions, we may define two senses of 'level', giving each a different name:

1. A stratum (N) is an emergent grade of Being whose essential properties are ontologically unique.
2. A level (n) is a rooted layer within a stratum.

Further, a quality is emergent in any (N) or (n) when, as a result of a developmental process, it arises as a novel property from

the precursive conditions which logically and temporally precede it. These definitions abjure any reference to the "building block" sense of stratum so favored by biologists; curiously, this is so because that sense (Bunge's fourth definition) is most prone to reductionist arguments, the very thing it was designed to refute.

Strata

Morgan lists four successive strata of emergence: psycho-physical events, life, mind, and spirit. Oppenheim and Putnam list six:elementary particles, atoms, molecules, cells, multicellular organisms, and social groups. Brody has seventeen, Weiss seven, and so forth. Here the following strata are proposed:

N_1. The Alpha-sphere of undifferentiated, mass-less energy; the primal stuff; the Milesian arché.

N_2. Corpuscular energies; dimensionalities; velocity; mass.

N_3. Phenomenality in conventional space-time; extension; duration; color; sound; tactility, etc.

N_4. Vitality.

N_5. Mentality (Consciousness^1).

N_6. Subjectivity (Consciousness^2).

N_7. Spirituality.

N_8. Omega-sphere; Agapic Divinity.

Such a scheme reflects the stratified structure of the natural and human universe. (To anticipate, persons are instantiations of the strata up to and including N_7). The strata in it are the most comprehensive stages in the great spectrum of Being. They also reflect the general ontological fact of discontinuity in the cosmic order. Within

each stratum are countless emergent properties, related to each other on a common ground in the ontological order of things, but between each stratum is an essential breach or gap which perhaps cannot be understood. Certainly the transformations occuring at the interface of strata are quite arcane, not to mention the process of emergence itself; it is a zone of complete mystery to anyone but a reductionist, who simply denies its existence. The move from stratum to stratum is a true quantum leap. How the first dimension, the first phenomenon, the first life, the first mind, or the first subject emerged is a staggering conundrum. Popper (1974), as an example, regards "the problem of emergence of consciousness in animals as...most likely insoluble; and I feel similarly about the further problem of the emergence of the specifically human consciousness of self" (p. 273). Goldstein (1973), somewhat less pessimistically, asserts that "students of development squarely face the problem of translation of properties from one level of order to the next because it happens repeatedly in each new generation. In order to understand development we have to understand the rules of translation from lower to higher level" (p. 35). Pattee (op. cit.) suggests that more understanding of instabilities and catastrophes may prove useful in approaching these questions.

Levels

By far, the notion of levels will play a more central role in emergent hierarchicalism, as will the philosophically more difficult notion of strata. Levels are more easily understood and are more accessible to empirical investigation, and the phenomenon of emergence is explicable in terms of levels.

Levels are rooted layers within an ontological stratum. Modifying

Bunge, levels are successive tiers of emergent properties confined to a bounded stratum of Being. A few examples of levels and emergence will evince a sense of their nature.

1. Within stratum (4) the transformation from polypeptide chains to enzymes begins with a single polypeptide strand of amino acid linked to amino acid at junction points. This structure is the inherited structure, logically similar to a fish line joined every few feet. The chain becomes a native protein simply by folding around itself, much as the fish line may become tangled and overlap itself at various points. Although no material has been added or subtracted, the polypeptide chain has become a protein simply through a process of rearrangement. When a suitable folding occurs, such that the contact points of the folded chain (like the overlapping loops of the fish line) are in optimum configuration, a new property emerges. i.e.. an enzymatically active site which was not there before. The polypeptide is level n; the enzyme is level n+1.

2. Eighteenth century geometricians knew the algebraic sum of realizable entities in a many-sided figure (polytope) must satisfy an equation known as Euler's Law. However, if two-dimensional polygons are joined at all their edges, forming a three-dimensional dodecahedron, the resulting entity no longer satisfies the equation. The law can be restored by introducing n+1, a new level, a new dimension, and an emergent entity. "Dimension n+1 emerges from the operation of combining entities of n-dimension. Therefore the concepts of emergence and level are fundamental in the geometry of aggregating regular polygons" (Williams, 1969). Medawar (1974) has advanced a

similar argument for a hierarchy of geometries.

3. In three lectures on the evolution and dissolution of the nervous system, Hughlings Jackson claimed, in 1884, that the nervous system is a hierarchy of evolutionary levels (Taylor, 1932]. Higher levels are the youngest, the most complex, in control of the lower levels, and the least automatic. The contemporary neurologist Maclean (1973] extends this conception with his three-levelled brain hierarchy, comprised by the reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian brains: "In the popular language of today, these three brains might be thought of as biological computers,each with its own peculiar form of subjectivity and its own sense of time and space and its own memory" forming a "hierarchic organization of the three basic brain types" (p.9].

4. Within the stratum of subjective consciousness, the act of speaking itself is a process at five levels: voice, words, sentences, style, and composition, subject to the rules of phonetics, lexicography, grammar, stylistics, a literary criticism. Each of these levels is irreducible to the one below it, and the unique properties of each level are emergents from the one below it.

5. Russell's Paradox is generated as follows: Let 'R' = 'the class of all classes which are not members of themselves', for example, the class of table, which is not itself a table, such that (1] (x](x∈R↔x∉x], and, by substitution, (2) (R](R∈R↔R∉R], that is, for any R, class R is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself, which is a paradox of the purest form. Russell putatively solved this paradox by introducing the Theory of Types, which essentially establishes levels of language and abstraction, such that there is a discontinuity

between the defining properties of a class and the existential properties of its members. Bateson et al (1956) transformed and generalized Russell's theory into a comprehensive communications model which stipulates orders or levels of communicative interaction, and when levels are not acknowledged paradoxical binds result. For example, a typical n-levelled message might be (n) "Be spontaneous"; (n+1) "You cannot be spontaneous, because I am giving you a command, and spontaneity ex definitio cannot be commanded"; (n+2) "Do not comment on this paradox"; (n+3) "Do not leave the context". Levels of language (Cf. Watzlawick et al, 1967) are not, strictly speaking, levels of emergence, but the example demonstrates the irreducibility of, e.g., n+1 to n.

With a partial sense of 'level' in hand, the first question to be asked is "What is the relation between levels (n, n+1) and what is the relation between strata (N, N+1)?". One sees first that the higher numbered N(n) is an emergent from the lower numbered one below it. Wavicles (N_1) leap forth from the primal field (N); they transform into atomic energy systems (N_2); phenomenal properties like color (N_3) emerge from these otherwise colorless systems; then out of phenomenality and solid structure springs life (N_4) and so forth. Similarly, the native protein (n_1) emerges out of the polypeptide (n) and into the enzyme (n_2). The simplest relation between these N's(n's), then, is one of conditioner and conditioned: N(n) is a necessary condition for the emergence of N+1(n+1). Concurrently, N(n) is conditioned by N-1(n-1). Without N(n), N+1(n+1) could not come to be or emerge; without N-1(n-1),

N(n) would lack a set of conditions in which to function. N-1(n-1) will therefore be defined as the Environing Condition (E^c) for N(n). This can be further clarified. Matter is the matrix of vitality; living entities have a material base as a presupposition, demonstrable by the fact that if the material base is seriously disturbed or dispersed, so are vital functions. And matter temporally preceded life in cosmic evolution, Matter is a necessary condition for life. At the same time. it is a limit of life; the properties of life are bounded by the stratum from which it emerges. Matter is an environing condition for vital properties and functions. The same thinking applies to levels.

Above the stratum of life is that of mind. When mind subsumes life, then life is also bounded or limited, but this time by the stratum above it. Clearly, mind is capable of controlling vital functions for its own purposes, as when organisms utilize fecal excretion for staking out territorial boundaries in a quasi-symbolic way, or when the mind controls vital functions through hypnosis. Here, the stratum of mind is a boundary condition for vitality, and is also an E^c for it. Other entities at the same stratum or level of any particular entity also form part of that entity's environment, perhaps the most important part. Drawing from field theory in physics, it may even be tentatively suggested that each stratum is a "whole" and the entities in it are merely localizations or excitations of the field. Thus an "atom" is the way in which a "field" articulates itself at some given moment. A material "thing" is a localization of material field, and an organism is a particularization of a life-field. In any case, each entity is environed by the totality of other ontologically similar entities.

Life is environed by the biosphere at its own stratum; mind is environed by the noosphere, to borrow from Chardin; and subjectivity is environed by the anthrosphere. These environments will henceforth be referred to as the Environing Milieu (E^m).

Each emergent N(n) introduces news laws which govern the functioning of its properties. The laws governing biological systems do not operate at the level of molecular systems. At the same time, emergent laws and properties do not ablate those of the lower N(n); these remain intact. So a law or property of N(n) does not displace the laws and properties of N-1(n-1); it merely absorbs them as the conditions under which it functions. This makes the functioning of N(n) liable to failure at N-1(n-1). So, for example, if speech is lexicographically disordered, it will be gramatically dysfunctional. Equally important is the principle that even when N-1(n-1) is not fully functional, its properties and operations can be deployed for use at a higher N(n). Thus, molecular systems may operate in the service of biological systems, and lexicography may operate in the service of grammar. The higher N(n) can use the lower N(n) for its own unique purposes. Put another way, the properties, laws, discourse, and epistemologies of any N(n) may become <u>subsumed</u> under those of N+1(n+1). This is unarguably the case in the organization of strata: consciousness subsumes mind, and life subsumes matter. That is, N not only organizes N-1 for its own purposes but subsumes it or subjects it. Stratum N, or level n, has its own particular laws and properties, and these emerge within the E^c of N-1 (n-1), but the important fact about N is that it can <u>regulate</u>, <u>organize</u>,

and dominate the laws and properties of N-1. The fact that one level or stratum is a condition for a higher one, while the higher one has control over the lower one, permits us to describe the schematization of levels and strata as a hierarchic structure. A hierarchy is at least an ascension of authority: "This harnessing of the lower level by the collective upper level is the essence of hierarchical control" (Pattee, 1973, p. 95).

In a hierarchy of emergent levels or strata N(n) does not lose its properties, laws, vocabulary, methodologies or epistemologies to those of N+1(n+1); it merely becomes regulated by a higher authority which, however, cannot function if subordinate levels cease to function. "In a hierarchic structure, the higher does not merely possess powers that are additional to and exceed those possessed by the lower; it also has power over the lower" (Schumacher, 1977, p.25). Any N(n) contains and subordinates the properties and laws of every other N(n) below it, and every N(n) comprises and conditions the properties and laws of every other N(n) above it. This is an asymmetrical relation, and it permits us to say that for every stratum or level in a hierarchy "the potential operations of a higher level are actualized by their embodiment in lower levels which makes them liable to failure (Polanyi, 1959, p. 67).

We witness here the crucial phenomenon of upward and downward influence by one stratum or level on the remainder of a hierarchy. At one and the same time, N(n) may positively or negatively affect the functions of noth N-1(n-1) and N+1(n+1), because it can regulate lower functions and condition higher functions. For example, a sexual

such as male impotence may originate at stratum N_5, mentality, in the form of a conditioned phobia, as when flaccidity is a conditioned response to the paired stimuli of female sexuality and female aggression or brutality. In this case, the phobia is a learned response to a stimulus at the level of mentality, involving affect, perception, stimulus transfer, memory, and so on. The response has an upward reverberation throughout the hierarchy of strata, evidenced in such things as distortions in personal mythologies of sexuality, moral dicta, aesthetics, and religious symbolism. The phobia will also reverberate downward, evidenced in the physiological and glandular disturbances it produces. The phobia will also reverberate throughout the levels of the stratum in which it originates, perhaps in the form of unusual associations, defenses, or information processing procedures. Among the most pressing of problems generated by this emergent-hierarchic phenomenon is a practical one, namely, making available a reliable and valid procedure for accurately isolating strata or levels of pathology. No assessment instrument currently exists for determining the N(n) at which symptoms should be diagnosed or treated, Dabrowski's effort notwithstanding (Dabrowski, 1977).

Let us use an example from the inanimate sphere of machines to bring out some of the principles by which levels are related, thereby gaining further insight into the structure of emergent hierarchies. The isolation of 'artifact' is a move of great utility, because while machines are ontologically defined at the stratum of matter (N_3), they are rational systems created under the aegis of subjective consciousness (N_6) within the E^c's of N_1 and N_2, and the E^m of N_3.

They are accordingly subject to the laws of physics and chemistry, the laws of solid mechanics, and the principles of engineering and architecture. A car is an archetypal machine, or a rational assemblage of parts. At the lowest level it is an organization of energies, emergent at N_2 as an organization of molecular systems. Reductionism would say that the car is nothing but the totality of combined parts or elements, but recall that if all the basic units of the car were strung out side-by-side and viewed by an army of atomic physicists under a powerful microscope, it would not be able to predict the emergence of a machine from them. The essence and purpose of a car is therefore unspecifiable and unpredictable in terms of its constituent parts or units. To repeat, the parts (elements) of a car jointly serve a given purpose specified by subjective rationality; they are unified by the principles of engineering and design, which presupposes the operation of other principles at lower strata. If the operational principles of the car are stipulated by the science of engineering, then engineering alone can tell us how to build and run a car. Of this, physics, qua physics, knows nothing. But only physics can determine the conditions which make the engineering principles practicable, and so a physico-chemical examination of the car can detect its potential successes and failures. Automotive engineering alone reveals the true nature of the car, while physics, chemistry, and a mathematical language determine only the conditions for its successful or incapacitated functioning.

The car is actually a hierarchy of levels within one ontological stratum, the stratum of organized matter, with E^C's in each direction.

It is in this sense a singly-stratified phenomenon, comprised of a set of sub-levels integrated into a whole. Indeed, it is a rational system, constituted by a number of related sub-systems: a combustion system, an electrical system, a circulatory system, a mechanical system, and so forth. Each of the sub-systems is an n-levelled micro-hierarchy contributing to the unitary phenomenon called the car. These levels of sub-systems are comprehensible only by reference to the single system in which they function.

It has just been claimed that a machine is an ascending hierarchy of levels. Let us view it for the moment as one system and bring to light the various perspectives from which it might be viewed. It can be seen, first, that the car might be incomplete; its construction may still be in progress. In this case, it would be said that it is in a stage of construction. For example, it might be at a stage of mobility insofar as it is welded together, in possession of wheels, a steering mechanism, et cetera. But it may also, at the same time, lack a combustion system and so it requires an external force to propel it. The stage it is at, structurally, precludes its possession of the property of internally generated mobility. On the other hand, it may be strewn about in various thousands of pieces, each piece consigned to a container designated as the sub-system to which the piece belongs. So at this stage of construction it lacks even the capacity for external propulsion. In any case, it may be at a relatively incomplete or relatively complete level of construction, and may therefore be described as fixed at a stage of development.

The car, considered as a total unit, may also be viewed from a variety

of perspectives from the point of view of function. It may, for one person, function as an aesthetic object; for another as an instrument of speed; for another as a utilitarian instrument; and for yet another as an index of social status. The point is that one and the same entity can be evaluated and appraised within several dimensions, any one of which may be or may not be essentially related to the others.

Within each of these dimensions there is a value gradient along which the machine receives a value determination. Within the aesthetic dimension, for example, it may be found that it possesses minimal appeal in terms of its design, color capacities, or functional efficiency. The gradient in terms of which it is evaluated is a continuum, limited at each end by the level within which the dimension is operative. The machine is therefore a hierarchic entity in at least three senses: it occupies a stratum in the cosmic order; it sits at a level of development within that stratum; and it can be represented in diverse dimensions, each evaluable on a hierarchic gradient of value.

Just as a machine, considered as a unitary whole, can be described as having reached a certain stage of construction or development so each of the dimensions constituting it can be described as being evolved to a greater or lesser extent. The dimension of beauty may be at a relatively nascent stage of development while the functional dimension may be almost complete---so if a car is viewed solely according to the single dimension of functional mobility it would be thought of as being at a mature stage of construction. On the other hand, to view the car in an aesthetic dimension alone would mean that it would not begin to emerge as an art object until it was almost fully mature mechanically.

In a living organism there are several inherent dimensions, most of which are observor-independent. It has a perceptual dimension, a metabolic dimension, a structural dimension, and a circulatory dimension. Each of these dimensions can be independently assessed according to its maturational completeness. An animal, at the embryological stage, has ALL its dimensions functioning at a low level of development. Later, its structural dimension might be operating at the highest stages of potential development, while the perceptual dimension still functions at an early stage. It is clear, however, that each dimension has a development gradient as well as a value gradient. The first gradient assesses the dimensions level of development, while the second assesses its normative development. The various dimensions of a car, for example, may all be developmentally complete by normatively sub-standard. In any case, another hierarchic scale has been added to the other three, namely, the scale of dimensional maturity.

The fact of dimensional difference leads to another consideration connected to the idea of a systematic totality. The car, considered as a unified system, is at a stage of development; each of its dimensions is at a stage of development as well as at a stage of normative excellence. To a certain extent the stage of development reached by the car is a function of the stage of development reached by each of the dimensions. A car without a steering dimension in incomplete. But in addition to this, a car with a steering mechanism is still incomplete if the steering system functions in isolation from, say, the combustion system, or if the combustion system is functionally independent of the electrical system. A minute element in one dimension, if dysfunctional, can disrupt the

operation of the entire machine. This fact compels the recognition that a new variable runs through the entire set of dimensional hierarchies. Each dimension is related to each other dimension comprising the unitary whole, and is governed in its relations by the overall purpose of the whole. There is, in other words, a scale of integration for the entire system. And at a certain level of integrity the whole emerges from its constituent properties and dimensions.

When a number of molecular systems are arranged in the right way they give rise to elements of the car: wires, screws, bits of rubber, glass, and so forth. Already something is emergent: phenomenal properties have been somehow generated from entities at a lower stratum lacking such qualities as solidity, viscosity, and color. At the stratum of matter, their integration progressively leads to a number of inorganic system states. When a closed system state like a screw is aligned with others it generates a new system---say an engine---which is a hierarchic composite of a number of sub-systems. Eventually the entire car can be seen as a single system, conditioned by but regulating the principles and properties of all the component sub-systems. The car is the unity of all its subservient parts and systems, a unity which simultaneously defines the purpose and nature of its components. It is the system which superveniently integrates a variety of components. That is, it is a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

A car is more than the sum of its parts, and the "more" is disclosed in the way these parts are related. Car-ness is not a quality superimposed on a collection of parts (as if car-ness could Platonically pre-exist cars) but a property which emerges from a collection of parts

related by an integrating principle . The total system of relations is a gestalt. The gestalt is the totality of relations in a system, but it is not only the totality of relations; it is essentially the emergent property generated by the relational ensemble; it is the configurational unity of the system itself, elevated to a new level in the emergent hierarchy at the stratum of matter. The emergent property is a consequence of the way in which properties at previous levels are systematically organized. The level of the totality is therefore determined by its systemic nature.

That a system is more than the summation of its parts is seen in the fact that parts may be lost and replaced while the system remains essentially the same. The epidermal system, for example, is said to replace all its cells every seven years, but this does not mean that the system is replaced. What persists is the pattern of relations between the cells composing it. Similarly, the personality's cognitive system can replace its "ideas" or "thoughts" every decade and still remain the same personality.

> An organized system differs from its scrambled parts neither in mass nor wieight nor content nor any other properties of its separate components, as far as these can be determined apart from their enmeshment in the whole ensemble. The critical difference, therefore, is not one of matter but one of the pattern of relations among the components. The salient feature of the "organized" state is that the overall features of this pattern are essentially invariant, whereas the behavior of the components varies greatly in detail from case to case and from moment to moment. (Weiss, 1971, p.33)

It is when the pattern of relations is transformed beyond a certain threshold, or when a new pattern is engendered,that a shift to another emergent level occurs, assuming, of course, that the shift is not disintegrative.

Care is being take here to contrapose emergent levels and emergent strata. The transformation of N-properties to and N+1 emergent stratum has already been admitted as a piece of mystery, describable (but not explained) as a quantum leap over an ontological threshold. Morgan's view that strata, and not just levels, are functions of relatedness does not seem defensible. There is little evidence that life is some new kind of relation or set of relations in the lower strata, or that mind is the reorganization of living organs. On the other hand, it is clear that levels are functions of integration, organization, and relatedness, that is, levels emerge as systems. A stratum, in fact, is a system of all entities sharing the unique ontological properties of a specified demarcation on the scale of Being: each living thing is a system within the whole biosystem. The universe must therefore be the hierarchic system of all sub-systems, and each level within its strata is also systematic, existing by virtue of the way lower levels establish new relations. Bertalanffy (1968], the originator of General System Theory, has comprehensively outline all considerations relevant to any investigation in this area, obviating the need to review them here.

Gathering together and augmenting what has been said so far, several basic axioms of emergent hierarchicalism can be summarized:

1. There are synthetic, emergent properties and novelties.

2. Emergent properties define a stratum of Being (N) or a level of a stratum (n).
3. Each stratum contains sub-levels of emergence (n...n+1).
4. Each N(n) is not reducible to N-1(n-1).
5. Each N(n) is a necessary condition for the emergence and existence of N+1(n+1).
6. Each N(n) is both comprised by and has regulative authority over N-1(n-1).
7. Levels N(n) to $N_x(n_x)$ form a hierarchic structure.
8. The relation between N's(n's) is one of discontinuity.
9. Each N(n) is at a stage of development.
10. Each N(n) is systemic.
11. Each instantiation of N(n) may be differentiable into dimensions of function; each dimension (D) is itself a hierarchy of emergents $n^d \ldots n^{d+x}$.
12. Each dimension is at a stage of development, relative to itself, to other dimensions, and to N(n).
13. Each D has an ascending value gradient (V) by virtue of which its function can be evaluated at its level of development.
14. Each D within N(n) is on a scale of integration (I) relative to other D's of N.
15. The description of N(n) level properties has an appropriate N(n) level vocabulary for discourse, and an appropriate level of epistemological apprehension.
16. Each N(n) and each D of N(n) has a set of unique laws.
17. Each N(n) has its own characteristic methodology, techniques, and operations.

18. Entities existing at any N(n) are contextualized by other entities at the same N(n). The other N(n)-entities form the environing milieu (E^m).

19. Each N(n) has levels or strata N-1...N-x (n-1...n-x) and N+1... N+x (n+1...n+x) as its environing conditions (E^c).

20. Degrees of freedom increase with ascending hierarchy levels.

The principles outlined above almost complete the preparatory work for the development of a philosophical anthropology. As Bertalanffy suggests, "Just as the conceptions of dynamics and wholeness in biology have their parallel in psychological gestalt theory, the hierarchy of biological organization has its counterpart in the strata of personality" (Bertalanffy, 1960, p.188, my underline). With this gravid suggestion, we can go on to see just what such a personality model would be. This portion of the investigation will complete the introductory section by outlining the formal structure of persons. The structural analysis will say nothing of the existentiality of subjectivity; if anything, it will be no more than a spatial metaphor for the organization of ontoanthropological thought. If anything else, it will be a completion of the architecture of emergent hierarchicalism, thus providing the desired point of departure for describing the stratum of subjectivity.

The Hierarchic Structure of Persons

The purpose of the ensuing remarks is to theoretically complete the prolegomenon to a description of subjectivity.

Persons are emergent hierarchies in two ways. First, a person is a series of N-strata up to and including subjectivity, that is, a person is

structurally a hierarchy of irreducible levels, beginning as an energy system (N_1), then as a molecular system (N_2), then as a spatially and temporally organized material system (N_3), then as a life system (N_4), then as a psychic system (N_5), then as a subjective system (N_6). Generally, the stratum of spirit, or what Kierkegaard calls Selfhood (N_7), is an E^c for N_6. The N-strata up to and including N_5 are necessary conditions for being a person, and must be included in any adequate developmental theory for personality. A hierarchy of irreducible N-strata, each functioning as a precursor for personality does not, however, characterize what is distinctly human about persons. A second hierarchy, beginning at the N-level of subjectivity, contains the sufficient conditions for being a person. That is, the uniquely human property of subjectivity is a hierarchy of n-levels emergent within the hierarchy of N-strata. A complete theory of the person accordingly describes its N-structure, its hierarchic n-structure at the N_6 stratum of subjectivity, the E^m of N_6, specifically the linguistic culture, and the E^c's of $N_1 \ldots N_5$ and N_7.

Subjective personality is a hierarchically structured system. I have taken pains to argue that the essential properties of any N(n) in a hierarchy are irreducible to the stratum of mind (Scheler, 1961), and that any attempt to reduce subjective consciousness to mentality is illegitimate, resulting in property-loss, ambiguity, incoherence and contradiction. Moreover, any attempt to reduce one n-level of subjectivity to another n-1 level has the same consequences. For example, more reasoning is a D of N_6, having six levels dn^1 to dn^6 (Cf. Kohlberg, 1963). Each of the five highest levels is irreducible to the ones below it. The main point here is that each N(n) in a hierarchy, because it is <u>irreducible</u>,

demands its own unique vocabulary, methodology, and epistemology.

At the stratum of mind, an organism is a stimulus-bound creature, incapable of transcending its innate programs and environmental circumstances. In fact, one of the defining characteristics of life at the level of mind is that its nature and activity is determined by innate potentials and its stimulus environment. Until and only insofar as subjectivity emerges from mind---which presupposes an organic awareness or consciousness of a type qualitatively different from subjective consciousness---mental life is controlled and directed by agents and conditions exterior to it. Bats, rats, and alley cats inhabit this ontological stratum, but persons do not, except to the point that the stratum of mind is incorporated into their nature as a condition for the existence of subjectivity. But then mind becomes a part of subjectivity and because of this it acquires radically new properties not present at the level of mind alone. This point is ignored by experimentalists and behaviorists who do not distinguish mind from subjective consciousness and who decompose the essence of persons into the level of mind alone. Not wishing to deny that mind is a necessary condition for subjectivity, correctly so, they make it a sufficient condition as well, incorrectly so. This simple logical fault forms the entire basis for a humanistic critique of traditional psychology.

What does it mean to be a human being, or a person? This is the fundamental question for personality theory (hereafter, "ontoanthropology"). Western existentialists repeatedly asked this question and provided different answers to it until it dawned on Heidegger that the question itself is deeply revelatory. No other kind of being, even at the N_5

stratum, can ask such a question of itself. Neither rats, pigeons, nor chimpanzees interrogate themselves with such an anguished question. Their being, nature, or essence is not problematic for them. Following Heidegger, we can say that persons are distinctly human insofar as their being is an issue for them, insofar as they confront themselves in the form of a mystery or a question. Persons are the beings which question, interpret, and define themselves. Being human is being concerned (sorge) about being-human; it is the ontological state of self solicitude. The human being's concern over its own being is the primal impulse and spring of every specifically human enterprise and activity, including the refusal to pursue the issue that being-human generates for itself. Subjective consciousness emerges from the N-stratum of mind in the context of a self-interrogative confrontation with itself and by itself. The irrevocable nature of such consciousness is accordingly internal division: subjectivity is the self-opposed, internally disjunctive being which stands over and against itself in the posing of the mystery "Who am I?". A person (a subject) faces itself as an object to be comprehended. This dividedness, this disjunction, this rift and disruption, is the essence of subjectivity; it is the property defining N_6.

Subjectivity is, however, a unitary phenomenon in spite of its internal disjunctivity; it is, after all, the same "I" which inquires and is inquired into. The subject and object of concern are opposed to each other in consciousness, and it is the same consciousness which relates them. Here, subjective consciousness is the field which unifies oppositional factors into a tensional relation. The

division of the self from itself occurs in a "field of interest" (inter-esse: to be between) in which the opposition is sustained. Subjectivity is the interest in its own divisionality. Subjective consciousness, therefore, can be provisionally defined as an emergent system, aware of and interested in its own disjunctive structure, desiring to identify itself.

Kierkegaard claims, in a pregnant and intricate analysis, that the ability to conceive the "I" is not actualized until it is expressed in language. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is both an ontogenetic and a phylogenetic statement. The property of subjectivity emerges in reflexive, symbolic representation, and the representation is possible only in discourse which opposes a subject and an object. The "I" of subjectivity is not the respondent "mine" of animal territoriality, for example; it is the "I" aware of its "mine-ness" recoiling back into itself in reflection. Reflection transfers or transforms the internal opposition of self-to-self into the form of self-to-object-other-than-itself, both moments being unified in the interest field. The self is alienated from itself, a stranger to itself within its own field.

The essential fact of being-a-person us being-a-division of opposed elements disclosed in language. The initial division is that of subject and object, that of "I" and the "World". The condition for such an opposition is that of "I" opposed to "My Self": "me" as both subject and object united in my concern or interest in such a split. But the fragmentation of subject and object is brought to light in awareness only when it is reflectively verbalized. The

conditions for subjective consciousness emerge in the consciousness itself and they become actualized by being disclosed there in language. Their concrete actualization is their relatedness: subjective consciousness reveals and relates the components of its structure by being interested in them, by being inter-esse, so subjective consciousness is the vehicle and illuminator of the fragmentatation of subject and object which constitutes a person.

The pure, undifferentiated awareness of natural mind is indeed a condition for human consciousness, for it is within this mode of receptivity to stimuli and innate programming that the subject-object split occurs. The break with organic mind is manifest in and through discourse. Organic immediacy, the continuous identity of subject and object, has no distinctions or relations within it (except as they exist for subjective consciousness) and organic awareness is a unity of subject and object which have never been counterposed in language. Animal awareness is pure <u>response</u> and passivity whose continuity is disrupted only when it speaks. Speech is the break with organic life, and subjectivity is the care inhabiting this break. Speaking alienates and divides off the subject from itself into opposed, contradictory spheres, and consciousness can be seen as the actual conflict or collision of these spheres. The unity of this field of conflict is the whole subject---a system inside which the subject-object distinction arises. So the person is not only a relation of subject and object in dynamic conflict, but a relation of opposed components <u>related to itself</u>. It is this aspect of self-relatedness which opens up the deepest

characterization of subjective, personal consciousness.

The internal relation of subject and object is one of conflict; subjectivity is the clash of these polarities in the field of consciousness. Their clash, their conflict, may be symbolized in several ways, but whatever representational form the conflict assumes for subjectivity, it is always the case that the conflict is potentially unresolved and the bipolar elements of it are in disproportion or disequilibrium. (Kierkegaard's great work, The Sickness Unto Death, is an analysis of the various forms in which subjective disequilibrium can occur and be symbolized.) The goal or need of consciousness is to bring the opposed, conflictual components within its field into balance, harmony, and integration. The relation between subject and object is brought into equilibrium when the relation itself gains an identity by taking a stand on itself, by choosing itself, or by relating to itself. The issue which subjectivity is for itself is resolved through the reconciliation of subject and object, and this is effected through the provision of an interpretive, symbolic framework in terms of which the subject's experience of itself and the world is made COHERENT. This orienting and reconciling structure is chosen as an instrument of identity. If anything, it is a posited Weltanschauung which imparts continuity and coherence to thought, actionm and the field in which they occur. Usually, the framework is absorbed from the E^m in the form of banal and vacuous social purposes and roles, i.e., it is "inauthentic". Much more will be said of this in due time.

The central datum in the structure of subjectivity is this fact of self-relatedness and the imperative it contains for the subject to come to terms with itself and harmonize the elements of its internal poles. The datum is that of a fundamental freedom to choose and consolidate an identity. Freedom is an emergent property, not found at the N-stratum of mentality; it emerges only in subjectivity. So Kierkegaard is able to say that the "synthesis (of subject and object) is a relationship, and it is a relationship which...relates itself to itself, which means freedom. The self is freedom (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 162). Subjectivity is not merely the reflective awareness of the relation between subject and object but "consists in the fact that the relation relates itself to itself" in the medium of a system of symbols (ibid, p. 146).

In the notion of freedom, the analysis of subjectivity has found one condition which is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective consciousness; mental life which lacks the property of freedom is not at the N-stratum of subjectivity: mental life which possesses it is already there. But the property of freedom is coextensive with the capacity for reflective symbolization, or language. It is in language that the cleavage of subject and object opens up such that the subject is present to itself in consciousness. Thus, the presence of language---which equates with the power to symbolize the opposition of the self (subject) from the not-self (object), rooted in the power to separate the self (subject) from itself (object)---is another defining property of the N-stratum of subjectivity. Freedom and symbolic capacity are coextensive properties,

and BOTH are sufficient conditions for subjectivity. Each is necessary as well.

In addition to the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of subjectivity provided by the N-1 stratum of mentality, there is one more necessary presupposition for the emergence of subjectivity. Symbolic capacities are not actualized without a symbolic community. That is, a linguistic society is a condition for subjectivity. Without participation in such a community, mind would not give rise to subjectivity. A linguistic culture is the environing milieu (E^m) for subjectivity, just as the biosphere is the environing milieu for life.

It appears, then, that the emergent properties defining a person have been found. A person can accordingly be defined as: free, symbolic consciousness existing within a linguistic society. Any entities with the properties of freedom, language, and cultural communality is at the sixth ontological stratum in the hierarchic cosmic order. Any description of the structure and development of the person must take its point of departure at this level, otherwise its distinctly human qualities will be ignored and concerns over a developmental psychology of the person, discussed in the introductory chapter will go unheeded.

Embryonic subjectivity is a relatively undifferentiated symbolic system. It is <u>minimally</u> the tensions of subject and object suspended in a field of interest. As this system matures it complexifies and differentiates into specifiable sub-systems which are initially

in a state of fusion. As the consciousness system develops it ramifies, so to say, into distinct functions, following Werner's "principle of orthogenesis", which says that "whenever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration" (Werner, 1957, p. 126). Langer, Werner's student, paraphrases the principle as follows: The inherent direction of development is toward (a) increasing differentiation and specification of primitive action systems that are initially fused with each other in one global organization, causing (b) the emergence of novel and increasingly discrete action systems that are also integrated within themselves, such that (c) the most advanced (differentiated), specialized, and internally integrated systems hierarchically integrate (functionally subordinate and regulate) less developed systems (Cf. Langer, 1969, p. 92). So, he goes on to say, "Many selves, individuated systems of action, arise side-by-side. The mark of normal development is these differentiated 'selves' are progressively related into a functionally and structurally hierarchized organizational whole in which constituent parts are not lost but integrated" (ibid, p. 92). What Langer calls 'selves" are here being called 'dimensions'. It is noteworthy that the machine model in which the concept of dimension was refined is applicable in one sense at the N-stratum of life, the N-stratum of mind, and the N-stratum of subjectivity: the machine does not begin as a global unity, but as a complete disintegration of parts that progressively unify into a whole,but the concept, or symbolic representation of a car is a full

Gestalt---an undifferentiated global unity. In this sense, even a machine's construction follows Werner's developmental principle.

The structure of a person is a function of its stage of development. At an early stage its structure is that of subjectivity *simpliciter:* subject, object, and the relation between the two in consciousness. Later, this system is ramified into a number of dimensions. Each dimension progressively articulates a more refined a complex structure until it forms an ascending hierarchy of sub-systems. But these sub-systems are all *related* dimensionally, and each dimension is related to the others within the entire system of symbolic consciousness. When one dimension of the whole structure of the person is retarded in its development, or when it is not efficiently integrated with the others, pathology is the result. Here the reference is to pathology in the symbolic system of subjectivity, but it is clear that the source of malfunction could be at lower strata of existence because a person is concurrently a hierarchy of systems within the N-stratum of subjective consciousness *and* a hierarchy of strata within the cosmic order (Cf. O'Connell, 1979).

Confining attention strictly to the hierarchy of n-levels within the comprehensive N-stratum of subjective consciousness, it is necessary to demarcate, first, some of the dimensions in which it can be described, so that levels of dimensions can be discerned.

To an important degree, like the hierarchic dimensions in a living organism, the dimensions of a person function within the

framework of the whole. They are related in form and function, not like an imbricative system but more like the strands in a piece of rope. Just as the metabolic system of an organism is detachable from its digestive system in abstraction only, the cognitive system of a person is detachable from its affective system only in theory.

The maturation of all three dimensions selected for discussion proceeds along the same lines as the maturation of the cosmic order. The set of principles stated on pages 64 to 66 can be telescoped and projected onto dimensional hierarchies, which means that the structure of the person reflects the general principles of emergent evolution. Consequently, the n-levels of a subjective dimension are emergent, and the properties of each of these levels are novel properties reflecting a mode of organization in the properties of the previous level. This statement is just a variant of the well-known principle of epigenesis.

Subjective consciousness is an irreducible symbolic system, free to choose itself. As a system it has an emergent-hierarchic structure, namely, it is differentiated into several dimensions (D's], each related to the others on the scale of integration (I-scale). The moral function has already been mentioned as an example of one D; another would be the affective function. Dabrowski (1977), who has elaborated a hierarchic theory of emotions with five n-levels, sub-divides the emotional D into 55 n-levelled functions. Consonant with Kierkegaard's analysis of subjectivity in terms of disjunctivity, it is postulated that each dimensional function is a BIPOLAR,

hierarchic scale. Subjective consciousness would then be the entire system of symbols comprising these scales, and it would rubricize the set of bipolar systems, which, integrated, constitute a field of unified consciousness. That is, the polarities of consciousness define its dimensions, as for instance when the good-bad polarity defines the D-hierarchy of the moral function through various levels on a rising V-scale. Others would be: true-false, defining the contraries of the D-hierarchy of cognition; beautiful-ugly (aesthetic D); pleasure-pain (hedonic D); male-female (sexual D), and so forth.

The dynamics of emergence fall within the laws of development, while the structure of emergent properties and their place in the whole falls within the descriptive categories of ontoanthropology. The obvious question to be answered at this stage is therefore: How are the dimensions of a person defined, and how are they integrated into a system? The system whose structure is to be made explicit can be diagrammatically represented in three dimensions as follows:

Insert Figure Three about here

In this system of axes and coordinates the whole person can be represented. Naturally, this is a frozen, static image of what a person is, representing only its structural properties at a fictional moment in time. It can be made more explicit by tracing out the properties of one of its dimensions, for example, the cognitive dimension.



Figure Three

The difficulty of defining the cognitive hierarchy immediately brings to light one of the properties of a person-system: each of its hierarchies is intimately connected with the others. Cognitive functioning is regulated to a degree by emotional needs and valuations, for instance. Alternatively, affectivity is conditioned by what a person knows or believes. Similarly, moral positions and activity are bound up with variables of the emotions and the intellect. A pure definition of 'cognitive is made difficult on that account. Nonetheless, the following definition might be advanced, based on the dual consideration that the person is not "a collection or aggregate of unrelated cognitive components" but a "complexly organized system of interacting components" (Flavell, 1977, p.4), and further that cognitive functioning is to be defined at the N-stratum of subjective consciousness and not that of animal intelligence. The cognitive system might then be defined as the logical-categorial organization of experience into an epistemological system of knowledge. The organizer is the subject, and so there is not a distinctly human cognitive hierarchy until <u>after</u> the emergence of stratum N_6. Prior to that there is only stimulus-bound behavior and programmed reaction. Thus, Piaget's first five levels of cognitive development in the sensori-motor stage are not distinctly human; they apply equally well to chimpanzees. But at the sixth stage (18-24 months) the human organism begins to emerge at the level of subjectivity as it acquires speech. At this point it achieves "the ability to represent the objects of one's cognition by means of symbols, and to act intelligently with respect to this <u>inner</u>, symbolized reality rather than simply, in sensori-motor fashion, with respect to the <u>outer</u>

unsymbolized reality" (ibid, p. 32, my underline). Here we see not only the emergence of subjectivity (the genesis of the person) but also the beginning of a cognitive hierarchy in the person, still relatively fused with the affective and moral dimensions. It is worth emphasizing that the "I" or ego-subject is formed at this semiotic level: here is the origin of subjectivity, the first appearance of the subject-object split and fragmentation, and the first possibility for the "I" to become a question to itself in a symbolic space. If Werner and Langer are right, the person commences its hierarchical ascent through cognitive levels in Piaget's sixth sensori-motor (semiotic) stage. At this stage, symbol, person, and referent are mutually "broken apart" (Flavell).

The cognitive dimension is a graded series of n-levels. At each level emergent properties appear, and a new vocabulary is required to describe them and their functioning. For example, the term 'reversibility' is required at the level of concrete operations (n+2) while the term 'counterfactual' is required at the level of formal operations (n+3). The need for a new or expanded lexicon to handle these properties gives rise to the conclusion that the new properties are discontinuous with those preceding them. Within each level, and ascending through the entire series, is the value gradient. At any level of the cognitive hierarchy the person may have achieved a high or low degree either failed or succeeded in bringing to full actualization those properties which are potential to that stage. Concurrently, the person may have achieved either a small or large amount of success along another scale, i.e., the scale of integration between the cognitive level and a corresponding level in another dimension.

The person may also be variable in its adaptability to its environing milieu. As it ascends through the cognitive hierarchy it develops new abilities to relate symbolically to other members of the language culture. At each level, the person discover new requirements and new potentials in the logical and categorical organization of his or her experience into a knowledge system. If he or she is arrested at some cognitive level or another, then cognitive interaction with the milieu is correspondingly impoverished at higher levels.

Finally a cognitive hierarchy is a scale of ascending authority. This is part of its structure. Consequently, one of the structural aspects of a person's cognitive system is the degree of progressive, regulative centralization of its lower levels in its higher levels. Each level is absorbed and subsumed by the next level.

The preceding brief outline of the structural properties of the cognitive hierarchy in a person is in conformity with the axioms of emergent hierarchicalism. In the cognitive hierarchy there are: emergent properties at an N-stratum, sub-levels of emergence, irreducibility of properties, regulative authority, discontinuity, stages, dimensional differentials, a value gradient, a scale of integration, and appropriate n-level vocabularies. With similar brevity, let us look at two other dimensions.

Erik Erikson has isolated eight levels in the person's affective-emotional development. 'Emotion" is defined as a disposition to feel and act, perceived as a complex of bodily sensations. The resolution of each level's "task" is a necessary condition for the successful transition to the next level, and emotional resolution includes reconciliation with the demands of an environing human society. At each

level, Erikson places a great deal of emphasis on the value gradient, or on how well the level's demands have been satisfied in terms of the properties it presents. For example, at the fifth level of the affective hierarchy the person faces the task of relating to himself with reference to social identity and role. He or she may do this successfully or unsuccessfully. Success depends largely on the acquisition of properties requisite to the previous level, among them the property of competence in socially defined tasks, but it is dependent in part on cognitive and moral variables as well. Role determination as an effective task is clearly related to what the person knows and values. So the affective dimension has its own scale of value gradients at each hierarchic level and it lies on a scale of integration relative to the other dimensions.

The fifth Eriksonian level was mentioned because it undeniably represents a level of emotion representing N-stratum properties connected to subjective consciousness. However, Erikson's scheme has the drawback that at no point does it locate the emergence of person-properties. At the earlier stages of the scheme one is not certain precisely what is being described, because the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person are not stipulated. He claims to be describing levels of the affective hierarchy in the human ego, but the description could also be true, at the lower levels, of a rhesus ego. There is also the question of whether or not the human neonate is and "I" at the lower levels: Erikson seems to confuse having-an-ego with being-an-organism. The oral-sensory level, as an instance, applies to all animal infants insofar as they are all "concerned with obtaining appropriate stimulation in the oral zone: and they must all "deal with the social

world" as well as the "wealth of sensory stimulation" impinging on them (Lerner, 1976, p.202). Moreover, as Harlow's studies of monkey's colonies have shown, young monkeys may be trusting or non-trusting in their behavioral transactions with the environment and with other monkeys. Erikson has no grounds for saying that human infants are any different; he provides no criterion by which a human subject can be distinguished from a behaving organism.

Kohlberg's moral hierarchy displays much the same problem, except that emphasis at all levels is on what kind of reasoning underlies moral evaluations, and this presupposes subjectivity. Persons must be present for there to be reasons at the lowest levels in the moral dimensions, but they need not be if the level describes nothing more than the way an organism is behaving. Kohlberg's difficulty is that there is an ambiguity running through his hierarchy between the way an organism behaves and what an organism thinks about its behavior. If the moral dimension is interpreted as nothing more than levels of moral reasoning then further grounds must be adduced for saying how it is we can know that it is in fact reasoning at the N-stratum. If it is interpreted as a description of behavior, then Kohlberg is required to show how it is human, and not just stimulus-bound behavior, especially through the first three levels.

Another hierarchic element absent from Kohlberg's scheme is that of the value-gradient. For example, at the sixth level of conscience and principle orientation, there is no hint of how to evaluate the competence

of moral reasoning or behavior. Conscience, an important vocabulary item of this level, may function poorly or well. Also, reasoning about principles may be performed poorly or well. And very little is said about the person's interactions with its E^m. But aside from these drawbacks, Kohlberg's theory of moral levels exhibits the characteristics of an emergent hierarchy. Each level represents a moral system, whose vocabulary and properties are irreducible to the one below it, and each system is a sub-system contained in the one above it. The moral D as a whole is integrated with the affective and cognitive D's, and it is contextually bounded by a milieu of other free, subjective, and linguistic agents.

Other dimensions of the N-stratum of subjectivity are unarguably required to round out a structural analysis of the person, and these will be defined in due time. The other D's, together with the deminsions of cognition, emotion, and ethics, comprise the dimensional elements of a complete theory of the person. The person is the system uniting all these dimensions at the N-stratum of subjectivity. Considered as a whole (as the system of all these systems) the nascent person is at a low level of dimensional differentiation; the mature person, on the other hand, is complexified into different dimensions each of which is more clearly distinct from the others than it was at earlier levels. The ontoanthropological model, in any case, is structurally filled out when the dimensional analysis is complete.

The main elements for a theory of the person have now been generally disclosed, so that the analysis has reached the point where

the concept of 'person' can be structurally defined. A person is a system of related hierarchic dimensions at the N-stratum of subjective consciousness. This system structurally mirrors the cosmic system pictured in the theory of emergent evolution, hence the N-stratum itself is an emergent in the cosmic hierarchy, and each n-level is an emergent in a dimensional hierarchy comprising the person. Further, each level is a system of related properties and functions. The whole person, the entire assemblage of hierarchies, relations, properties, and dimensions, is unified in subjectivity. In freedom, the whole is related to itself, and this is its most fundamental property.

The last consideration leads directly to a concluding comment on the relation of the person, considered as a whole, to itself as a whole. Taken in toto as a single, unified phenomenon, a person is not only the aggregation of its dimensions, and its emergence is not only the growth of its properties in sum. As a complete system it is more than the summation of its elements: it is a unity in multiplicity, but the unity transcends the multiplicative ordering of its components. As Angyal points out. "Wholes cannot be compared to additive aggregations at all...aggregation and whole formation are processes of an entirely different order...In an aggregation the parts are added, in whole the parts are arranged in a system. The system cannot be derived from the parts; the system is an independent framework in which the parts are placed" (Angyal, 1941, p. 257]. A more stringent contention, made by Goldstein, is that a

segment cannot even be comprehended except as a participant and contributor to a transcendent whole (Goldstein, 1947, passim). How, then, does a person as a whole relate itself to itself at various levels?

The person, recall, is an internally divided structure---the opposition of subject and object in consciousness. The subject is an object to itself, but the opposition of the subject and subject-as-object is the "space" in which all the aspects of the subject cohere and merge together. It is a symbolic space something like a mathematical space in which the dimensional hierarchies of cognition, emotion, and so on, are synthesized into one system or whole. But still, subjectivity is not only the incorporation of all aspects of the subject-as-object into a synthetic unity, because the totality of all aspects of the subject-as-object still announces itself to the subject qua subject as something to be comprehended. The subject unifies and synthesizes its component dimensions into a whole but is still, as a whole, an issue for itself; it is still possible for it to ask "What IS this whole which I am?".

In the subjective space which transcends the unity of its elements, there is an "I" which is aware that "I" know something in the cognitive dimension. In this space, "I" am aware that "I" am feeling something; when "I" ask who "I" am,I can say that I am the totality of my thoughts, beliefs, feelings, liaisons, and so on, but the I-as-subject stands over and against the totality of those things which constitute the I-as-object. When I ask who I am as the subject which is aware of all those things, then, I am really

asking what I am independently of all the things I can say about myself. Considering myself as a whole which transcends the sum of my contingent qualities and their relations, I am aware of myself as pure subjectivity, as the bare relation of myself to myself which I experience as a nullity to be filled in. My subjectivity is that which seeks a meaning, an interpretation, not given in the totality of qualities by which I am constituted. The person of pure subjectivity is the relation of the whole to itself, expressed in the need for a meaning. The need for meaning, for interpretation, is met and progressively satisfied by consciousness itself and the capacity for it to take a stand on itself and its life---to relate itself to itself---by creating an interpretation for itself. The whole person, so to speak, is the self-aware metastructure which CREATES ITSELF. Consciousness is a system which is FREE to interpret itself. The interpretation is elaborated and existentially pursued at the para-symbolic N-stratum of spirit.

Summary

1. A multi-levelled hierarchic paradigm has been developed, positing a distinctly human level at which novel properties emerge.

2. The comprehensive laws and principles of this paradigm were systematized from the example of a machine, and these principles were tentatively applied to a modular analysis of personality.

3. The following chapter will extend the analysis through a reconstruction of Kierkegaard's phenomenological anthropology.

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CHAPTER THREE

ONTOANTHROPOLOGY II:

KIERKEGAARD'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SUBJECT

The way has now been prepared for a comprehensive description of level N_6 of the human hierarchy; the preceding two chapters form the framework and justification for such an undertaking. The general feature of the project will be a search for the distinctly human properties of subjective consciousness, emergent from the previous level of natural mentality, coupled with a developmental account of their origins. This project, which is an essential task for ontoanthropology, must conform to the requirements already laid down for an adequate theory of personality development. In prosecuting this task, some material already developed will be retraced in detail.

It has already been emphatically stipulated that ontoanthropology must remain resolutely antireductionist. This entails that only those properties of subjective consciousness which do not appear at any prior level are appropriate for discussion. They must be genuine emergents and they must be fundaments of subjectivity. Any reference to ontological properties shared by other entities must be abjured, and hence most of the categories of traditional psychology must be suspended. Also entailed is the necessity for establishing a language and a method appropriate to N_6. This will have profound implications for our enterprise, because adherence to the requirement that conceptual categories and investigative methodology be irreducible to those aligned with N_5 dictates that notions such as 'verification', 'description', 'theory'

and 'knowledge' will undergo striking changes.

The reformulation of 'property', 'language' and 'method' within the ontoanthropological framework is conditioned, to a certain extent, by the most basic fact of human existence, i.e., its encounter with itself as an issue or problem to be overcome. The human being is the unique being for whom its own Being is an issue; it is the being for whom its own Being rebounds upon itself as problematic. Being human is being concerned about being human; it is the ontological state of explicit interest in itself. The human being's concern over itself, its self-solicitude, is the primal impulse of every specifically human enterprise and activity, including the refusal to pursue the issue that being human is for itself.

The manner of approaching its own being is limited and distinct from the multitude of technical approaches with which the human being has furnished itself for the purpose of objective investigation; the distinct approach arises when the "object" of investigation is the human being's essence or nature. When the human being's concern over itself is restricted to its onta and nothing derivative of its onta, its self concern is then an ontological concern. To appropriate human nature as problematic, to establish one's own being as a issue, is already to have charted the direction and context for the resolution of that concern.

The being for whom its own being is a problem is able to differentiate and pursue a number of methodologies through which it attempts to acquire a lucid comprehension of itself as a being imbued

with many properties: emotions, values, a physiology, a language, and so forth. But the methodology reflecting each of these properties is derivative and, to a certain extent, artificial. The ontological aspiration to face itself and question itself, and to act on that comprehension in the totality of its being prior to the objective differentiation of human "properties" for the purposes of "scientific" investigation, can be adequately satisfied only through a phenomenological ontology of the subject qua subject. Phenomenological description is the only available methodology and language for an ontoanthropological psychology at the level of subjectivity. The properties isolated at level N_6 are accessible only through phenomenology, a fact which exposes the inherent contradiction in most traditional "scientific" psychology: it seeks understanding of human nature or subjectivity but it is constrained to abolish the very thing it seeks to understand because it owes allegiance to a methodology of objectivity which has no access to the subject. The subject can be known only subjectively, not as an object.

Phenomenology is descriptive. It describes the structures of experience as they are directly and immediately present to awareness. A phenomenology of subjectivity would therefore amount to the subject's experience of itself. Following Giambattista Vico, the eighteenth century thinker, we can say that a "new science" of human nature finds its principles "within the modifications of our own human mind" (Vico, 1970, p. 53). The data for ontoanthropology are found in subjectivity itself.

If it is indeed the case that the ontological constitution of human

being is or ought to be revealed through description, and not through a prescriptive model derived from prior dogmas or previous ontological presuppositions, then ontoanthropology must confine its descriptions only to those realities of which it has direct experience. The methodology is therefore "radically empirical," to use William James term. The properties of subjectivity susceptible to description, then, are only those properties which can be experienced. Everything else is inference.

The position which states, in effect,that comprehension of human nature has it starting point in description derived from the direct observation of consciousness, by an observer whose personal interests and beliefs have been suspended in the interests of knowledge and truth, is a position laden with difficulties. It is striking, for example, that for any ontology of the subject there is another standing opposed to it on some fundamental point. But each ontology is professedly a descriptive one, and two descriptions of the same phenomenon ought to agree, provided that the descriptions are directed to the referent's essence or uniqueness. Somehow, the alleged veridicality of an ontological description must be reconciled with the variations which emerge when two or more of them are put together.

It is necessary to understand what an ontoanthropological description is; moreover, it is necessary to see that what for so long was thought to be a description in the classical sense is an impossibility for ontoanthropology. Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics (Strawson, 1963] is important and useful, but

it is also misleading, for it applies to every methodological approach except ontoanthropology. He has applied the distinction to ontology, the only science for which such a distinction is a misunderstanding. Ontology, specifically ontology of the subject, is not either descriptive or revisionary: it is both. Ontological description IS revision (re-vision; seeing again); a novel or radical description of human being is a modification of Being. To experience ontoanthropological structures in a completely new fashion and to describe that experience is an alteration or displacement of previous structures; the description is concurrent with an ontological reconstruction or revision. Ontological description at level N_6 is a report on the perspective from which one has experienced the structure of subjectivity; it is an outline of a personal consciousness of human nature. (Description, on this account, is verifiable, because my experience can be anyone else's experience. My experience can be verified by the Other; it can be made true, as the conjunction of verum and facto implies). That an ontology of the subject is a description and a revision at the same time is to be expected from a property of subjectivity already mentioned, i.e., that it iterprets itself.

In addition to subscribing to Vico's suggestion that ontoanthropological description is an operation of subjectivity on itself, this chapter will also make use of his principle that human nature must be described developmentally and historically. It has previously been asserted that the structure of human being is determined by its development, meaning that the composition of emergent levels is a function of evolutionary sequences. At the N_6 level, Vico suggests going even

farther: the structure of subjective consciousness cannot be understood except by reference to its temporal origins: the essence of subjectivity is precisely its beginning, its evolutionary emergence out of level N_5. Thus, if "doctrines must take their beginning from that of the matters of which they treat" (Vico, p.49) then ontoanthropology must seek subjectivity's nature in its nascence, its being in its birth(natus). The search for this nature must be both ontogenetic and phylogenetic, so that the experience of the individual can be comprehended as the experience of the race. The procedure will accordingly be to elaborate a description of subjectivity's structure and then to trace its origins in individuals and in the species, a procedure occupying the next two chapters.

KIERKEGAARD'S ANTHROPOLOGY

Structural Analysis

Søren Kierkegaard's ontology of the subject is being used here as a point of departure for description for several reasons. First, he is one of the few psycho-philosophers to have explicitly and systematically explored the essential structures and origins of subjectivity. Second, he does so in a language and with a method not subject to reductionism. Third, he is interested in applying his ontology to pathology and therapeutics. All three reasons would justify the use of Sartre as well, for example, so a final reason may be adduced which makes Kierkegaard a viable choice. It is the two-fold consideration that all existential phenomenology of the subject originates in Kierkegaard's thought, and that of all the major thinkers who potentially contribute to the development of ontoanthropology Kierkegaard is the most

important and the least understood. In itself, a reconstruction of his theory of human nature is a major contribution to modern scholarship and paradigm revision.

Exploring, clarifying, and explaining the structures and dimensions of Kierkegaard's anthropology is of supreme importance; man is, as his history abundantly demonstrates,a deeply troubled creature. His nature is a fissure within Being. He is the fracture or cleavage in Being whose conscious condition is, as Dostoevsky puts it, one of thoroughgoing illness. Kierkegaard knew this profoundly, and the Archimedean point around which all his thinking revolves is his description of man as a sick creature standing in need of a radical cure. As yet, no attempt has successfully been made to lay bare the ontological structures of subjectivity as Kierkegaard understood them. He himself didn't do it either, as he was more preoccupied with curing than with diagnostics. Numerous attempts have been made to unpack such dense concepts as 'subjectivity' and 'dread' but few have succeeded because they evade the most central and most difficult question raised by Kierkegaard: "What does it mean to be a human being?". Only when the anthropology in Kierkegaard's work is clarified will the categories of dread and despair, for example, make sense, because these moments in existence rest on and are formulated in terms of the anthropology; until the phrase 'what it means to be a human being' makes sense nothing is explained. The analysis of the structure of subjectivity is the ground floor of Kierkegaard's thought, thus it is at this point that reconstruction must begin.

There is, throughout the entire published authorship, only one systematic attempt by Kierkegaard to address himself directly to the question of the nature of human being. His ontology of man in the Sickness Unto Death (SUD) and in the correspoinding Papirer entries, is a description of the morphē of every subject. As an ontology it is painfully cryptic and incomplete, but it is the basis for any reconstruction, because it is the only work in which a conscious attempt is made to establish an ontoanthropology.

The Sickness Unto Death makes a central distinction between "man" and "self" which provides Kierkegaard with the means for making the critical structural separation of "aesthetic" existence from "ethical" existence. What he calls the aesthetic self shall here be called Subjectivity (N_6), and what he calls Selfhood(or, interchangeably, Spirit) shall be called the same(N_7). The textual basis for the subject-self distinction is readily apparent: "Man is a synthesis... a synthesis is a relation between two things. So considered man is still not a self: (SUD, p.146). This proposition clearly states that man (the Subject) is something distinct from Selfhood, and it provides the point of departure for an ontoanthropology whose first task is to clarify the notion that subjectivity is a composite relation.

What is being called subjectivity is, in Kierkegaard's language, a synthesis of the "factors" or moments constituting the natural being of the anthropos. In the relation between two factors in subjective existence the relation is itself a third term, acting as a "negative unity" and the two factors "relate themselves to the relation, and in

the relation to the relation"(SUD, p.146). But when the factors form a relation related to the relation itself, then the relation is a "positive" third term and Selfhood has established itself. This is Kierkegaard's way of stating a bare anthropology, and it clearly needs thorough elucidation.

Ontoanthropology is interested for the present in the structure of human existence before it posits itself as a "positive unity" in Selfhood. The complete analysis of aestheticism is found in the concept of a "negative Unity". Here, 'negative unity', 'subjectivity', and 'aesthetic' are being roughly equated. ('Aesthetic' normally means 'pertaining to beauty or the arts' but Kierkegaard retains the original meaning of aisthesis: grounded in sense experience. The archetypal aesthetic is Don Juan, who makes no reflective choices.) With this tentative equation, the subject is simply described as composite and dualistic; it is a relation of opposing categories. It is necessary to recognize that the subject is a relation of factors. They are phenomenologically disclosed as opposites and existentially known as contradictions, but objectively and conceptually their union is absurd.

What is a factor? Kierkegaard does not say, so the analysis must be provided for him. It is indicated that a factor is at least a presupposition for Selfhood, since subjectivity is a relation of factors and the Self is this relation's relation to itself. Thus it is certain as well that the factors function as constitutive structures of subjectivity. Subjectivity is not Selfhood, for it is only when the

relation chooses itself that Selfhood emerges: "...the self is not the relation, but that the relation relates itself to itself" (SUD, p. 146). The relation is present in the subject, indeed is the subject, and the relation is the boundary or context in which the Self will later be chosen. The factors must therefore be construed as the primitive conditions of subjectivity in general. They can be understood as the existential a priori categories of subjective consciousness, posited as the field and ground of human existence, plunged into the world with the imperative that a Self be created out of them.

A disjunctive list of factors would oppose at least finitude and infinity, and temporality and eternity. Also included in the sale list are the factors of possibility and necessity (vide: SUD, pp.162-175). In addition to these three sets only one other is clearly warranted. It can safely be said that the subject is also a relation of mind and body (det sjelige og det legemlige) and that this relation is primitive and covalent with the others. This is beyond a doubt the case when in the Papirer we find the assertion that the mind-body synthesis provides the crucial point of distinction between dread (angest) and despair (fortvivlelse) (Papirer, VIII B 168:6). In the Concept of Dread (CD) itself, Kierkegaard twice asserts that "man is a synthesis of mind and body" (CD,pp. 39,79). And in the opening passage of the Sickness Unto Death there appears the following remark: the relation which is "not yet a self" is a "third term as a negative unity" and "such a relation is that between soul and body, when man is regarded as soul"(SUD, p. 146).

This is the only passage in which Kierkegaard discusses man before

he has a self, and the only factors mentioned in the passage are those of mentality and corporeality. All the other factors are discussed extensively, but as elements of Selfhood; the factors of mind and body are never mentioned in the context of human existence before-being-a-self.

Pursuing this fact further, it begins to appear that some important distinction is to be drawn between factors as they function in Selfhood (Kierkegaard's "solution" to aestheticism) and as they function in precursive subjectivity (aestheticism). The most plausible suggestion seems to be that mind and body are the first factors to come into existence in human life and that these factors delineate a context for discussing subjectivity. Any investigation of subjectivity, if this suggestion is correct, is bound to use the mind-body relation as a beginning.

Kierkegaard himself legitimizes the claim that the mind-body relation is the initial object of analysis,if not the sole structural basis, for subjectivity. Without this relation, the others can never emerge: "Man was said to be a synthesis of mind and body, but he is also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal...Concerning the latter synthesis it is quite obvious that it is formed differently than the first" (Begrebet Angest, my translation, p.122). Already the mind-body relation is "first" and it is "formed differently". Within the context of The Concept of Dread it is admissible that Kierkegaard considers the mind-body split as developmentally prior to the other relations, that is, it is ontogenetically the initial set of subjective factors. Indeed, he admits that subjective existence can persist under the categories of mind and body alone; he calls such a life a psycho-sensuous one. But

more important, the mind-body relation is different than the others. The primary difference, according to Kierkegaard, between the mind-body relation and all the others lies in the fact that the mind-body relation is a relation in itself, while the others are relations for themselves (Journals,I, p.347).

On the basis of what has been concluded so far it could be said that Preston Cole, in his study of selfhood in Freud and Kierkegaard, is quite right in excluding the mind-body relation from any discussion of the Kierkegaardian self (Cole, 1971). The self, as it has been argued, is a synthesis of possibility and necessity, temporality and eternity, and finitude and infinity, but the subject prefiguring Selfhood is a composite of mind and body, and since the present investigation is concerned to describe man before he is a self it must be carried out solely within the context of the mind-body relation.

To isolate the most general disturbance generated by the collision of mind and body is to bring to light the subject's existential condition and to lay the groundwork for a phenomenology of the subject. This project has reached the point of describing subjective existence as a composite of opposed factors; in describing the properties of the factors it has become apparent that mentality and corporeality are ontologically primary and directly relevant to any understanding and to analysis of subjective existence. The results of the entire investigation to this point are summarized by Kierkegaard himself when he says that "Every man is a mind-body synthesis planned as something which will become spirit" (Sygdommen til Døden, my translation, p. 42). It remains to be seen how the factors relate to each other.

The factors of mind and body have been defined formally as elements in a "negative unity" by saying that they contradict each other; they are abstractly and conceptually related by being logically opposed and at odds. The inadequacy of such a relation consists in nothing more than the fact of the uncomplementarity, the oppositionality, of these factors in subjectivity. For Kierkegaard the mind-body relation is a conflict between contradictions and as such it is unhealthy, inadequate, and not gratifying. It is not until the factors are posited as the conditions of Selfhood that they have a chance of being positively unified, at which time their oppositionality is preserved but their conflict is annulled. So far, Kierkegaard's anthropology is nothing more than a formal model of the subject. Consciousness completes this model. Kierkegaard's description of human consciousness allows him to describe the mind-body relation as a sythesis within consciousness, and this is what he does. Consciousness, Kierkegaard will say, is the synthesis of mind and body.

Mentality and corporeality, as well as the other factors which later emerge as elements of Slefhood, have been depicted as the presuppositions or conditions into which human existence is thrown. They are the imparted a priori's for subjectivity, but they do not concretely exist as such until they are disclosed or revealed by consciousness, so in a sense subjectivity brings intself to light. Human consciousness unveils the conditions of existence and in so doing it makes them concrete and it "creates" itself. Kierkegaard acknowledges that such a view of consciousness is mysterious and paradoxical, but he nonetheless maintains it.

The conditions of human existence emerge in consciousness and they become concretely actualized by being disclosed there. Their concrete actualization is their synthesis; consciousness reveals and relates them by being interested in them. Mind and body are therefore to be construed not as indifferent, objective states-of-affairs, but rather as constituent references for human consciousness.

That the factors are disclosed in existence by consciousness is a notion suggested but not explicity worked out in one of Kierkegaard's early works, Johannes Climacus, or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est (JC). Johannes Climacus is principally an inquiry concerning the meaning of philosophy, concluding with an inquiry into the nature of human consciousness, into "Mind or consciousness as it is in itself, viz, as the instrument which explains all individual minds without itself being an individual mind" (JC, p. 147).

Consciousness is the vehicle and illuminator of the fragmentation which subjectivity is; it is the contradiction of mentality and corporeality conscious of itself, existing in the awareness of division and opposition. It is not simple awareness, since all life is awareness, but awareness of itself as the split between oppositional factors. More than this, human consciousness is the abyss suspended between and surrounded by its opposed, conditioning factors, and it is actual only as the interest of this abyss in itself. The pure undifferentiated awareness of the external world shared by organic consciousness (N_5) is indeed a condition for human existence, for it is within this organic mode of receptivity and open-ness that the break in human consciousness occurs. Such a primal awareness,

however, does not explain human consciousness; it is only a starting point. Organic consciousness, or the simple awareness shared by all living entities, is described by Kierkegaard as "immediacy", and this world of immediacy is hermetically enclosed in feeling. Whenever feeling breaks out of immediacy in thought or reflection it is no longer feeling and consciousness is no longer immediate consciousness. Immediacy is pure silence.

Speech is the break with organic life. Human consciousness abruptly leaps out of immediacy in language and its contradictions develop within speech:

> Cannot consciousness then remain in immediacy? This is a foolish question, for if it could no consciousness would exist. If this immediacy be identical with that of an animal, then the problem of immediacy is done away with. But then what would be the result of this? Man would be an animal, or in other words he would be dumb. That which annuls immediacy is therefore speech. If man could not speak then he would remain in immediacy... immediacy is reality and speech is ideality. For when I speak I introduce opposition.(JC, p.148)

Immediacy is absolute indefiniteness, having no distinctions or relations within it, even to the extent that it never distinguishes truth or falsity in what is present to it. It is pure, continuous response, without any opposition of subject and object, and its continuity and unity is disrupted when it speaks. But speaking does not formulate and lay down the oppositions which consciousness then appropriates as the substrate or matter of its actuality; human

consciousness is not a response to speech, rather, it is speaking. This implies the important point that consciousness is not just "ideality" opposed to "reality"; consciousness is the locus of these two contradictory spheres, engendered in speech. Human consciousness is not to be identified with reality. "Reality" and "ideality" and the elements of consciousness made explicit in speech; consciousness is their contradiction brought to life:

> For consciousness implies collision, and then contradiction inevitably appears. Reality is not consciousness, any more than ideality is. And yet consciousness is not present without both, and this opposition or contradiction between ideality and reality is the origin and essence of consciousness. This is the first pain of Becoming. (JC, pp. 149-150)

Consciousness, which has been labelled as the conditions of life made explicit, does not, however, create those conditions. It is only the contradiction living itself out in reflexive concern. The division in terms of which consciousness is concretely actual preceded consciousness originating in speech or "mediacy".

What is mediacy? It is "word". The "word" is the break with organic life, with immediacy, and consciousness is the care inhabiting this break. The word magically and violently fragments immediacy. The word is Reflection. Through Reflection, the world stands over and against the subject, whose life is divided into halves, and the emptiness between the halves is consciousness. "Reflexion is the possibility of relationship," but "consciousness is the relationship. The basic form (or essence) of consciousness is consciousness or opposition" and "the classifications

made by Reflexion are always dichotomatic: e.g.,ideality and reality, soul and body...and so on." (JC, p. 150)

Reflection, that is, language, posits duality and opposition---so speech is the possibility of consciousness---and consciousness is the actual contact of the factors in the duality when they collide. Consciousness is Interest or Care: "This can also be stated thus: Reflexion is disinterested. Consciousness on the contrary is relationship, and it brings with it interest or concern; a duality which is perfectly expressed with pregnant double meaning by the word "interest" (Latin interesse meaning: (i) to be between (ii) to be a matter of concern)" (JC, p. 152).

The severance of the speaker and what is spoken about is the first opposition introduced by language; before he speaks man is an immediate unity of organic receptivity and his environing milie at level N_5. The separation of subject (the speaker; ideality) and object (what is spoken about; reality) is a primary disjuction. Kierkegaard calls it the "origin and essence of consciousness" or the "first pain of Becoming". The second disjunction, which also presupposes speech, is a dismemberment within the speaker who, in speaking, discloses a dichotomy of mind and body within himself: this dichotomy is what makes him a subjective consciousness, a term defined here merely as reflectively aware contradiction. Consciousness is the synthesis of these two dichotomatic categories in interest; the subjective relation of mind and body is consciousness.

Kierkegaard leaves himself open to the interpretation that speech produces a mind and a body, that it is somehow an agent of creation for a psychological and physical system, which is absurd. Here the status of the factors must be remembered. Kierkegaard is surely not thinking

of the body which objectively exists as a bare fact before it is disclosed by language as a condition of human existence and subjectivity; he is not referring to a physical system of leucocytes, bone marrow, and so on. Nor is he thinking of mind as a sensate system of perceptions and information storage. Body and mind, conceived in this way, would equate with Strata N_4 and N_5 on the emergent hierarchy. Their status, then, is quite different when they are defined as ontological realities than when they are defined as categories in the symbolism of subjectivity. They are, in the context Kierkegaard establishes, categories of subjective existence, revealed only within and for consciousness. 'Mind' and 'body' are designations for realities described by ontoanthropology and they can therefore be described only as they are directly present to consciousness, given in the form of contradictory demands. The identity of subjectivity is contradiction; the existential a priori's of mentality and corporeality, given as the conditions of subjectivity, are juxtaposed in consciousness by concern or interest. On this basis, Kierkegaard's assertion that man is a "synthesis of mind and body sustained by spirit (der baeres af Aand)" (CD, p. 79) is comprehensible, when 'spirit' is understood as 'consciousness'[1].

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1. "Consciousness is spirit..."(JC,p.151). The equation of consciousness and spirit is a crucial point. Without such an equation the whole ontology of the subject collapses. The only commentator to have seen this necessary equation, to my knowledge, is the editor of the Danish edition of Sygdommen til Døden. Cf. the Gyldendals Uglebøger edition, p. 124: "Sjel, D.V.S. bevidsthed". In understanding the reason for this obscure equation one understands the unstated ontoanthropology in Kierkegaard.

It has been argued that subjectivity is a relation, that the relation is a relation of mind and body, and that the relation is within consciousness. A final important element, which could be referred to as a concrete determination of the relation, demands attention. Kierkegaard calls it the "negative" aspect of the subjective synthesis, and he provides a clue to the meaning of this concept. With specific reference to mind and body he says that when the relation "is the third term as a negative unity...such a relation is that between soul and body, when man is regarded as soul" (SUD, p. 146). It can now be asserted that subjectivity is the negative unity of mind and body in consciousness, that is, subjectivity is the interest in the contradiction of mind and body. Such is the subject's definition when he is regarded as soul, or, as Kierkegaard says elsewhere, when he is "psychically" defined. Kierkegaard doesn't say the subject is a negative unity when he regards himself as soul, but when he is regarded as soul. This means: "regarded as consciousness", a move permitted by the footnote on the previous page. In addition, the Concept of Dread provides grounds for this reading. In that work he defined man as "a synthesis of the soulish and the bodily. But a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third factor. The third factor is spirit" (CD, p. 39). Spirit, as we have learned from Johannes Climacus, is consciousness (JC, p. 151). So the triad is mind-consciousness-body. This is what Kierkegaard means when he says that man is a negative unity of mind and body "regarded as soul". Why is the subject a negative unity?

Human life at N_6 is primordially characterized as never-being-at-one with itself; it is always interested in itself, care-full of itself, solicitous toward itself. Its being is always an issue for it; it is never settled. The life of Everyman is a perpetual striving, as Kierkegaard says, always within essential disquiet, in continual motion, breathing in an atmosphere of tension: inert, homeostatic, fixed subjectivity is unimaginable. To attempt to conceive of human life without its restlessness and movement is to conceive of unconsciousness and death. Subjectivity's perturbed cycle of Becoming is a series of moments in which contradictory needs or demands are exerted in consciousness. Change is formally understood, even from a purely mechanical point of view, as the movement within oppositional conditions, that is, all kinesis is the offspring of conflict. Strife, as Empedocles saw, is the root and spring of all change, movement, and process. But such a formal, logical description is not vacuous, indeed, the Becoming of human existence is experience precisely in this way. It is strife pure and simple. The strain and tension which is subjective life is conflict generated from the mutual demands of opposed or contradictory forces. At the aesthetic, subjective level, this is what subjective existence is: restless change, generated from the clash and conflict of opposite factors.

Human being is experienced as the problem of resolving the contradictory demands within it accounting for its disquiet; human subjectivity recognizes its fate as the necessity of discovering the means for terminating the battle between these demands without actually destroying them. But while it is anxiously searching for a dynamic

equilibrium it is nonetheless the being which is in conflict; it is, the unrest and movement generated by demands or forces "outside" it, which have assumed the status of contrasting poles holding existence together.

Opposing forces, even forces like negative and positive elementary particles, can engage in conflict and initiate activity through their conflict only when they have a medium or field in which their potential opposition becomes actual. The ontological components of human being similarly become actual only when consciousness emerges as the field of their conflict. Consciousness is the actualization of ontological disparity, human subjectivity is a relation between opposing forces; it is the field within which opposing forces engage each other; the moving tension eventuating from their engagement is human consciousness.

All human movement is essentially undirected conflict; human subjectivity is fundamentally a division, a duality, a nature which is split. It is the rupture in Being in which conflict thrives, motivated by the demands of oppositional forces. The conflict is constant: no demand is ever met to the exclusion of the other. The other is always implicitly within its opposite, threatening it, disturbing it, or perverting it. Each is, as Kierkegaard says, dialectically related to the other. One force or demand can assert itself existentially only because its opposite resists it, making its own demands, and this is always the case, even when the Self is posited as the "positive" synthesis of opposite demands.

This much has been uncovered: human existence is most primitively delineated as disquieted movement generated by the clash of contradictory demands, and its destiny is somehow to reconcile the contradictions dividing it. This is the first and most general form of human life: the subject is the relational field of opposite demands, which form clusters, so to say: they gravitate towards a limited number of discernible elementary poles, each of which is a condition for subjective consciousness, an ontological presupposition for human life. Onto-genetically the first "cluster" is the dislocated mind-body relation.

Before the subject chooses itself in Selfhood it is a relation which is "negative". It is a negative relation, or an incomplete being in which contradictory demands tumultuously cohabit; subjective life is a fractured existence whose nature it is to be at odds with itself. The subject is the combat waged by the factors constituting its being. Prior to the founding of Selfhood, the relation is one of opposition and conflict only, of tumult and upheaval, where mind and body strive against each other without complementarity. The negative relation has no axis within it, no specific gravity (so to speak) through which the factors get positively synthesized. There is, in the negative relation, no commerce between the factors other than an impossible battle between divergent demands, never terminable in victory for one or the other, because the annihilation of one is the obliteration of both. The subject is the locus of pure conflict: he is the stand the factors assume relative to each other, not a stand relative to and in terms of them. The quiddity, in its purest form, of subjective life is negativity in the

mode of conflict arising out of the conditions of human life. The conflict, the incompleteness, or the negativity of subjectivity, is expressed as disequilibrium between the factors.

The formal properties of subjectivity have to a certain extent been spelled out in terms of the nature of the factors by which subjective consciousness is constituted and in terms of the form of the factor's relation to each other. Attention must now turn to a description of subjectivity's existential response to its nature and to the imperative given in that nature.

Existential Analysis

Structural analysis has described the properties of subjective existence in terms of its composition and the formal relation of its composite factors to one another, but nothing concerning an existential response to these properties and their relation has been clarified. It is known only that a set of factors is thrown into the world along with an imperative to come to terms with itself. What does this structure do once it finds itself in the world? Kierkegaard's answer is that the subject can undertake one of two gross existential projects: it can either pursue its "salvation" by "relating itself to itself" or it can recoil from this possibility and attempt to fall back even further into the level of pre-subjective mentality. The recognition of this "either-or" in subjectivity is made in dread (angest).

Dread is the experience in which the knowledge that subjectivity is pathological and that it must cure itself arises. It is an ambiguous mode of consciousness, which for Kierkegaard consists in the subject's awareness of his own sin, the first movement in the disruption of innocence

and immediacy. Sin, being for Kierkegaard the opposite of faith, is equatable here with the sickness inherent in subjective existence, and dread is the understanding, first, of original sin and, second, of the fact that the conditions for its transcendence are given in it. Dread is the "first reflex of freedom". It is also the awareness of the necessity to exercise the terrible freedom to choose one's self if one is to cure one's natural condition. Kierkegaard describes the consciousness engendered by dread as ambiguous; dread is phenomenologically disclosed and experienced as ambivalence toward the either/or given to consciousness when the fact of constitutional pathology is discovered; the subject desires a "cure" for his natural condition; at the same time he fears it: dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy (CD, p. 38). The possibility of salvation given in dread is both fascinating and alarming, thus it informs subjectivity of its options: a leap of faith or recoil and flight.

The phenomenon of dread exhibits dual aspects, one informing the subject of his facticity and pathology. "Sin" is now definable as "negativity", that is, in terms of the negativity of the subjective relation. So dread is, initially, the state of awareness in which the subject is informed of the contradictory duality on which his existence is based. The fact uncovered in dread is the fact of the divisionality of human nature, already depicted as the mind-body disparity at the point of origin. It should therefore be the case that the conflict of mind and body is the first ontological cleavage

experienced in dread, and for Kierkegaard this is exactly what happens.

Before the emergence of dread the subject is "innocent" and unaware of his fragmentation; he is not "determined as spirit, but psychically determined in immendiate unity with his natural condition" and his Self is "dreaming" (Begrebet Angest, p. 70). As long as the subject has not differentiated the poles of his existence in reflective consciousness he is an immediate unity of mind and body, distinguished from life at N_6 only insofar as he is potentially a split. In innocence, "everything turns upon dread coming into view" and with the inruption of dread disjunctivity is disclosed. In his disunity of mind and body, the subject comes to a consciousness of his sin through the category of the sexual. The sexual is the initial disclosure of subjective contradiction. This is the first chasm opened up by consciousness when reflection fragments immediacy, and the inseparability of sin (the fall from immediacy) and sexuality is of the utmost imortance for showing man's original state, for "if he was not indeed a synthesis reposing in a third thing the two consequences would not follow", to wit, the consequences of sin and sexuality. "If he was not a synthesis of mind and body, supported by spirit (sic), the Sexual could never have come in with sinfulness". The structure of subjective existence is posited as contradiction first in the sexual"; as soon as subjectivity posits itself as human it posits the synthesis of mind and body "but in order to posit the synthesis it must first penetrate it differentially, and the extreme limit of sensuality is precisely the sexual" (Begrebet Angest, pp. 78, 79, passim).

In dread, consciousness totters; the prolongation of dread is sexuality. Sexuality, in proportion to dread, intensifies as the subjective problem is revealed, to the point that a solution for sexuality becomes a necessity. The aesthetic "solution" is to try and return to immediacy and restore the original unity of body and mind by becoming objective.

The Sexual signifies the "prodigious contradiction" on which subjectivity is structured; this contradiction is the source of dread, and it is what makes man a subject and not an object, for subjectivity is contradiction and opposition. "If man were a beast or an angel he would not be able to be in dread. When he is a synthesis he can be in dread, and the deeper the dread the greater the man" (BA, p. 205). So by becoming less a man, less a contradiction or subject, consciousness decreases dread: "The most effective means for becoming free of the demands of spirit is to become spiritless" (BA, p. 160) and to become spiritless is to become less a subject and more an object.

Objectivity is the Weltanschauung of human being when it consistently confers the status of objects upon everything in its world, including itself. Objectivity is not, therefore, a property of objects but a way of existing for consciousness of which only a subject is capable. It is an attitude toward the world and toward oneself, an existential posture, in which subjectivity subsumes all phenomena, or tries to, under the rubric of object. They are transformed into the modes of exteriority and publicity, making human

life a catalogue of propositions and calculations. Objectivity is the expression of the subjective desire to return to original immediacy.

The objective "subject", in detaching his thought from his interiority and in handing it over to the community, is a Public entity, subject to the impersonal operations of measurement and calculation. The subject can do this, however, only because the community itself is given over to the ideal of objectivity, so that objectivity is really the outgrowth of a massive conspiracy (in this sense it is the source of original sin). One of Kierkegaard's shorter works, The Present Age), analyses this conspiracy. The most general conclusion of his brief phenomenology of cultural objectivity is that the tyranny of objectivism in all areas of human existence represents a withdrawal from subjective existence into a paralytic stratum of subsistence where subjective realities are flattened out and levelled down, where conflict and contradictions are neutralized.

The subject, as reflective objectivity, recedes back into a detached, spectatorial posture, effacing his subjectivity only to emerge as an ambiguous carrier of quantities submerged among other similar entities. He is pure externality, and as such announces himself to the world as a THING which, having produced a system of thoughts and actions, transports them into a public market place; he inserts them into a world of public objects where they function as indices of his identity. Although they are accidents somehow aligned

or contingently attached to him, they must at all costs be defended in the forum established by objectivism, for they represent everything he is.

The subject's turnover of itself to the negativity of abstract objectivity eventuates in its becoming levelled out into a kind of mathematical entity with all other given-over human beings, but in a way that no personal demands are placed upon it and no distinctions are found within it. A negative and abstract equality ensues between human entities when they retire from their being in this fashion. Once individuality is erased, the levelling process draws everything into its orbit and down to a common denominator of quantity, and all issues are referred to the empty denominator of number for resolution. The process is vicious: in a levelled world the subject does not really know he or she is lost, for the levelled world is exactly the means for camouflaging lost-ness, inasmuch as it has annihilated subjectivity.

The levelling process is a fall from plurality to one-ness, that is to say, in the process of levelling existing subjects dismantle their subjectivity and interiority until each person's nothingness conjoins with the nothingess of everyone else at a common vacuous point which provides support for each instance of emptiness: nothing remains except a cohesive impersonal wasteland of negative "subjects".

The levelling process is possible only because subjectivity can disperse itself into a repository of objectivity, where it subsists as impersonal, objective, externality. Inwardness dilutes

outwardly into a locus of emptiness, which untruthfully confirms that the emptiness is "real" and "full". The procedure is simply this: human nothingness convinces itself that it is something by resorting to the very criteria for nothingess; nothingness is externality and the medium of confirmation for objective existence is also externality.

Kierkegaard calls the repository of objectivity "The Public". The Public has no density, so to speak, no point of self reference. giving the subject no centre through which he is defined by himself and for himself. Instead, the public subject is an abstract, ungrounded negativity outside himself. As such, the Public subject makes nothing his own, appropriating nothing into interiority: its thinking, its interests, and its language is sunken and flattened in the Public Self.

The Public dismembers the principle of contradiction; it is the law of included middle, where A and not-A fade into each other. From the point of view of ontoanthropology, as far as it has been worked out, the abolition of the principle of contradiction makes perfect sense. What, after all, is the subject? It is contradiction bearing the requirements that it reconcile its contradictions by taking a stand on itself in venture and risk. The nature of its contradiction has already been spelled out, and from that standpoint levelling can be understood as the retreat from existential contradiction into objectivity, such that human existence, whose very substance is opposition and disjunction, refuses to be itself by transforming itself

into an objective thing in the medium of Publicity.

Things are non-contradictory; homogeneity is their essence. In the mode of Public thing-ness, human being has erased its essence, because it has honed down its contradictions to the point that nothing is opposed within it any longer. A levelled Public entity is an object, absorbing the world and its experience into the modality of objectivity. Its being is objective; its truth is objective; its happiness is objective. That is, the subject is EXTERNALIZED.

Kierkegaard's position has been reconstructed to the following point. Human existence is constituted dualistically; it is the movement generated by the conflict of contradictory demands (factors) which, by virtue of the imperative that subjectivity heal itself, seek a positive synthetic resolution. The discovery of the divisionality of human existence and its concurrent need for healing is made in dread by the consciousness responsible for unveiling the factors in speech or symbolic discourse. The primordial division revealed in dread is the split between mind and body, whose existential expression is absorption in sexuality. The retraction from the possibility for positive synthesis, uncovered in dread, is the project in which subjective consciousness attempts to reduce itself to an object in the hope of restoring an original unity.

As a negative synthesis the subject longs for deliverance from his contradictions; the conflict generated by the antipodes of his nature can be eliminated only if his inherent duality is also eliminated. The flight from dread, the recoil from the innate "sin"

of subjectivity, is an attempt to get back to an original state of innocence, to a primal unity, to immediacy. The aesthetic ideal in terms of which all aesthetic projects are undertaken is the obliteration of subjective consciousness and a restoration of the primitive consciousness out of which subjective consciousness emerged in reflection and discourse. That is, aestheticism is the way in which subjective consciousness pursues the pure feeling or sensation which pre-existed discourse, and this is immediacy. Aestheticism is the way in which objective human subjectivity sustains itself; it is how the subject which seeks to be an object existentially maintains itself while necessarily remaining a subject.

Consciousness and immediacy mutually cancel each other. And yet the return to immediacy remains as the fundamental goal of aestheticism, with the result that aesthetic existence must be characterized as the pursuit of an illusion. To succeed, aesthetically, is to fail completely; to descend to the level of immediacy sought at N_5 by the aesthetic ideal is to simultaneously remove the very conditions which desire continuation in fulfilment. This is the impossibility inherent in Kierkegaard's aestheticism: to become an object, embodying pure, undifferentiated sensation and still remain consciously human. The self-negating project is nonetheless ambitiously pursued; the subject is driven by the nature of his being to do it.

Aestheticism posits exterior objects as sources of gratification and pleasure. The objects cannot be located within the aesthetic subject himself, for it is precisely externality into which the subject flees in dread. So something <u>other</u> than itself must be

procured which generates and stimulates sensation for the subject's receptivity. The Other is sought and pursued as a reference to the need projected from dread, namely, the need to heal the rift between mind and body. The rift is expressed as sexual interest. Consequently, the Other must bear those attributes appropriate to the nature of the need. Such an object could be nothing other than a sexual object which functions as a reference and source for the gratification of subjective desire. The sensation sought by the aesthete, in his attempt to recover an immediacy prior to the dislocation of mentality and corporeality, must satisfy the needs of those conditions which initially invoked the demand for salvation; dread reveals mind and body as divided, and once conscious of himself as such a division, living out its contradiction in sexual interests, the aesthetic subject is necessarily constrained to pursue immediacy in a sexual object. This is the fundamental aesthetic project: to attempt to restore immediacy in the medium of sexuality. Sexual objects are directly present to subjective consciousness as a coalescence of mind and body.

Whether subjectivity is acting on the Other or being acted on by the Other, its fundamental project is still the objectification of erotic entities as sources of sensation, and its medium of interaction with them is force and control (exhibited in endless and subtle ways). Both forms of aesthetic orientation still reduce to dependence: "The aesthete...is dependent on objects which are

other than he is and which condition him. He discovers that his form of consciousness is really a dependent consciousness" (Bernstein, 1971, p. 86). Erotic objects are the condition for aestheticism and the must be manipulated and controlled in order that sensation can be elicited from them.

Erotic objects are the condition for human control. They are, however, objects of subjective interest and therefore appear to consciousness not simply as matter (or body) nor simply as mentality, but as mind-and-body expressed in sexuality. Sexual objects, existing in the world as potentiality for control, function as resistance; aesthetic love is the attempt to subjugate this resistance, actively or passively, in such a way as to secure sensation from it. It is the need to isolate another erotic entity as an object for seduction. Seduction is the paradigmatic project of aesthetic subjectivity; it is the apparent instrument for restoring immediacy to objectified subjective consciousness.

The preceding lengthy reconstruction of Kierkegaard's anthrpology is intended to serve as the basis for developing a phenomenology of the subject. His authorship, as it has been interpreted, is prodigiously suggestive and gravid: in one form or another, all his major concepts contribute---in modified form---to a description of the emergent properties of subjectivity. On this basis, the elaboration of the ontoanthropology can proceed with indebtedness to Kierkegaard's insights.

Summary

1. A reconstruction of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of the subject was proposed as representative for the analysis of the distinctly human properties of level N_6 on the emergent hierarchy.

2. Structural analysis disclosed human nature as consciousness of contradiction. The first contradiction is revealed in dread as the mind-body opposition, and it arises through language in the form of sexual interest.

3. Existential analysis disclosed that human consciousness generally attempts to resolve its contradictions by regressing to the non-contradictory state (the objectivity of N_5) out of which it emerged. The environment is which this regressive project occurs is the impersonal Public.

4. The next chapter will attempt to expand and corroborate Kierkegaard's analysis with historical and empirical evidence. It will retrace the development of human consciousness in the race and in the individual.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ONTOANTHROPOLOGY III:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECTIVITY

Kierkegaard's revelation of the significance of such categories as immediacy, duality, dread, consciousness, and objectification form the basis for an analysis of the level of subjectivity. His insights, subject to modification at the bar of historical evidence and modern interpretation, remain essentially intact as contributions to the development of a comprehensive and contemporary ontoanthropology. As Becker points out, "In the last few decades as new discovery of Kierkegaard has been taking place, a discovery that is momentous because it links him into the whole structure of knowledge in the humanities in our time...He gave us some of the best empirical analyses of the human condition ever fashioned by man's mind" (Becker, 1973, p. 67). The psychologist Mowrer is quite right in pointing out that Freud had to conceptualize psychoanalysis before Kierkegaard's genius could be appreciated (Mowrer, 1950), so that now, in a post-Freudian era, the original Kierkegaardian categories can be refurbished and deployed as foundational elements in a modern metaphor of man.

The procedure now will be to synthesize an ontoanthropology from Kierkegaard and a number of other relvant sources, commencing with an evolutionary account of the emergence of the subjective stratum (N_6) in the species and the individual, adhering to Vico's principle that a thing's <u>nature</u> is given in its <u>natus</u> (coming-into-being).

The synthesis will be guided by the principle that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, so the first section will search for the origins of subjectivity in racial and individual development. Once the emergent essence of subjectivity is located in time, the structure and development of subjectivity as a dimensional system can be described.

The Evolution of Subjectivity

Phylogeny

Like nearly all great ideas, Kierkegaard's intuition concerning the origin of human nature is elegant in its simplicity: human nature emerges when the unity of natural life ("immediacy") is reflectively split and becomes interested in itself as a dualism. Subjective consciousness is, quite simply, the opposition of symbolic categories within a field of awareness; it is the awareness of internal separation, distinction, difference, contradiction, or bipolarity. Unlike consciousness of the natural mind at stratum N_5, which is indeed able to make discriminations and distinctions, subjectivity distinguishes "this" from "that" introflectively, (to speak neologistically) beginning with the opposition of "I-ness" and "Otherness", subject and object. These are concepts or categories, already buried in the symbolism of consciousness, a knowing-along-with which presupposes human language. Soofar, this is a repetition of Hegel's analysis of intentionality in the Phenomenology of Mind (Taylor, 1975), but Kikerkegaard advances beyond Hegel by giving the dual structure of consciousness an existential content in the form of sexuality.

The natus of subjectivity's natura is pinpointed by Kierkegaard in the emergence of a sexualized being, when the upright animal experienced shame (blufaerdigheden) over its naked body, when it lost its natural innocence and became reflectively divided off and alienated from its corporeality in dread. The first alienation for Kierkegaard, recall, is the alienation of mind from body in the medium of sexuality; this was the original sin, the original loss of faith and wholeness. The appearance of sin, which is to say sickness,is the same thing as the historical emergence of subjectivity, and for Kierkegaard this is " a subject for the interest of psychology" (CD, p.19). He approaches the origins of subjectivity through the single most important narration in Biblical mythology, namely, the myth of the Fall of Man from the prelapsarian innocence of Eden. This myth is incontestably one of the most critical pieces of historical data for an ontoanthropological accounting os subjectivity's emergence. With appropriate amendments and concessions, it can be read as a psychological, rather than theological, narration of subjectivity's phylogenesis. Now, it is inconceivable that the Genesis myth of human origins has the same meaning or intention in King James English as it did in Mosaic Hebrew. For one thing, there is not one narration, but two. But a motif is evident in each which, in general outline, discloses some deep and foundational facts. First, the original human, the Primal Man, was not sexually differentiated: "Male and female he created them and called their name Adam in the day when they were created" (Genesis 5:2). That is, Adam was not the first male of the species, but the name for the males and females of the race before their sexual differentiation or before they were subjectively conscious. 'Adam' would

then designate, in a loose sense, the asexual state of human nature before the Fall into subjective consciousness, a state of unpolarized generality, of androgyny, of psychophysical hermaphroditism. 'Adam', after all, derives from 'formed from the earth' in Hebrew (as does 'human' in English) and the systematic masculinization of the term, as well as of 'God', is a result of a mistranslation (Mathers, 1957). The first human (the first differentiation of humus) was "man-woman, and as hermaphrodite he is basically asexual" (Singer, 1976, p.99). It was later that Adam slept and spawned the female other, thus differentiating each into male and female, but even at this stage the sexes are not aware of their difference. They are not yet subjectively conscious. It is only when they become conscious of distinctions, above all the distinction between the polarities of good and evil, that "the eyes of them were both opened and they knew that they were naked" (Genesis 3:7).

> The radical alteration of God's image by his own hand that occurs when God extracts Eve from the body of Adam represents the first act of differentiation that occurs within the infantile psyche. Here, the first step away from the unconscious hermaphrodite is taken with the appearance of two distinct units or opposites. But with this first act of differentiation a strange event occurs. The division of the figures yields a type of creature God had not anticipated. Here for the first time the possibility of consciousness occurs...suddenly, for the first time since their separation out of the original hermaphroditic mold modelled after their maker the two perceive one another. They look at each other and see each other

> in their nakedness; they have feeling for one another. (Poncé, p. 26)

The Fall is out of innocence, nature, and immediacy into the knowledge of opposites, into the antipodes and polarities of symbolic consciousness, first manifest in the awareness of Otherness, specifically sexual Otherness. The knowledge of good and evil is existentially experienced in the psychological separation of male and female in consciousness. As Kierkegaard points out, differential genital organization has already occurred, but until the Fall transpires, subjectivity is "dreaming" and the opposition is still only potential. On this basis, it can be said that the Genesis myth is a very bare narration of the movement of humanity from the stratum of natural mind N_5) to the stratum of subjectivity (N_6) and the contradictions of consciousness. The narration is of course ancient and sparse, reflecting subjectivity's comprehension of itself in its infancy, and hence it leaves out as much as it says. Two problems in particular lead to the necessity of interpretation.

First, what is the role of speech in the Biblical story? We know that Adam possessed language in some sense before the Fall, because Genesis tells us he named all the creatures and that he spoke with God. But when he ate the fruit of knowledge everything changed: he became subjective and sexually differentiated. It is impossible to say now what 'knowledge' would have meant in Hebrew around 800 BC, or even what 'good' and 'evil' meant, but at least we know from the Biblical myth that the first knowledge of which the primal Adam was capable before his fall into sexual otherness was the knowledge of contrariety, and this

contrariety was somehow constitutive of his nature. Good and evil became categories for consciousness; they formed the symbolic content for the disjunctive structure of human nature. Since the precursor to subjectivity is natural, immediate mind, the essence of the transformation from one stratum to another may be clarified through a comparison of natural mentality with subjectivity, thereby clarifying the differenct between natural communication and subjective discourse. All animals communicate in one way or another (Wilson, 1978) with whistles, motions, colors, shreeks, and so on. At the highest levels, chimpanzees communicate with visual signs, but no organism other than human gives any sign of having the capacity for what Kierkegaard calls discourse. Before acquiring "knowledge" of disjunctive categories the Edenic Adam must have closely approximated this state of bestial intelligence, in which communication is automatic, determined, respondent, and genetically programmed. The qualitative leap into subjective consciousness occurred when communication dramatically transformed from signal codes into symbolic meaning systems (Cassirer, 1944; Schmidt, 1973). This is not a change in quantity or degree but a true emergent kinesis. The prodigious change resides in the emergence of an interior symbolic space, an inner mental region, whose reality is experienced as a system of meanings in reference to which the "I" identifies itself. This change from mentalistic communication to subjective symbolism, from stimulus-bound responses to categorical representation, is the change from the stratum of mind to the stratum of subjectivity, from communication to reflective discourse. With the

Fall, a new stratum emerges:

> No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe, Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront reality immediately, he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites, that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium (Cassirer, 1944, p. 25).

Concerning the role of speech in the Biblical narrative, we may say, then, that language or communication pre-exists symbolic consciousness (subjectivity), but it is a language of bestial and immediate intelligence commonly observable in the nonhuman species today. With the advent of subjectivity this natural language is not improved or modified but <u>displaced</u> at a higher level by symbolic speech. Symbolism <u>creates</u> a new ontological stratum, a new reality. Novel properties emerge which are not found in the lower stratum of immediate mentality.

A second question concerns the necessity for subjectivity to express its first contradictions as sexuality. The Biblical narrative says that the human race became conscious of itself in its sexual nature when it became knowledgeable of the symbolic polarities of good and evil. Again, the symbolism of 'good' and 'evil' more than twenty-seven centuries ago is beyond our contemporary grasp, but a consistent interpretation is possible along Kierkegaardian lines. Jaynes (1976) suggests that 'evil' originally designated the void or emptiness left behind by the loss and departure of the Gods, by the loss of direct authority. 'Good' and 'God' may have in fact been identified, as they are in their etymological roots in old English. Evil is then the absence of God (as some modern theology says it is) and subjective consciousness would accordingly emerge as the knowledge of separation from God, in short, as alienation from the ground of being. The knowledge of Good and Evil is originally the awareness of difference and estrangement; to eat of the tree of knowledge meant that the Edenic human differentiated the Self from the not-Self. The primordial symbolism of consciousness is simply the subject-object split of which the subject has knowledge, or upon which it reflects. With this first reflective act, mankind is banished from paradise, condemned to mortality, and invested with sorrow.

The break with unity and innocence, the shattering of immediacy, accrues on the knowledge of good and evil, which has just been defined as knowledge of separation of opposition. They symbols of difference violently wrench the first human out of their natural minds, and the first chasm opened up by this difference is the bare distance between I

and Other. The first form of this I-Other separation, according to Genesis and Kierkegaard, is sexual distinction---the sexualized opposition of male and female. Why does the structure of Otherness first reveal itself as sexual contariety? The Biblical account does not say; we know only that prior to having "knowledge" the man and woman were "naked...and not ashamed" whereas later they "knew that they were naked" and there was "enmity" between them. Singer(1976) says only that "gradually in the process of becoming conscious (man) becomes aware of all the other pairings of opposites, the male-female pair being the most important, for this pair can be seen as a metaphor for nearly all the others" (p.100). Kierkegaard's explanation is that the instant subjectivity "posits" itself it does so by positing an opposition within itself, and this opposition is "first posited in the sexual as a contradition" because the "factors" in the opposition are those of mind and body. N.O. Brown (1966) approaches the problem in roughly the same way. Originally everything was unity, a single body: this is the Good (Godhead). The body of God, in the Fall, is "broken into pieces", into difference and polarity: "Separateness, then, is the Fall---the fall into division" (p. 148). The original body is androgynous and hermaphroditic, but the self splits <u>itself</u> off from the body in the original dismemberment. It becomes separated from God in the reflective knowledge of good and evil. When mankind (adham, or Adam) fell, it first fell into bare otherness, but the "ego is incapable of splitting the object (or splitting with the object) without a corresponding split taking place within the ego" (p. 148). Moreover, "the split of self from environment, and of self into both self and

environment, is also the split of self or soul from body" (p. 51). The body, originally an androgynous unity, is dismembered into body and other-than-body,i.e., into body and soul. Again, the dismemberment is a division in the symbolism of consciousness; the primordial Self-Other fracture is an opposition of categories in and for consciousness, and is originally expressed as a disjunction between mind and body. The "prototype of all opposition or contrariety is sex...Dual organization is sexual organization" and the "prototype of the division into two sexes is the separation of Mother Earth and Father Sky, the primal parents. The primal one body that was divided was parental and bisexual" (p.23).

At this point consciousness emerges as sexual concern because sexuality is the most pervasive medium for the restoration of immediacy and unity. For consciousness, it is a symbol or metaphor of reconciliation, of union and unity, of innocence. Adam became male and female in his Otherness and alienation in the moment he perceived Eve in her nakedness as a sexual object which would heal his separateness of Self and Other, body and mind. "The tendency of the sexual instinct is to restore an earlier state of things, an earlier state of unity, before life was sexually differentiated; ultimately going back to a state "before living substance was torn apart into spearate particles" (Freud)" (p. 85). The original symbolic cleavage, the first subjective representation of the withdrawal and splitting of Godly unity into self and other, is the polarization of mind and body. The original principle of unity, metaphorized in the image of the androgynous cosmic parent

uniting within itself the male and female principles, is symbolically realized in the completion of coitus. The ideal is essentially realized in the repeatedly sought moment of orgasmic union, in which subjective consciousness is literally lost and the symbolic contradictions of subjectivity are transitorily dissolved. This most profound anthropological fact justifies the concluding assertion of the last chapter that seduction is the paradigmatic project of aesthetic retreat back to objectivity. The dread or anxiety of Otherness almost demands it.

The objectification of selfhood should therefore be evident in the earliest institution of ancient history. From Genesis one would infer that the institution of marriage is mankind's first objectification, since Adam and Eve's first significant act after being banished from Eden was a sexual, procreative one. Eve was Adam's "wife" in Eden, but their alliance was not consummated until after they became conscious, and they did not start a family until then as well. Vico sagaciously observes that human history commences in the institution of marriage, which originated in sexual desire. In a deeply revealing passage, Vico relates that early man was once indiscriminately copulating when a thunderstorm began and, terrorized by the thought that the Gods were angry, the man dragged the woman into a cave and kept her there for sexual purposes (Vico, p. 128). In any case, one sees that the attempt to get back to innocence, to recoil into immediacy and heal the mind-body rupture, is objectified in the institution of marriage. The importance of this notion will eventually be made evident.

The myth of the Fall elucidates something about the phylogeny of humanity. It is the deepest and most revelatory narration in Western history, so much so that our most sacred book commences with it. As such, it illuminates the deepest structure of subjectivity and the earliest experience of the species, thus providing the basis for a psychology of subjectivity. Genesis is mythology (mythos=story, fable), and mythology is the repository for the collective experience and memory of the race. It is our single most important source of information about our natus. As Campbell has expertly concluded, "Dream is the personalized myth, myth the depersonalized dream; both myth and dream are symbolic in the same general way of the dynamics of the psyche. But in the dream the forms are quirked by the peculiar troubles of the dreamer whereas in myth the problems and solutions shown are directly valid for all mankind" (Campbell, 1949, p. 19). Motifs in other myths of human creation should accordingly verify or corroborate that of the Biblical account. And so they do.

Every culture embodies a mythological account of origins. There are two types; one is cosmogenic and the other is anthrogenic. Each is pervaded by a single theme: creation is the result of an original bifurcation of unity, a separation into opposites. The opposites are usually described according to sexual gender (Cf. Freund, 1975). For example, the ancient Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad describes it this way: As a lonely man is unhappy, God was unhappy. He wanted a companion. He was as big as man and wife together; He divided himself into two, husband and wife were born. God said: "Man is only half himself; his

wife is the other half." They joined and mankind was born (Freund, p.3). Similarly, the Homeric version of creation divinizes Eros, oldest of the Greek pantheon and double-sexed, as the one who set the universe in motion. Later, Plato refers to a prototypical myth of the origin of human love in his Symposium. Essentially, love is the desire to reunite with one's original half which was lost when the Gods severed everyone in half: "Human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love"(p.319). The myth of the Fall from unity into sexual differentiation crosses all cultures and religions. It is found in one form or another in all ancient cultures, and its structure remains pretty well invarient (Singer, p. 122). It is foundational to the world views of ancient astrology, Gnosticism, Kabbalism and medieval alchemy. The world views of Taoism and Hinduism, with their mythologies of yin and yang, male and female, would be unthinkable without a narrative of an original "breaking into pieces". Jungian psychology begins with this conception. But nowhere is the myth more clearly evident than in the doctrines of Tantric yoga. Elisabeth Haich, in a necessary but intellectually muddled attempt, argues that "poles" are expelled from a primitive unity, and that these poles are mind and body. Sexuality is the link between them, and Tantric yoga is the path for recovering the original androgynous condition (Haich, 1972; Thompson, 1973; Singer, 1976). Curiously, the recently discovered Gospel according to Thomas attributes the following saying to Christ: "...When you make the male and the female into a single one, so that the male will not be male and the female (not) be female... then shall you enter (the Kingdom)" (p. 17).

An extensive survey of planetary mythologies would likely confirm Kierkegaard's choice of the Eden myth as the most important Western documentation of subjectivity's phylogeny. But rather than pursue this tack, the results of two significant investigations into the origins of consciousness will be summarized, both of which are based on comprehensive knowledge of mythological motifs. These inquiries have been isolated because they are specifically interested in the emergence of subjective consciousness, and they jointly illuminate the structure and evolution of subjectivity.

1. Neumann: The Origins and History of Consciousness

Neumann's superb investigation into the natus of subjectivity is regulated by the dictum, already accepted as an ontoanthropological principle, that the stages of racial development are recapitulated in the stages of individual development; his task is to show that

> A series of archetypes is a main constituent of mythology, that they stand in an organic unity to one another, and that their stadial succession determines the growth of consciousness. In the course of its ontogenetic development, the individual ego consciousness has to pass through the same archetypal stages which determined the evolution of consciousness in the life of humanity. (Neumann, 1954, p. xvi).

The developmental stages are not so much temporally defined periods in linear development as they are "layers", each of which is a qualitative transformation of the preceding ones. Each stage is ultimately conditioned by an original emergent event in the life of

collective and individual subjectivity, namely, a primordial splitting and breaking of immediacy and unity. This momentous psychological event represents the dawn of consciousness in the race and in the child. Prior to this event, there is no world, no ego, no otherness. In the creation myths found throughout all cultures the unconscious condition of unity and perfection is symbolized in the circle or the egg. The World Egg, the nucleous of the beginning, is "the perfect state in which the opposites are united---the perfect beginning because the opposites have not yet flown apart and the world has not yet begun" (p.9). The earliest representation of this stage of hermaphroditic roundness was the Uroboros, the self-begetting and self-consuming serpent which eats its own tail. It is the paradisical state, containing within it the world parents who are unconsciously joined in perpetual coitus. It is the Taoistic t'ai chi (the circle containing male and female) and the Hundu purusha (the unity of male and female). Neumann describes this unconscious condition as the uroboric pleroma: the self-contained stasis of plenitude and wholeness, and the longing to return to it as "uroboric incest". This incestuous urge is individually manifest in various symbolic efforts to return to the womb.

The twilight of consciousness, before the emergence of the ego, is a consciousness of assimilation of objects from the "outside" to the "inside", specifically through the mouth in the form of food. With the development of reflective symbolism the act of eating is ritualized and symbolized. In Genesis, Adam becomes conscious after he eats; Neumann believes man prefigured consciousness in ritualistic cannibalism and communion mysteries. Already the uroboric simplicity begins to

dissolve: the presexual, hermaphroditic round is distinguished from the ego as a source of nourishment, which accounts for the phallic content of the earliest mythologies and food taboos or fetishes. The third stage is that of separation of the world parents into male and female, and with this act subjectivity emerges. Detachment from the uroboros, entry into the world as an independent, sexualized "I" opposed to the "Other", is the first essential task of human development.

The uroboros is the collective womb of humanity, and life in its undifferentiated roundness is unconscious. Uroboric existence is therefore identified with maternity, with the mythological great mother. The incipient ego, under the dominance of the unconscious maternal principle (which is still presexual in character), contends with several aspects of unconscious nature, broadly represented in primitive mythology as the devouring mother (nature as destructive) and the good mother (nature as nourishing). Both aspects must be worshipped and appeased, and this involves a rebellious struggle in which the conscious ego separates from the original maternal principle and becomes "masculine": "The stage of the struggles marks the separation of the conscious ego from the unconscious, but the ego is not yet stable enough to push on to the separation of the first parents and the victorious struggle of the hero" (p. 96). With the separation of the uroboric world parents, subjectivity is nascent.

The struggle with mother nature individuates the ego as "this" distinguished from "that", as "I" opposed to "nature".

> The experience of "being different", which is the primary fact of nascent ego consciousness and which occurs in the dawnlight of discrimination, divides the world into subject and object; orientation in time and space succeeds man's vague existence in the dim mists of prehistory and constitues his early history...Besides disentangling itself from its fusion with nature and the group, the ego, having now opposed itself to the non-ego as another datum of experience, begins simultaneously to constellate its independence of nature as independence of the body...This leads finally, as we know, to a state of systematized ego consciousness, where the entire bodily realm is to a large extent unconscious, and the conscious system is split off from the body as the representative of unconscious processes. (pp. 110-111)

The struggle then begins: the masculine ego is separated from the feminine body. The original bisexual constitution of the uroboric world parents is sundered and fractured into Male and Female. It is the first symbolic, reflective delineation of ego: "To discriminate, to distinguish, to mark off, to isolate oneself from the surrounding context---these are the basic acts of consciousness" (p. 121). In Neumann's interpretation, then, there are successive developments in the origin of consciousness. First, the pleromatic shell of unconscious nature is made into an object, symbolized in rituals such as ceremonial food consuption, fertility rites, and sacrifices. Consciousness is incipient here; the leap into subjectivity is not yet complete. The stage is being set, however, insofar as the oppositions

of self and nature, ego and body, conscious and unconscious, are being reflectively symbolized. The completion of this process is the third stage, when unconscious nature is polarized into male and female, into opposites, shorn of unity and wholeness, at enmity and in conflict. This dismemberment is the expulsion from paradise: This loss of wholeness and of total unconscious integration with the world is experienced as the primary loss; it is the original deprivation which occurs at the very outset of the ego's evolution. Isolation from nature (the first dismemberment) leaves the ego frightened and alone; isolation of male and female from the original pleroma leaves the ego in turmoil and internal disruption.

The tumult of consciousness is, for Neumann, generally placated in one of two ways. The ego can first suppress one side of the opposition or the other, that is, it can force the masculine side (animus) to subdue the feminine side(anima), or it can force the masculine side to capitulate. Alternatively, the ego can attempt a regression to the preconscious pleromatic condition (uroboric incest). This is the project of group collectivization and massification; the group stands in as the medium in which the unconscious desire for unity is pursued. Both projects are futile.

Neumann's reconstruction of mythology continues into further stages in the evolution of consciousness, which include the heroic stages of stuggle with the first parents, transformational odysseys, and the synthesis of selfhood. But for our purposes, we have enough to go on. His interpretation has confirmed a profoundly significant idea:

> The breakdown of the uroboric initial state leads to differentiation in duality, decombination of the original ambivalence, division of the hermaphroditic constitution, and the splitting of the world into subject and object, inside and outside, and to the creation of good and evil, which are discriminated with the expulsion from the uroboric Garden of Paradise where the opposites lie down together. Naturally enough, as soon as man becomes conscious and acquires ego, he feels himself a divided being, since he also possesses a formidable other side which resists the process of becoming conscious. (p. 122)

Neumann's conclusions derive from an exhaustive survey of ancient mythology, and they historically corroborate aspects of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of subjectivity, at least the most important ones. Another investigator, Jaynes, has made similar excursions into early mythology and has come up with conclusions which while strikingly different in some respects, cannot be neglected by any attempt to build an ontoanthropology from a Kierkegaardian base. A brief summary of his findings will eventually be incorporated into the analysis of level N_6.

2. Jaynes: The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind

For Jaynes, the question of the essence of consciousness has never been answered. He intelligently rejects every position on the question from behaviorism to phenomenalism. His own position, to be spelled out here, regards consciousness, i.e. subjectivity, as an emergent quality quite distinct from mental or biological processes. His 1977 work is

an account of the structure and development of subjectivity.

Jaynes is much more emphatic than Neumann in his insistence that subjectivity is grounded in language. If anything, it is a transformation of the Edenic signal language discussed earlier. Language, he says, is metaphor. Every term of speech was originally metaphoric, in which a metaphrand (the phenomenon described) is symbolized by a metaphier (the descriptor). "Subjective conscious mind is an analog of what is called the real world. It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behavior in the physical world" (p.55), and "mental acts are analogs of bodily acts" (p.66). Infused into most metaphors are associations or attributes of the metaphiers, called paraphiers. Paraphiers are reflected back into the metaphrand as its paraphrand. For example, in the metaphor "she purred gently" the metaphrand is a bit of behavior which is appealing, and the metaphier is a relaxing cat. But the power of the metaphor is in the paraphier of the metaphier: slow, rhythmic, contented, gentle action with quasi-erotic associations. These associations then become the paraphrands of the original metaphrand. Jaynes' argument is that consciousness is spun out of the concrete metaphiers of expression and their paraphiers, projecting paraphrands that exist only in a functional sense, so that consciousness "is the metaphrand when it is being generated by the paraphrands of our verbal expressions. But the functioning of consciousness is, as it were, the return journey. Consciousness is spatialized, rooted as it is in visual metaphors, and it excerpts particular aspects of the world into

its space. The analogic "inner" world (the analog "I" or the metaphoric "me") narratizes itself and its experience within this metaphoric space".

How did this process of consciousness originate? Jaynes argues, with massive historical corroboration, that at one time man was unconscious, even though he had language. But the spatializing, analogizing, narratizing, and interiorizing aspects of subjectivity were absent, because all behavior was responsive conformity to commands from the Gods. The divine voices, Jaynes believes, were literally auditory hallucinations, and when these hallucinations stopped, human beings had to fill the void on their own, thereby becoming subjective. This happened at some point in the second millenium BC. Until then entire civilizations were unconscious, much in the same way that somnambulents and hypnotized subjects are, living with no inner life until about 10,000 BC, when they developed inner voices to solve problems. These voices, actually just side effects of early language, enabled the early humanoids to persist in their tasks. Eventually the voices were attributed to kings and gods, becoming instruments of social control which permitted, almost like a superego, early nomadics to live in communities. The brain slowly evolved to accommodate the voices; the "bicameral mind" had two sides to it: "...the speech of the Gods was directly organized in what corresponds to Wernicke's area on the right hemisphere and was "spoken" or "heard" over the anterior commisures to or by the auditory area of the left temporal lobe" (p. 105). Bicameral civilization began to break down sometime after 2000 BC, due to social stress, the undermining of divine authority by the written word, migrations,

invasions, and natural catastrophes, all of which contributed to the "wedge between God and man which results in consciousness" (p.259). Though subdued, the voices of the right side of the brain still break through in delirium, drug intoxication, schizophrenia, and intense creativity. The neurosurgeon Penfield (1963) may have revived them electrically when he stimulated the right side of the brain and elicited feelings of unreality, often music, and strange voices ordering the patient to do something.

Jaynes' compilation of data from neurology, psychopathology, archaeology, linguistics, and, particularly, mythology in support of his theory is indeed both exhaustive and impressive, but it is not relevant to either recount it or evaluate it here. The assumption is made that his argument is evidentially sound. Instead, some general implications and themes of his model need to be summarized for incorporation into ontoanthropology. The first of these is that the emergence of subjective consciousness is coextensive with a catastrophic transformation of bicameral "language" into subjective symbolism, which Jaynes would characterize as metamorphosis from automatic signal language into metaphoric symbolization. Preconscious man was a robot without an ego, slavishly following the commands of the Gods without a sense of will or agency. It is only when there is a breakdown in the bicameral mind and a concurrent opposition or conflict between the divine commands and kinaesthetic sensations that the analog "I" emerges into consciousness. Jaynes cites an example in the Iliad, where Agamemnon is told by his

voices to take Briseis away from Achilles: "As he does so, the response of Achilles begins in his etor, or what I suggest is a cramp in his guts, where he is in conflict or put into two parts (mermerizo) whether to obey his thumos, the immediate internal sensations of anger, and kill the pre-emptory king or not" (p. 259). Such a tale may even narrate the nature of the mind-body split in the earliest moments of subjectivity, where the voices are equated with mind and the visceral reactions with body. This is certainly a prefiguration, in any case, until the voices stop and the analogic "I" replaces them; now, instead of voices contradicting feelings, it is the 'mind' or conscience contradicting the 'body'. Jaynes finds the actual derivation of the mind-body dualism significant: 'psyche' originally referred to a bodily function (psychein='to breath'), thus breath was at first a metaphor of life, when life was originally called 'psyche', in opposition to 'soma', which meant corpse or deadness, and soma becomes not-psyche, or matter, and the mind-body dualism has begun. With the coalescence of psyche and nous (visual perception) in about 500 BC, psyche "is now the conscious subjective mind-space and its self that is opposed to the material body" (p.291).

In general form, Jaynes has confirmed the central notion in the analysis of subjectivity and its origins. Level N_6 emerges when the first human become aware of their separateness from the Gods and their internal disjunctions occasioned by this separateness. Their consciousness was in effect the agony of self division as a result of their being lost and divided off from an original unity, in this case an

original unity of the brain. Subjectivity was the emergent "space" which had to fill itself in or construct itself in the absence of the hallucinated divine voices. Human literally became conscious when their mentality was split into two at a historical point which, Jaynes proposes, can actually be pinpointed with a fair degree of accuracy.

Until the splitting of bicamerality occured, the human races existed at the stratum of natural mind, inhabiting a noetic environment which controlled their behavior. As in the Biblical myth, they possessed language, that is, a reflexive signal system; they lived in a signal and stimulus field and were capable of all the mental acts potential in all other primates: volition, discrimination, sensory memory, social organization, territoriality, communication, and so on. But they were not subjectively conscious because they possessed no symbolization of difference: I-not I; mind-body. All their behavior, including communication, was programmed, automatic, robotized. Not until that behavior could be narratized and symbolically detached from the analogic 'I' and the metaphoric 'me' was subjectivity a possibility. Only the symbolization (metaphorization) of an interior self or soul, made possible by the withdrawal of the Gods and the concomitant need to fill the void occasioned by the retreat, could explain the transformation out of natural mentality into the contradictions of subjectivity. It was possible only when language became reflective.

Jaynes clearly argues that the preconscious state of natural mind is a necessary condition for the emergence of subjectivity, and he sides with the ontoanthropological principle (#19) that N_5 must be an

environing boundary condition from which N_6 emerges: "The presence of voices which had to be obeyed were the absolute prerequisite to the conscious stage of mind in which it is the self that is responsible and can debate within itself, can order and direct..." (p. 79). Also consonant with previous ontoanthropological conclusions is Jaynes' intuition that one of the imperatives for subjectivity, consequent on its loss of self-identity and unity, is to find a metaphor for itself which organizes and synthesizes its various funations and contradictions (which we now posit as the process which eventuates in the emergence of the next higher level, N_7). The search for such a metaphor begins with Philosophy in the pre-Socratic period. Conspicuously absent from his analysis, however, is a statement on subjectivity's response to its contradictions in sexuality and the recoil back to bicamerality through mass culture. It will eventually become necessary to show how these anthropological data are reconcilable with Jaynesian theory.

The bicameral theory may not be correct in historical detail or even adequate in some of its more central notions, but one fact seems incontestable: it claims that there was a historical point at which humanoids became subjective, and that history vindicates the hypothesis that we can now isolate a preconscious period in which the properties of subjectivity were simply absent. There is no consciousness in the Iliad, for example, nor in the ancient epics of early civilizations. Equally incontestable is the fact that subjectivity begins as the break with immediacy (bicamerality) into the contradictions of symbolic awareness.

This being so, the process must also occur in the transition from neonatal unconsciousness to humanized consciousness in individual development.

Ontogeny

Mainstream developmental psychology has, to all intents and purposes, ignored the question of subjectivity's natus; astoundingly, it has contributed little toward understanding how human nature develops, and this is implicitly its regnant purpose. The failure of academic psychology to contribute to an understanding of subjectivity's developmental structure is significantly influenced by the constraints imposed on it by reductionist science. Certainly the large amount of useful knowledge about development is commendable and necessary; we now know a great deal about embryology, motor development, behavioral conditioning, cognitive transformations, moral reasoning, and stage-specific character, but concerning the development of human consciousness psychology has ascertained very little. This state has been rectified only very recently in the exemplary work of Leovinger (1976), whose outlook is heavily Freudian. In fact, the description of subjective ontogenesis comes to rest squarely in psychoanalysis, first with Freud, then with his heirs, specifically Erikson, then with the neo-Freudians, and finally with the contemporary psychoanalystic revisionists, upon three of whom this section will depend extensively (Becker, 1973; Brown, 1959, 1966; Marcuse, 1955).

Freud may be importantly and interestingly wrong in many respects, but one of his anthopological insights is fundamental for describing the

evolution of subjective consciousness in the individual. In explaining the origin of subjectivity---or in psychoanalytic language, the origin of the ego---Freud cannot be forgotton. His greatness, even if all his other formulations are ignored, might consist in the single insight that the ego is an emergent from the primitive, unconscious unity of the id into a symbolic culture which is localized in the superego, and the life project of the ego (which is essentially intact in the first six years of life) is the reinstatement of this original unity, or, as Brown (1959) puts it, man is "the historical project of recovering his own childhood" (p. 52). Based on this single composite thought, a necessary revision of psychoanalytic thinking is possible. The revision must add to psychoanalysis something which is profoundly absent in Freud and nearly all his followers, namely, a theory of linguistic symbolism. Freud has no general theory of language or symbolism. He has an inadequate theory of signal language, derived from Sperber's analysis of mating calls, etc., and he has a theory of signification for recurrent themes in dream and myth content, but no accounting for the symbolism of consciousness. 'Symbol' in Freud is the "relation...between a dream-element and its translation" and the dream-element itself is a "symbol of the unconscious dream-thought" (quoted in Ricoeur, 1970, p. 499). His theory of symbols, first worked out in The Interpretation of Dreams, is actually a kind of lexical map for interpreting dreams, and not a theory of how symbols constitute the ego. A theory of symbols, in the fullest sense of that word, must be added to Freudian thought if psychoanalysis is to achieve the desired status of a unified conception of human nature and the human

condition (Cf. Yankelovich & Barrett, 1971). This addition must not be a translator's guide to significations but a comprehensive hermeneutics of symbolism in the tradition of Cassirer (1944; 1953-57) and Ricoeur (1970).

Freud clearly asseverates the ontoanthropological principle already adopted that individual development retraces the history of the species: in the first two years of childhood "we have to recover the enormous distance of development from primitive man of the stone age to civilized man of today" (quoted in Brown, 1959, p. 13). For Marcuse (1955) the analysis of ontogeny is ultimately the analysis of phylogeny, which explains the ordering of his chapters on the repressed individual, first, and the repressive culture, second. It is not necessary, however, to dogmatically adopt the canon that ontogenesis follows the same dynamic as phylogenesis: both Jaynes and Freud may be right. The development of the individual may retrace the development of the race in form and theme without being subject to identical conditions and events; the emergence of subjectivity in Adamic Eden is conceivably different than the transmission of subjectivity to, and its awakening in, each individual at stratum N_6, but the result is the same: subjective consciousness emerges as dualism and contradiction with the compulsion to make itself whole. In Freud, all life, including human life, originates in a pleromatic state of "quiescence". The ego differentiates from a prelapsarian state of uroboric simplicity and the sublime solitude of organicity where everything is fused. So far, this says nothing special about humans, and the separations to which all organisms are subject do not explain human nature: the separation from the

paradisical womb, the separation from the maternal breast, or even the separation from the familial nexus. Essential to the development of the ego are symbols of difference, which provide to subjectivity an awareness of itself as separate from the world and separated within itself.

> It is one of the great romantic visions, clearly formulated by Schiller and Herder as early as 1793 and still vital in the system of Hegel and Marx, that the history of mankind consists in a departure from a condition of undifferentiated primal unity with himself and with nature, an intermediate period in which man's powers are developed through differentiation and antagonism (alienation) with himself and with nature, and a final return to unity on a higher level or harmony. But these categories, primal unity, differentiation through antagonism, final harmony, remain in the romantics arbitrary and mystical because they lack a foundation in psychology. The psychoanalytical theory of childhood completes the romantic movement by filling this gap. (Brown, 1959, p. 86)

Freud's stages of psychosexual development are indices of the progressive fall into the dualisms of self-other, mind-body, and male-female. Becker (1970) thinks that anality reflects the first form of subjective duality; the human paradox is to be "out of nature and hopelessly in it", a fact expressed in the opposition of body(nature) and symbol (non-natural mind). The body is finite, determined, material, and unconscious; mind is unlimited, free, incorporeal, and aware. But Becker identifies the self (the subject) with the mind, thus subjecting himself to the difficulties of Platonism (which is startling, considering that he begins with Kierkegaard). He also does

not go far enough back: the I-Other split has already occurred, and we must return to Freud to explain it. In the oral stage, from birth to about one year, the human neonate cathects its libido in and around the mouth, this area being the localization and focus for the instinctual release of tension and reception of pleasure. Freud designates oral activity as the most "primitive" stage of development, because it is where libidinous energy is first centered, but this notion of energetics, with all its philosophical difficulties, can be discarded for a far simpler one, namely, that nature directs the infant to instinctual activity for survival purposes and, in doing so, gives it pleasure as a stimulus and reward for doing so. But the object of pleasure, and its source, with which the neonate is fused and from which it is not psychically distantiated, is already an inheritance of culture, a negation of nature. The neonate is in perpetual syzygic attachment to the maternal source and the rest of nature, without composition or distinction, but the mother is divided from nature in symbolism and culture. The provision of food to the infant is therefore not simply the libidinous diffusion of two ids into each other in a mutual, unconscious act. One party in the act is already conscious, and brings the symbolism of consciousness and difference into it. In doing so, the mother imposes an <u>un</u>-natural (non-spontaneous) set of contingencies on the act, thereby preparing the first moment in the infant's subjective evolution: the separation of the neonate organism from its natural environment: the alienation of ego and object. This happens in many ways, all within a linguistic context: food is a scheduled reward---<u>the object cannot be found</u>. Original food is artificialized and replaced---

the object changes. Food is given with inconsistent affect, sometimes warmly, sometimes impatiently, sometimes carelessly---the object carries contingencies. All these variations, however, accompany the act of incorporation in all non-human organisms as well, but they do not emerge as subjects. Why? Because in humans the act is overlaid with symbolism from the source of nurturance, which is gradually transferred to the infant, so that by the end of the oral stage---when the infant is beginning to speak---it obscurely and incipiently forms a consciousness of meaning in what is happening to it. It begins its Fall from paradise, into a twilight zone which is still pre-subjective but in which it formulates a dim perception of itself as being distinct from the mother.

In the oral stage, the structures of id, ego, and superego are vaguely prefigured, existing in prototypic form. The id is simple unmediated appetite. The impositions of the mother, her sanctions and demands, establish tensions, conflicts, frustrations. These impositions carry the weight of authority and, along with other cultural demands transmitted through the mother, they collectively form the superego. Concomitantly, the ego, inter-esse between the urges of the id and the prohibitions of the superego, develops as the locus of mediation and resolution. The ego here begins its long journey of detachment, separating itself from the environment, recoiling into itself from the demands of its body and the vicissitudes of its pleasure source. Both its body and the source of the body's pleasure verge on being objectified into Otherness.

The subject and object are becoming split, waiting only for the symbols of difference to estrange them in consciousness, in the ego. Freud is quite right in his statement that it is in the oral stage that the dualism of subject and object erupts (Freud, 1959, p. 77). Like Adam, who became subjective when he ate from the tree of knowledge, the child emerges into consciousness in the medium of the mouth.

The first formation of the ego is schematized and outlined in the oral stage; its status as the agent of repression is formed here. The primary emergent dualism in the oral stage is that of subject-object, and "otherness" has a dual aspect, namely, the promptings of the id and the demands of the superego. Sometimes the ego-subject displaces the authority of the superego with id gratification, making the superego's requirements unconscious, and sometimes it suppresses the appetites of the id in favor of the demands of the superego. The first movement of the ego, in any case, is the process of repression, in which the stage is set for the development of the unconscious.

In the course of oral development, Freud says, the locus of libidinous gratification shifts from the mouth to the anus. This is not a spontaneous movement, as Freud thinks, but a culturally induced one. Through the parent the culture demands progressive control not only over the incorporative processes, but over expulsive processes as well. "Manners" are extended from the table to the toilet throughout the anal stage, lasting from about one to three years. During this period, the emergence of subjectivity is almost

complete; all that remains is the sexualization of the ego's disjunctions. Throughout the anal stage the ego becomes more autonomous (Erikson) and progressively more divided. At this point the division is internalized as the cleavage of mind and body, which originates in the superego's uncompromising demands that the "self" subdue and subordinate "natural" urges to urinate and defecate indiscriminately. Becker's analysis of anality applies, for the most part, to the development of subjectivity in this stage, and need not be gone over. Freud himself does not use the terms "mind" and "body" to designate the dualism of the anal stage; for him there is the "contrast between <u>active</u> and <u>passive</u>, which may be described as the forerunner of the sexual polarity with which it links up later" (Freud, 1952, p. 336). With all the associations of "activity" and "passivity", and Freud's explicit identification of the anal region at this stage, it is clear that the contradiction of mind and body IN THE EGO can be psychoanalytically located at this point.

For ontoanthropological purposes, we have followed Freud far enough in his developmental stages, even though we have not come to the male-female polarity of the phallic stage. We have what we need in the realization that the individual proceeds through two precursive movements un his evolution toward subjectivity: the subject is progressively sundered from the object (ritualized in the trauma of weaning) and mind is progressively sundered from body (ritualized in the trauma of toilet training). These are the first cultural events in the evolution of the individual; until they occur he has

had no cultural experience. To repeat an earlier observation, however, we still do not have a satisfactory comprehension of these events as human events. All organisms are subject to maternal separation and social-parental controls, but they do not develop consciousness. But again, this is because they do not evolve in an environing cultural milieu of language and symbols, nor do they possess the genetic and biological capacities for doing so. Perhaps, in the higher species, their minds are still bicameral. Whatever it is, human consciousness has the symbolization of its experience as a necessary condition; the major events of oral and anal enculturation must be ritualistically symbolized into oppositions before they can constitute a human subject. Ritualistic symbolization entails the metaphorization of actual events; Cassirer, like Jaynes, avows that language is "by its very nature and essence, metaphorical" (1944, p. 109). With its cultural inheritance of symbolic language the infant recapitulates the centuries-old metaphorization of a significant experience in the oral stage: the coerced loss of its source of gratification is given a metaphoric meaning, conceptualized as the separation of Me from Mother. The experience is named, conceptualized, and given a content. Absence, a symbol of difference, becomes the metaphrand, divided into two metaphiers: what is absent, i.e., the Other with all its paraphiers, and what remains after the Other absents itself, i.e., a void to be filled in, conceptualized as the metaphoric 'me', with all its paraphiers. Similarly, in the anal stage, the experience of controlling the sphincture is a metaphrand, generating two metaphiers. "Good

boy" points to them: the metaphier "you" (the willing, directing, volitional psyche) controls the metaphier "it" (the resistant, foreign soma). Psyche and soma are metaphorically and symbolically split into categories, between which consciousness emerges as anxious interest.

Predictably, the study of development verifies that ego development coincides with symbolic development. For example, the subject-object split emerges out of the oral stage JUST AS THE CHILD IS LEARNING LANGUAGE, completing itself in the mind-body split after language has been conquered. In fact, Freud's anal stage coincides with the change from one-word utterances to syntactic speech, and toilet training is completed in this period (McCandless & Trotter, 1977, p. 112), usually by about the age of eighteen months. Significantly, the end of toilet training and the beginning of symbolic speech overlap. In Piaget's sixth sensory-motor stage (18-24 months) the achievement is "the ability to represent the object of one's cognitions by means of symbols (Flavell, 1977, p. 33) and to act with reference to them rather than to the immediate environment. In Werner and Kaplan's analysis

> The major entities in any symbolic act are the symbol itself, the person producing or comprehending it, and the symbol's referent. Initially these three entities are largely fused together, or psychologically undifferentiated from one another, and a very important aspect of development of symbolization is their mutual breaking apart, differentiation, or "distancing". (Flavell, 1977, p. 39)

The human race became subjectively conscious sometime in the second millenium BC; individuals becomes subjectively conscious sometime between eighteen and twenty four months after birth. The symbols of difference in subjectivity are unalterably determined by the two major cultural rituals of the first two years, aligned with eating and excrement. The first is not symbolically represented as it occurs. The break with organic unity is therefore retrospectively romanticized in nostalgia; the subject-object split is lived through, however; the fragmentation of mind and body is a concrete, existential process. It is at this time that the separated ego-subject first raises the question "Who am I?" and the endless task of subjectivity has begun.

Freud has been followed no further than the anal stage of psychosexual development, obviating the need to enter the intricacies of the Oedipus and Electra complexes at the phallic stage. For psychoanalysis, this stage symbolizes the third dualism of consciousness as masculine-feminine (Freud, 1960, p. 77). Without following psychoanalysis into this third development how then is the male-female dualism, and the overwhelming significance of sexuality, to be disclosed? We have already learned from Kierkegaard, mythology, Freud himself, and the most casual observations of human social life, that sexuality is a constitutive phenomenon in subjectivity---perhaps its most fundamental fact. The answer lies again in Freud, but in another direction, which he charted in one of his later works, Beyond the Pleasure Principle

(1959), an admittedly baffling work which many psychoanalysts find embarassing because it revises much of Freud's earlier thinking. The work introduces Thanatos, the death instinct, and concerning its conclusions Freud says "I do not know how far I believe in them" (p. 103). But an important point is contained here, spelled out as follows. Freud's final dualism is an opposition of life instincts and death instincts. Freud "cannot escape a suspicion" that he may have hit upon a "universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general...that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces". (p. 67).

The instincts, rather than being propellants toward expansion or growth, are "an expression of the conservative nature of all living substance" (p. 68). The state to be restored is an "old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or another departed" (p. 70). With great reluctance, Freud posits that the life instinct and the death instinct serve the same purpose: Eros and Thanatos are both concerned with the "most universal endeavour of all living substance---namely to return to the quiescence of the inorganic world" (p. 108). Love and death are unified in the "sexual act (which) is associated with a momentary extinction of a highly intensified excitation" (ibid).

At the deepest level, sexuality is the integrator of the fractured poles of subject and object, mind and body. The unification of Eros

and Thanatos restores the original androgynous unity. Freud quotes Plato's myth of the formation of mankind by bisection of an originally bisexual creature to suggest that Eros "in seeking ever wider unification, might be seeking to reinstate a lost condition of primal unity" (Brown, 1959, p. 133). He uses the myth to venture the hypothesis that life at one time was "torn apart into small particles, which have ever since endeavoured to reunite through the sexual instincts" (Freud, 1959, p. 102). Here, Freud diverges from Kierkegaard, who goes even further. In Freud, humanity is a neurosis spawned from repression and alienating symbolism, and neurosis is fundamentally anxiety. Freud's only solution to the problem of anxiety is a regressive one, back to an original state where dualisms are re-united, but at the cost of the ego. Kierkegaard's is a progressive one, positing a "higher immediacy" in which an absurd synthesis of polar categories is effected in a leap of faith from subjectivity to spirituality. Having seen how Kierkegaard, in combination with phylogenetic evidence and ontogenetic descriptions, has explained sexuality, we are now in a position to organize several insights into a skeletal phenomenology of the subjective system.

The Form of Subjectivity

The general structure of subjectivity has been outlined in Chapter Three. It can now be filled in more rigorously and improved upon in light of what has been uncovered in the subsequent chapter.

The thrust of the argument, as it has been hitherto developed, can be allegorized in the Metaphor of the Evolving Brain. The brain has vertically evolved from simple living substance (N_4) to mind (N_5) to subjectivity (N_6). Its genesis begins in the subcortex, whose three major structures (the cerebellum, the medulla oblongata, and the pons) contain the primitive life functions. Next is the layer of mind, centered in the diencephalon and the limbic system, where, just below subjectivity, the expressive and sexual functions reside. Mind ascends into the apex of the brain hierarchy, the cerebral cortex, domicile of the higher intellect which governs language and judgement. In humans, the cortex is split into two distinct "minds", differentiated out of the lower level of natural emotion and sexuality into masculine (analytic) and feminine (intuitive) sides. In effect, the brain is bisexual; consciousness inhabits this polarity. But the two halves can be potentially androgynized over the corpus callosum; Their integration and synthesis would constitute the emergent stratum of spiritualized selfhood (N_7) on the hierarchy of Being. This allegory pictorializes the entire argument of this work. At present, interest is focused on the split of N_6 before it has been bridged.

Subjective consciousness emerges in angst (dread, anxiety). Heidegger calls it sorge (care); Freud calls it neurosis. The first quiver of consciousness is the dislocation of absolute fusion and conjunction, when the symbols of difference disrupt the prelapsarian immediacy of nature. Neumann's description of the state of innocence

before the Fall as the "uroboric pleroma" captures its essence completely. This Edenis state cannot be experienced as such within subjectivity because the closer the subject gets to it the less subjectivity is conscious, the less contradictory and dualistic it becomes. Paradise is nostalgically yearned for and the experience of infancy and the womb is craved like a lost love, but its recovery is impossible for subjectivity. It is an empty memory, as are the first two years of childhood, only dimly approximated in art and intoxication. It is perhaps reached only in the regressive instant of orgasm, when consciousness re-enters the nirvana of extinction, and in the higher meditative states, when subjectivity ablates itself into a higher stratum which transcends the contradictions of consciousness and its pain.

The return to innocence, the recovery of childhood, the dissolution of dualism, would be a restitution of ABSOLUTE OBJECTIVITY, an annihilation of subjectivity. In objectivity, entities are not conscious: they are objects pure and simple. Even entities characterized by mentality and feeling, mobility, and behavior are objects because they are not internally contradictory, because they have no consciousness of the symbols of difference. They are in mute syzygy with their environment and identical with themselves. They are objects because they do not <u>constitute a world</u> with metaphors and symbols; for them there is no world to which meaning is imparted, no experience to organize and interpret. The world in which they are unconsciously sunk

is already organized genetically and behavioristically, and, qua objects, these entities can do no more than deterministically respond. This state of objectivity is symbolized (for subjectivity) in the ancient archetype of the androgyne (Singer, 1976). This is Freud's polymorphous perverse character of sexless childhood and the Biblical state of grace, when consciousness, in the individual and the race, is only "dreaming" (Kierkegaard). It is the dormant sleep of the Cosmic Twins, joined in coital embrace. The pre-subjective state of grace and nature, in any case, is broken and sundered and flung into opposition. The wrenching of subjectivity out of its natural mind and out of the immediacy of nature is a Fall into many things, but it is first of all a Fall into dread and anxiety.

The first moment of consciousness is a severance, a fracture, a rent (Hegel). This first moment is the "fault" (Ricoeur, 1967) opened up between subject and object, the fissure from which all other symbols of difference flow: mind-body; real-apparent; true-false; good-evil; male-female; finite-infinite; temporal-eternal, active-passive; and so on indefinitely. The dismemberment into subject and object is the first determination of angst; having come to a knowledge of dualism, the immediate consequences for Adam before his banishment (apart from sexual shame) were fear, belittlement, privation, enmity, inequality, and sorrow. These are subjective emotions. Dismembering or severing an organism produces reactive pain but not anxiety or dread, because dread is a determination of a subject which narratizes or symbolizes its division in consciousness of loss, in the awareness

of part of itself divided off. Between the self and its otherness is a nothingness or chasm, a void, and this void is consciousness or subjectivity. Subjectivity is the "nothingness" (Sartre) which relates the symbols of difference, and this nothingness is what subjectivity first dreads (Cf. Kierkegaard, CD, p. 38). The first flush of subjectivity IS dread.

It has already been claimed that subjectivity is only prefigured in the subject-object dualism, because at this stage language is still incipient, and metaphoric symbolization is barely available to subjectivity. The analysis of Freud's anal stage, recall, concluded that consciousness emerges in its symbolic fullness only after the acquisition of language, and what is prefigured in the subject-object split becomes complete in the mind-body split. Full subjectivity emerges as the relational void between the symbols of mentality and corporeality, subjective consciousness being the interest (inter-esse) between them. The derivation of mind-body from subject-object has been satisfactorily achieved, but for the moment attention shall continue to dwell in the phenomenon of subjective dread. Referring back to Jaynes, it can be said that anxiety begins with a loss: the voices of the Gods depart, leaving the subject to mediate the separation of good and evil. In ontoanthropological terms, this myth discloses that subjectivity begins only when unity is broken and when consciousness symbolically experiences the absence of its object. The object is ALIENATED from the subject. Alienation is dread. But the full weight of

dread encumbers subjectivity when it is disclosed to itself as a contradiction of mind and body. 'Mind' and 'body', as symbols of difference, are alienated (made foreign, strange) to each other within consciousness. Again, consciousness is their relation in a field of interest. A fundamental ontoanthropological principle is disclosed in this concept. It is that conscious subjectivity is the void sustaining the relationship between contradictory antipodes and THIS VOID IS AN ISSUE TO ITSELF. IT IS A NOTHINGNESS WHICH EMERGES AS THE NEED TO SYMBOLIZE ITSELF, IDENTIFY ITSELF, AND CREATE A MEANING FOR ITSELF WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF ITS CONTRADICTIONS. In Kierkegaard's words, subjectivity is "the relationship to one's self". The primordial disclosure of subjectivity as angst erupts in this nexus. First of all, subjectivity is the clash of opposites, the conflictual collision of symbolic "factors" (momenter, moments), and this is a neurotic condition: "The essence of man-animal is neurosis, and the essence of neurosis is mental conflict" (Brown, 1959, p. 82). Moreover, the experience of neurosis is anxiety, about which both Freud and Kierkegaard agree. Second, and more important, the locus of conflict is in the emergent "I" of subjectivity, which is essentially a void waiting to be filled in; subjectivity must symbolize itself. Subjectivity encounters itself as the radical freedom to carry out this necessity, and it is this task and this freedom which stabds forth in the fullness of angst. The freedom resides in the possibility of consolidating an identity out of NOTHING, hence

anxiety is the existential expression of this fact. The task, to repeat, is to absurdly form an identity within the symbolism of difference, now phenomenologically disclosed as the symbols of mind and body, so that the task is equally to synthesize the polarities of mind and body into a conscious synthesis. Such a task is dread-full. Dread is the root of consciousness.

It remains to be seen how the motif of sexuality, already uncovered in phylogenetic and ontogenetic analysis, is central to the dualistic structure of subjectivity and its successive polarities. Combining Jaynes and Freud, it can be said that consciousness of difference is first symbolized in the disjunction of mind and body as sexuality. They jointly answer the question for which Kierkegaard does not have an answer; he says only that sexuality is the "expression" for the "prodigious contradiction" on which human existence rests. This is not enough, however. There are actually three explanations, or perhaps three variations of the same answer.

First, the symbols of male and female constitute the content of a collective mythis archetype, as Neumann and others have shown. In Brown's words, "Dual organization is sexual organization...the prototype of all opposition or contrariety is sex" (1966, pp. 22-23). The prototypic fall is into sex: the dual organization of mind and body is mythically symbolized in the division of male and female, because the state preceding the descent into difference was a unified one, and unity is archetypically recollected as androgynic coitus.

> The archetype of androgyny appears in us
> in an innate sense of a primordial cosmic

> unity, having existed in oneness or wholeness before any separation was made...The primordial unity is broken apart; then there exist the Two, as opposites. Only when the two have become established as separate entities can they move apart and then join together in a new way to create the many and disperse them. In time, pairs of opposites tend to polarize...One pair, male and female, serve as the symbolic expression of the energic power behind all of the other polarities... Gradually in the process of acquiring consciousness (man) becomes aware of all the other pairs of opposites, the male-female pair being the most important, for this pair can be seen as a metaphor for nearly all the others. (Singer, 1976, pp. 20, 100)

If the archetypal metaphor of severance is male-female, then the aligned metaphor for union must be sexual congress.

Second, the <u>task</u> for fragmented subjectivity is to unify its mind-body cleavage. Freud's great discovery is that the recovery of the unity of the individual is sought in the erotic which "binds all things together". Division of self from self, body from body, and body from self is overcome in the erotic, which "restores an earlier state of things"; the original antipodes have "ever since endeavoured

to reunite through the sexual instincts"(op. cit). In psychoanalysis the recovery of the pristine state is a regressive effort in the medium of sexuality. The actuality of the sexual act testifies to this: sexual union, intensified in the moment of orgasmic release, is experienced as the dissolution of Otherness and separation, when the self and other, mind and body, are one.

Third, sexuality is phenomenologically disclosed as the expression in consciousness for duality. No other phenomenon, apart from the possible exception of ritualistic eating, exhibits such an ambiguity of "mental" and"bodily" aspects. As a concrete, lived reality sexuality is neither of the body nor of the mind, but simultaneously of both. It is charged with corporal and mentalistic symbolism, preserving each in a kind of tension. Body events, feelings, ideation, cognitions, and psycho-somatic values, as well as the ambiguous sexual urge itself, are drawn together in the experience of the erotic, coalesced into a single experience.

Sexuality is an expression, a task, and a memory. In it are grounded all otherpolarities of subjectivity. In one way or another, each half of every successive disjunctive opposition in consciousness relates back to either the symbolism of the body or the symbolism of the mind, and in one way or another every synthesis of consciousness finds its metaphor in sexual union. For example, the symbols of time and eternity originate in the body and mind respectively, as do the symbols of finitude and infinity. Time and Eternity conjoin in the

Eternal Now, while finitude and infinity conjoin in the Cosmic Point; experience of these synthetic unions is often described in the mystical literature in sexual imagery. Kierkegaard recognizes that the mind-body relation is subjectivity's first duality, upon which other dualities are built. The relation of time and eternity, for example, "comes after" that of psyche and soma, and it is "not fashioned in the same way as the former" (1944, p. 76). The same is true of the others, i.e., possible-necessary; finitude-infinity. What we have in Kierkegaard is the comprehension of a succession of symbolic polarities in consciousness, each new opposition being built on or layered over the earlier ones. In Kierkagaard, the development of each new symbolic duality is throught to have an element of fixity and necessity to it, such that the sequence of dualities is inevitably ordered in a definite way.

At this point, however, ontoanthropology develops its own principle, following Kierkegaard in the notion that the dualisms of consciousness are derivative from the prototypic mind-body split, but differing from him in the notion that subsequent dualities unforld in a determinate order and in succession. Rather, the evolution of subjectivity is the differentiation of several polarities from a common point of origin, and these polarities develop simultaneously. Development proceeds in accordance with Werner's principle of orthogenesis, and in accordance with ontoanthropological principles numbered 11 to 14.

The subjective system ramifies and complexifies into any number of

bipolar sectors, all of which originate from the mind-body polarity. These sectors are the hierarchic dimensions of subjectivity; each dimension has levels to it. The symbolic content of these dualities, however, is contingent, determined by culture and individual psychological experience. Every subjective system has its own unique character and mode of integration; no two systems of consciousness are the same. As it turns out, most individuals have many general features in common because they share a common symbolic inheritance and a common cultural indoctrination, but their dimensional structure and the polarities by which those dimensions are constituted, as well as their mode of integration, is idiographic. In each individual, some particular bipolarity is hegemonic and in fact may be a polarity no-one else is familiar with. It is accordingly impossible to describe a system of dualisms applicable to everyone; a nomothetic characterization of the content of subjectivity is precluded by virtue of the individual's specific experience and relative context. The determination of an individual's subjective content is in fact one of the tasks of psychotherapy, and Kelly's personall construct psychology (1955) figures prominently in the development of a technique for carrying out this task.

We have already seen that the first disjunction of subjectivity is the mind-body dualism. Followimg Kierkegaard, it is agreed that the "factors" of this dualism are contradictory and in conflict. Consciousness is originally the comflict of these opposites concretely living itself out in sexual concerms, that is to say, sexuality is the

expressive relation of the antipodal factors in consciousness. The conjunction of the original symbols of difference is expressed as sexuality, which is consequently the manifestation or actuality of subjectivity's internal conflict and contradiction. Because the tension of mind and body is disclosed to consciousness as a clash, conflict, or collision, consciousness is fundamentally anxious. It is also anxious because the turmoil of consciousness can be quieted only when consciousness synthesizes its polarities by defining itself in terms of them, by symbolizing an identity which provides a point of synthesis for them. The dread of subjectivity is thereby annulled. But Kierkegaard, among others, has shown that subjectivity fears its freedom and the task presented in that freedom. Subjectivity recoils from its contradictions by regressively trying to return to its original condition of objectivity and unity; it abdicates its nature and existential purpose through a retreat into objecthood. The collective pursuit of objectivity is carried out in the medium of mass culture (den Publik, das Man). Mass culture is the sum of institutions into which subjectivity objectifies its contradictions. As such, it is the environing milieu for regressive subjectivity. The purpose of the next chapter is to analyse this phenomenon in detail.

Summary

1. The properties of human nature at N_6, already outlined in Kierkegaard's phenomenology, have been found in a developmental account of the emergence of subjectivity in the species and in the individual.

2. The evolution of subjectivity in the species was recounted in Biblical mythology, Newmann's analysis of mythology, and Jaynes' historical research. The evolution of subjectivity in the individual was recounted in Freud's theory of psychosexual development.
3. The form of subjectivity was outlined, based on the findings of the previous chapter and the contents of this chapter. The outline focused on the origin of subjective contradiction in symbolism, whose first determination is the subject-object split, followed by the mind-body split and the subsequent oppositions it generates.
4. The next chapter will discuss the most general response subjectivity makes to its nature, and it will describe the subjective environment created by this response. The investigation will conclude with a statement about the role of psychotherapy in the evolution of human nature.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ONTOANTHROPOLOGY IV:

PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE ENVIRONING MILIEU

To this point, this investigation before us has undergone the following sequence. The naturalistic and reductionistic paradigm in contemporary psychology and the aligned practice of psychotherapy is superannuated and needs to be replaced by another unifying paradigm which posits hierarchic levels of reality with corresponding hierarchies of methodic, conceptual, and nomological levels; a psychology of human nature demands such a paradigm, so the distinctly human properties are not lost or made incoherent in being reduced to a lower level. The unifying paradigm which displaces reductionism is emergent hierarchicalism, which assigns human nature to the N-stratum of subjectivity, a stratum which subsumes all previous strata and which itself contains levels of development, ramified into several bipolar dimensions. These dimensions, and their relations, constitute a symbolic system. Drawing from Freud, Kierkegaard, and mythology, it was found that the essence of subjectivity is to be split in its nature, originating in the prefigurative severance of subject and object and the prototypic opposition of mind and body; these disjunctions spawn the subsequent dimensional polarities, whose content is determined by experience. The regressive project of subjectivity is the attempt to dissolve its disjunctions and dread by returning to the stratum from which it emerged, i.e., the state of unconscious objectivity at N_5. Its

progressive project is the attempt to reconcile its disjunctions in a transcendent emergence into the stratum of spirit(N_7).

The regressive project is really the undertaking to lose subjectivity by becoming an object. In Kierkegaard's analysis, the regressive project is the way subjectivity evades its freedom to define itself. Subjectivity is abdicated in favor of objective existence in the Public, which is the environing milieu for inauthentic consciousness. Because the original split in subjectivity is mind-body, and because regression to objectivity is pursued in the medium of sexuality, the phenomenon of seduction was isolated as the paradigm of human social activity. It now remains to be seen how this paradigmatic activity is fully objectified in cultural institutions. In fact, it remains to be seen how mass culture in general functions as the environing milieu for inauthentic subjectivity. Following this, the investigation will be in a position to conclude with a statement on the role of psychotherapy and its possible approaches.

Social Phenomenology

The analysis of subjectivity's environment must conform to requirements already stipulated for the analysis of subjectivity itself, that is, any comprehension of the structure and process of symbolic culture must occur at the appropriate level of method, concept and law. The properties of subjectivity's environment are as novel and discontinuous as the properties of consciousness are; environments are also hierarchically structured. Laying down such a requirement immediately

excludes most traditional social psychology as irrelevant to an understanding of human social realities, because its methods, laws, and language apply to a lower stratum of behavior.

From its inception, social psychology has been internally divided between the 'psychological' and 'sociological' approaches, a division introduced with the publication of the first two textbooks in the field (Lott, 1973). The psychological mode of social psychology (PSP) has been the official paradigm for social psychology, since it is directly connected to the history of general psychology in a way that the sociological mode (SSP) is not. PSP emphasizes that the only reliable data are bits of publicly observable behavior, but because 'publicly observable behavior' encompasses so much it becomes equated with 'experimentally replicable behavior', and this commits PSP to the now obsolete unity-of-science canons of mechanism, probabilistic measurement, operationalization, and reductionism. The consequence is that its research uproots human behavior from the very network of social meaning and significance by virtue of which it is understandable (CF. Armistead, 1974). And because of its allegiance to experimentalism, PSP research has eventuated in large amounts of trivia and superficiality. Enormous amounts of money and time have been invested in verifying what we already know. The classic experiments of Milgram (1963) and Asch (1955) are cases in point. Their findings are both true and banal; as experimental observations they advance nothing. The experimental method has verified a hypothesis already known to be true, but it

cannot explain this truth or elucidate its significance, only reiterate. Indeed, the findings are only a starting point for comprehending group behavior. An infinite number if experiments could never explain this behavior.

The explanation lies in social phenomenology, a derivative of SSP research, in concert with philosophy and sociology. One of social psychology's most demanding questions is "What is the constitutional structure of human social life?". With the question, a way of getting an answer is given: isolate for explanation the various aspects of the lived social world. So social psychology begins with an INVENTORY OF THE OBVIOUS.

It is obvious that humans collectively inhabit a linguistic, symbolic milieu; that they ritualistically consume food; that they bury their dead; that they regulate and fetishize their sexuality; that they form religions; that they acquire property, and so forth. These are all obvious facts to be explained. Another obvious fact is that the large majority if people within any social collective maintain a remarkably homogeneous point of view concerning what is true, good, and beautiful. This fact, the standardization of belief and value, is the phenomenon to be explained by a social phenomenology of mass culture. The obvious facts which need explanation must initially be referred back to the structure of subjectivity for elucidation. Specifically, the structure's existential response to itself must be discerned with reference to the group and social milieu in which it encounters itself and in which it works out its destiny.

Following suggestions by Kierkegaard and some of the third force psychologists, it can be said that human existence is thrown and thrust into the world with the imperative that it define and choose a meaning for itself. It is first disclosed to itself as an uncompleted task, and in this resides the freedom of subjectivity. Once disclosed to itself as a possibility to be pursued, human being can undertake one of two general existential projects: it can either transcend itself into the next stratum of emergence---the stratum of spirit and the community of love---or it can (and generally does) undertake to forget itself by pursuing an impossible goal: retreat and recoil into the pre-human state of feeling and reflexive mentality which preceded language, ego, freedom, and the internal ruptures of subjectivity. The second project, which could never be completed except in death, really amounts to a refusal to be a subject while trying to be an object. It is an attempt to return to the passive, prelapsarian state in which there is no subjectivity, i.e., in which there is no internal division or cleavage within consciousness and no alienation of the self from the world. It is the refusal to be human, to choose an identity, to exercise autonomy and freedom.

The options for subjectivity are either transcendent emergence or withdrawal and retreat; each option aims at synthesizing the ruptures and conflicts within subjectivity. The first project, the transcendent movement toward integration and unity in the person, holds out the prospect of success and the restoration of wholeness, while

the second is a self-contradictory and self-negating undertaking, doomed to failure. In each case the ultimate aim is the restoration of wholeness and, most important, each project is an existential expression and participation in the social milieu in a specific way. Whatever project is undertaken, the individual is unavoidably in a relation to an environing social group, becuase the group is the milieu in which consciousness acts in the same way that the physical environment is the milieu in which the organism lives.

Taking each of these existential projects in turn, let us first inquire generally into the charactertistics of group life at the N-stratum of spirituatlity. Any depiction of a communal ethos at this stratum would at best be utopian speculation since (as Shaw once observed of Christianity) it has yet to be tried out on a broad scale. Nonetheless, projections and inferences are possible, based on the characteristics exhibited by the kind of person who would contribute to such a community. In many ways, such a person would be what the existentialists call "authentic", possessing many of the attributes of Maslow's "self-actualized" human" wholeness, completeness, justice, vitality, simplicity, honesty, beauty, uniqueness, playfulness, autonomy, spontaneity, and so forth (Maslow, 1962). One might add to Maslow's list such qualities as : capacity for non-possessive intimacy and love, compassion, self-dependence, cooperativeness, a sense of the absurd, intellectual curiosity, realism, and personal potenecy. The list could go on. But of all the "properties" one could adduce as characterizations of a spiritualized existence, there

appears to be one central notion, derived from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, around which all the other congregate. It is the notion of autonomous self-identification.

The possibility for choosing and consolidating an identity has already been disclosed at the N-stratum of subjectivity. Kierkegaard would say that the disclosure occurs in a state of dread. The leap into authentic selfhood, or spirit, is the exercise of the freedom and possibility given at the stratum of subjectivity. The emergence of spiritualized selfhood from subjectivity requires that the inherent disparities of subjectivity are synthesized, integrated, and consolidated into a coherent whole by virtue of a totalizing choice of identity; the transition is effected when subjective consciousness, taken as a total system of (a) its several dimensions and (b) its stratified structure, chooses and creates its own identity through the provision of an interpretive weltanschauung, but which ALL its experience is COHERENT. For Angyal, "the central design of life is the desire to shape one's existence into a meaningful, full expanded whole which will give perfect coherence and unity to one's life" (Hall & Lindzey, 1970, p. 323). Leckey's idea that the person "must define for himself the nature of that totality which he is" reflects Angyal's idea. He says there is "only one developmental goal, namely, the achievement of a unified and self-consistent organization" (ibid, p. 329). But the transformation of subjectivity into autonomous selfhood, via a coherent self-interpretation, is not the result of discover or grace, but the result of personal creation. It is the frightful immersion in subjectivity's radical freedom.

What would a society of spiritualized, autonomous beings be like? What group milieu would they engender? A brief answer to these questions could only be banal and jargonized. Taking a cue from Theodore Roszak's recent book (1978) we may look to the classical and avante-garde traditions of monastic life. In doing so, we are struck by two fact: monasticism's purpose is to provide a context for the solitary pursuit of salvation and meaning, yet this autonomous pursuit is a communal venture; the monastic tradition stresses spiritual purity and the abandonment of concern for prestige, wealth, power, and possessions, and yet the same tradition gave birth to a domestic economics of the most stable and productive sort. Such communities, in intention if not in practice, exhibit no striving and grasping for domination and competition among their members; they are, ideally, agapic networks in which each participant tolerated the other's autonomy and identity. Perhaps this is the ethos of a spiritualized society: one in which the members provide each other with a context in which freedom and love are shared cooperatively, tolerantly, and spontaneously toward the end of personal wholeness, health, and integrity. Satin's recent book (1978) is an effort the schematize such a society for contemporary consciousness.

Of greater interest, in the present context, is the kind of society engendered from the collective refusal to exercise the radical freedom disclosed in subjectivity. It is of greater interest for three reasons: first, it is the kind of society we now inhabit and mindlessly promote; second, its anthropological, psychological, and philosophical analysis is historically far more complete; third, a

critique of its status and nature provides theoretical grounds for psychotherapy of a particular type.

The collective recoil from freedom, subjectivity, and identity is clearly revealed in modern bourgeois society, and such a society represents---at the group level---a "fall" of humanity from its most challenging and most authentic possibilities. The modern industrialized, consumerist society is the atmosphere human beings have created by virtue of their collective refusal to pursue their humanity and its higher possibilities. The fallen character of modern societies, especially our own, is the antithesis of health and authenticity, but it has become the norm for the "decent and good life". The tragedy of modern life is that our fallen state is thought to contain the seeds of paradise, a conception so widely and fervently adhered to that the fledgling participants in it are quickly and efficiently programmed not to question its premises or consider its transcendence. The Existential project of retreat, so to speak, is like original sin: it is an inherited condition and the presupposition of contemporary life.

The critique of inauthenticity, the analysis of "fallen" life in the social collective, has been competently done several times from diverse perspectives. The two most conspicuous examples are provided by Marxism and European existentialism, although equally potent critiques have come from theologians, sociologists, psychologists, economists, and educational theorists. The analysis of social existence to be offered here is a distillation of the existential viewpoint.

Mass Culture

Social existence in the mode of what we now call "mass culture" is collective inathenticity, a concerted flight from freedom, an estrangement from subjectivity and identity. But the phenomenon of massification, the retreat into the state of passive receptivity and, primarily, the consumption of things, ideas, values, and feelings, has little or nothing to do with the contemporary fact of large numbers and assembly-line production. Neither large numbers nor recency, neither mass communications nor industrialization, essentilly characterize mass culure. The view that they do is not only mistaken, but prevalent (CF. Gerbner, 1972; Shils, 1971; MacDonald, 1953). Large numbers, the media, and the production line are certainly in intimate collusion in modern times, acting in league to proliferate mass culture, but they are only the instruments of an underlying phenomenon which makes them possible. They provide the form in which mass culture is currently dispensed: in large volume, efficiently, and instantly. But these aspects presuppose something far more important, namely, a receptive, collaborating mass mentality. Mass culture is not something imposed on unwitting, innocent victims. It is the way the collective consciousness organizes itself at any particular time; it is what the mass mentality produces. The description and analysis of this process passes over from SSP ro social phenomenology, whose task it is to explain its psychological basis.

Perhaps the nature of mass culture can more clearly be depicted if we disengage ourselves from the current SSP preoccupation with mass media and mass industrialization. The outline of a theory of mass culture can be seen just as easily in the early modern period before there was radio, television, assembly-line production, and a (comparatively) large population. Looking back to the illustrious fourteenth century at the height of the Italian Renaissance, we find a single institution regulating and defining social reality, dispensing value and meaning, and providing the very things it has itself defined as necessary for a meaningful life. The Catholic Church was the institution from which meaning was derived and in which authority was invested. The church was the power which regulated the life of the masses. Mass culture was defined ecclesiastically: its politics, its science, its art, its philosophy, and---above all---its QUOTIDIAN EXISTENCE.

Any contemporary inventory of the obvious must recognize the fact that the authority once vested exclusively in the Church is now dispensed throughout several related institutions. In mass culture, the institutional authority of the church has by now been usurped by the School, the Media, the Factory, and the State. But this dispersion of authority doesn't mean that the psychology of mass culture must seek new principles or uncover new structures: the phenomenon of mass culture is fundamentally and essentially the same in the 14th and 20th centuries.

A second point: mass culture is not a consequence of mass production and distribution. The Church distributed the content of mass culture through the pulpit just as effectively as the Factory does

now through its board room and media adjuncts; the Quatrocentto in Italy was just as culturally totalized by the decisions of the Papacy as 20th century Canada is by General Motors and the CBC. This means that mass culture is not a function of pure quantity; there are more of the masses now, but their character is no different except in contingent details. As Ortega y Gassett proclaims, "Strictly speaking, the mass, as a psychological fact, can be defined without waiting for individuals to appear in mass formation. In the presence of one individual we can decide whether he is "mass" or "not" (y Gassett, 1932).

It can be taken as axiomatic that no existential modality like that of modern mass-man arises ex nihilo. Socio-cultural forms are constructed through the unified participatory efforts of all members of the social body. Mass culture is therefore not to be viewed as the imposition of values, beliefs, and so on, upon the weak majority by a strong minority but as the way in which the social collective organizes itself in thought and action.

Human consciousness externalizes and objectifies itself into a social world of institutions, roles, and practices, and however "objective" the structures of the social world appear to be they are always comprehensible only as expressions of a common human nature. "In other words, despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not therby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 57). Mass culture is consequently a phenomenon to be understood as a modification of human consciousness, or a way of being humanly conscious. The various dimensions of mass culture, like

television, do not explain or produce consciousness, rather, consciousness explains the presence and nature of mass culture. The task of social analysis starts with the perception that the structure of mass culture is made possible by the structure of the human psyche.

It is often useful to interpret mass culture in terms such as "vulgar", "homogeneous", "standard" and "conformist", but notions like these are not sufficiently fundamental. They are more like symptoms of massification than explanations for it. A better explanation is somehow aligned with the idea that mass culture is a state-of-mind or way of being, and ONTOLOGICAL STATE OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. Thus, the masses do not form a set of people distinct from the non-masses. To be a 'member' of the masses is to participate in what Heidegger calls the Alltaglich (Everyday) mode of consciousness, to inhabit the ordinary Form of Life (Wittgenstein), which ALL members of ANY social order do in varying degrees. Mass culture is simply the concrete context of everyday life.

The most general fact of mass-man (or Das Man, as Heidegger describes the phenomenon) is that of passive dependence. Mass man, rather than being a creative agent for subjectivity, is a receptive consumer of objective things, facts, values, and beliefs. Having externalized his or her subjectivity into objective institutions, concurrently annihilating personal agency and responsibility, the individual becomes given over in its being to powers outside itself (powers it unconsciously creates and sustains). It becomes part of a

vacuous counterfeit of humanity, and in doing so demands that the institutions in which the Public embodies itself carry out its most human operations and then feed them back. The mass-man abdicates its individuality and subjectivity to the institutions into which it objectifies itself and then, having become a generality, depends on these same instutions for direction and sustenance.

Thus, contemporary mass-man consumes Health from the Hospital, Truth from the Media, Knowledge from the Schools, Enlightenment from the Therapists, Salvation from the Church, and the Good Life from the Factory. Mass culture is the sum of those institutions in which individuals repose their humanity and from which their values are defined and supplied. In such a state of passivity and dependence, mass-man becomes more and more like everyone else, paradoxically adjusted to a fictitious entity: The Public. In order to become the same as everyone else, individual subjectivity pulverizes its own reality to the point that it is nothing; it negates itself into a standardized mode of objective existence, indeed, it becomes an object to be filled up with ideas, experiences, and things, to the point that its identity is equated with externalities it has attached to itself through effort or fortune.

The conditions for mass culture are alienation, impersonality, and objectivity amongst its members. Far from being the medium in which humanity binds itself together, mass culture is the means for retreat from humanity into a state of unconscious dependence. Mass

culture is the opiate of subjectivity and its authentic passions, the contradictory solution to the problems and anxieties of being human; it is the collective flight from the radical freedom of subjectivity: the freedom to choose one's self.

The point has now been reached where a theory of health and its relation to culture can be spelled out. It has been found, to this point, that within the general framework of emergent hierarchicalism (whose implications for therapeutics are vast) human existence interacts with a specifically defined milieu at each level of emergence: at the stratum of mentality the milieu is the stimulus environment; at the stratum of subjectivity it is symbolic culture; at the stratum of spirit it is the community of love. The "fallen" form of subjectivity exists and acts in the inauthentic environment of mass culture and collective institutions, a pathological condition aligned with the human purposes it serves. Another way of putting this is by saying that, structurally, human existence is always in a mode of mit-sein (being-with-others). The task now is to organize this anthropological fact into a theory of health and therapeutics.

Pathology, Health, and Groups

The N-stratum of subjectivity has a very odd character to it; it represents an ambiguous position on the emergent hierarchy. At the same time that it introduces the essence of human existence, it also introduces a state of instability and conflict into the hierarchic

because the human structure emerges as a problem to be solved. There is no health in subjectivity; it achieves health only by completing and transcending itself at the next higher stratum. As long as this completion does not occur only two possibilities are open: subjectivity either persists as turmoil, clash, and opposition, or it sinks away from both its transcendental possibility and its internal disruption into the tranquillizing, levelled emptiness of the "group" with its institutions and conformist rituals. Here, the struggle for a complete humanity is not even considered, and the point of that struggle is not felt. Transcendence is displaced by the search for comfort and happiness: existence becomes "suified" (Tennessen, 1966). Paradoxically, the psychological establishment, usurping the role of the church, has become a major agent for dispensing happiness and adjustment; it generates and reinforces the content of mass culture while speaking the language of awareness, self-actualization, freedom, and so on (Cf. Rosen, 1977; Schur, 1977; Gross, 1978). In any case, subjectivity falls into a state of mass-mindedness, giving itself up and turning itself over to an impersonal and objectified consciousness embodied in social institutions like the Club, the Business, the Church, and the School. (Illich's phenomenology of schools is a profound comprehension of this fact, and can almost be generalized to any institution in which mass-mindedness embodies itself. (Cf. Illich, 1972). Using Heidegger's terminology and the perspective of emergent hierarchicalism, let us inquire into the nature of Das Man's pathology.

The fall into group-mindedness is a kind of double movement into pathology, for, as we have seen, human nature at the stratum of subjectivity is itself schismatic, a condition of dismemberment and conflict occupying the polarities of consciousness. But the recoil into Das Man, that is, the attempt to flee from the transcendent demands of subjectivity by reverting to a lower stratum on the emergent hierarchy, represents another pathological condition. Thus a new existential disorder replaces a previous one; it is a compound sickness because it is (a) a withdrawal from spirituality, which represents synthesis, wholeness, and health, and (b) a form of existence in which subjectivity's divisions are contradictions are still in conflict and in which this conflict is repressed with the aid of life illusions and deceptions. The condition of repression, in one sense an illusory, inauthentic state, is in another sense the fundamental state of communal life in mass-mindedness. Not only, then, is life in social collectivities unwholesome, but additionally it is an unwholesomeness which is hidden from consciousness in the group's vital lies and illusions.

The pathology of Das Man has three aspects: it is a retreat from subjectivity; the retreat fragments it further; the fragmentation is denied and repressed.

Retreat. The recoil from the specifically human demands and anxieties of subjective consciousness, as Kierkegaard suggests, is a process of objectification, that is, a process of objectifying the

subjective. Subjectivity, as a systematic whole imbued with the imperative to create a coherent, meaning-giving framework for itself, is essentially activity, commitment, and freedom. Objectivity is accordingly the cessation of activity, the dissolution of commitment, and the denial of freedom. If, as Freire claims, it is "man's ontological vocation...to be a Subject who acts upon and transforms his world" (1970, p, 12), then the refusal to respond to this vocation is manifest in man's passivity and manipulability. In other words, he becomes AN OBJECT, a thing, something acted upon, something to which things merely happen. The existentiality of the subject is subjectivity; the existentiality of an object is objectivity. And the pathology of group mindedness is precisely that of the objectification of subjects.

Objectivity implies depersonalization and the abdication of autonomy. Depersonalization and the release from personal responsibility is exactly this: the subject gives itself over to the group, and identifies itself as a group entity; identity is accordingly dicated by the group mind, and the absent subject is defined like every other entity in the collection. Even its "individuality" is purchased and controlled within the boundaries of group taste and superficiality. In objectifying itself, the subject dissolves its anxiety by allowing the group to determine its feelings, cognitions, values, and meanings. Concurrently, the collective mentality formulates methodologies and slogans (however absurd or illusory)

which, while promising fulfilment ("happiness"), keep the members enslaved.

It has already been said that the most general fact of group-mindedness is passive dependence, such that mass-man is a consumer or container for those things, facts, and values delivered from sources into which subjectivity has dispersed and objectified itself. The person, in this event, essentially has the status of an incinerator. Its sources are social institutions, and man is what he consumes from these institutions. Subjective values, objectified into institutions, are purchased and received from the institutions in the form of commodities, and these commodities are manufactured to satisfy everyone and no-one in particular: they are produced for mass-man, i.e., for the average, common, de-individualized Public. Every individual, insofar as he or she participates in group or mass-mindedness, is essentially the same as all the Others, defined individually not by what he or she IS but by what he or she HAS. Erich Fromm approvingly notes Spinoza's view that the passions inherent in the having mode, such as greed, envy, competition, and possessiveness, are aspects of mental illness: "In this statement, so foreign to the thinking of out time, Spinoza considers passions that do not correspond to the needs of human nature as pathological; in fact, he goes so far as to call them a form of insanity" (Fromm, 1976, p. 95). So the fall from subjectivity creates pathology because it distorts and falsifies human nature.

The falsification of human nature in objectivity accounts for the basic fact of life in human groups, namely, the fact of alienation. Relationships between individuals whose collective identity is predicated on a flight from their humanity are irreducibly founded on antagonism, competition, and fear. Again, due to its original structure, seduction is the paradigmatic activity of fallen subjectivity. Das Man's pathology is deeper than falsification, however, because the project of retreat from one emergent stratum to a lower one contains a contradiction: a subject cannot be an object. The pursuit of objectification is therefore an on-going recapitulation of failure.

Fragmentation. A clearer understanding of the pathological nature of group life is given within the context of emergent hierarchicalism; the way in which humans suffer is dictated by their structure. The emergent-hierarchic theory has depicted human nature as a stratified phenomenon, where each level of the person is considered to be a system. At this N-stratum, the whole system is differentiated into several dimensions. Subjectivity is a dimensional whole, comprised of dimensional sub-systems such as the cognitive, the affective, the aesthetic, the moral, and so forth; each of the dimensions has a specific character and each exists in the specifically human stratum of symbolism or linguistic culture. Moreover, each dimension has its own scale of development, and the retreat from subjectivity back into objectification reduces each dimension to a lower level of development. More important, all the dimensions of subjectivity are related to each other on a scale of integration: the more healthy the person is

the more whole it is, i.e., the greater the integrity and coherence of the entire system the more it is healthy. At the higher levels of development, then, the dimensions of subjectivity become integrated and complementary, while at the lower levels they are fragmented and oppositional. Health is wholeness, and wholeness is integration.

It has also been emphasized that all existence, for every stratum on the hierarchy, has an environing context. At the N-stratum of animal mentality the environment is the stimulus milieu; at the next stratum of subjective consciousness it is the symbolic (cultural) milieu. Subjectivity authenticates itself in a community of love, and it pursues its refusal to be human in the pathology-ridden collectivity of mass-culture. In its pathological form, the social milieu takes over, indeed defines, the interests of its members by virtue of its control of the objective institutions in which subjectivity dissolves itself and its values. SUBJECTIVITY OBJECTIFIES ITSELF INTO THE INSTITUTIONS OF MASS MINDEDNESS AND EACH OF THESE INSTITUTIONS EMBODIES A VALUE CORRESPONDING TO A DIMENSION OF SUBJECTIVITY. Thus, subjectivity becomes fragmented and disintegrated in the process of objectification, and consequently becomes less whole and less healthy. Here is the real pathology of group life.

The value for cognition is truth; the value for morality is goodness; the value for aesthetics is beauty; the value for affect is sensibility, et cetera. Each dimension of subjectivity has a value, and the manner of realizing that value reflects itself into the social milieu. The net result of objectification is a social

structure of institutions which separately dispense values to different parts of the person. The social milieu is therefore fragmented and unwholesome in its major features, a fact which is coextensive with the disintegration and fragmentation of its constituent members.

The catastrophic results of social and individual fragmentation are understood by the social critic Ivan Illich. He has systematically documented how subjectivity has handed over its values of truth, mobility, health, justice, and salvation to the industries of education, automotives, medicine, law, and denominational religion. His phenomenology of schooling, for example, can be read as an analysis of how individuals objectify themselves into mass culture in one area of value, and the logic of the analysis applies equally to the other areas. The objectification itself is pathological, but another form of pathology appears in the fact, unacknowledged by Illich, that objectification disrupts and dismembers wholeness.

Repression. It is as if we are collectively pretending to be human while seriously pretending not to pretend. Our nature is repressed to a low level, perhaps even to the level of pure reflexive mentality overlaid with symbolism. Collectively refusing individual freedom, denying autonomous and self-reliant activity and praxis, falling into automaton conformity, and escaping into the status of objects, individuals do not thereby become free of their subjectivity and the anxiety which fundamentally characterizes it. The dread of

subjectivity always asserts itself, because personal choice and activity are always indissociably aligned with risk and uncertainty. Kierkegaard has convincingly established this. Mass-man lives in a state of perpetual repression, not of this or that impulse or drive, but of his NATURE; the repression of his subjective nature is at the same time a repression of the dread (angst) or anxiety in subjectivity first makes its appearance. Dread is the possibility of freedom.

Mass culture, in repressing subjectivity, is thereby primarily concerned to repress the manifestation of subjectivity, namely existential anxiety, the anxiety which "makes manifest in Dasein its being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being---that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its own Being-free-for the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is" (Heidegger, 1967, p. 232). Objectification into the institutions of group-mindedness is a fragmented retreat from the anxiety of being human, the anxiety generated from awareness of freedom and finitude, but the retreat is a retreat into repression. Oddly, the "solution" of repression is more problematic than the problem of being human it is intended to solve. How is this so?

Repressed anxiety, of which only humans are capable, announces itself in a multitude of phenomena and it reproduces itself in a specific way. The phenomena appear in the group, in the interactions

of group members and their cultural milieu.

Any inventory of human history provides a catalogue of the ways in which fallen subjectivity structures the social world: sexual manipulation, psychic and somatic decrepitude, pollution of the biological and symbolic environments, institutional authoritarianism, slavery, war, and so on. Less obvious, but perhaps more damaging to human nature, are the emotional, cognitive, and spiritual assaults on the person engendered from mass-mindedness: indifference, intolerance, hatred, racism, domination, oppression, distrust, dishonesty, superficiality, projection, denial, and so on. Two aspects of repressed anxiety, violent crime and war, are pretty well fixed invariants of history. And human beings are the only creatures who repetitively alter or diminish their consciousness chemically. But in its saddest form, repression manifests itself in the everyday, average, normal expressions of banality and meaninglessness in social and group interaction. Because mass-mindedness sedates people into existing as objects in the mode of having, they interact with each other other stereotypically and ritualistically, frantically proving themselves "real" by negating each other with one form of violence or another. Life, in the group, becomes a struggle for recognition, usually at the expense of another's freedom or subjectivity. Objects can relate only to other objects. Accordingly, subjects may repress anxiety either by doing violence to others, by negating them, or by doing violence to themselves; either way, objectification results.

Hence "conflict is the original meaning of being for others" (Sartre, 1956, p.364.) Existence in the milieu of mass-man is primordially determined as alienation or estrangement, and interpersonal transactions in this milieu principally operate in the service of subjective negation.

The theoretical foundations laid down to this point indicate that health, or wholeness, is not a state of adjustment to societal norms but rather a systematic integration of elements comprising human reality at each of its strata. In terms of emergent hierarchic-alism, health is integrity in stages, each stage being a stratum or level of development. Thus, psychological health presupposes corporeal health in the bio-organism; and this kind of health would be the integration of bio-organismic sub-systems into a functional whole which interacts creatively with a biological milieu or eco-system. Similarly, health at the specifically human level presupposes wholeness and unity at the prior stratum of reflexive mentation. At the stratum of subjectivity, HEALTH IS THE INTEGRATIVE COHERENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN A SYMBOLIC, CULTURAL MILIEU: IT IS THE HOLISTIC INTEGRATION OF VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF THE PERSON WITHIN A COMMUNITY OR GROUP. This last point can never be sufficiently stressed; the health of individuals is <u>always</u> in relation to an environing culture, community, or group. At the level of fallen subjectivity the environment is mass culture; at the stratum of spirituality it is <u>communitas</u>---the community of free and authentic charity. To heal

is therefore to at least provide the environment and process in which thoughts, beliefs, values, and feelings can be brought into coherence and into creative relationship to a community of persons. Again, there is no individual existence independent of a group representing culture; as Heidegger says, mit-sein (Being-with) is the primordial structure of human existence.

Etymological sources are frequently productive starting places for getting an adequate sense or feeling for a concept, although such sources are only beginnings. The origin of "psychotherapy" is an especially felicitous example: therapy is healing (therapia); the healing act is directed toward what we nowadays call the mind (psyche), which was originally representative of all the spiritual and vital functions. Psychotherapy originally meant, literally, healing the person, and there seems to be no reason for significantly modifying such a definition today.

Pursuing this line further, to heal something initially meant to make it whole, to restore it to unity and completeness. "Heal" is derived from the Old English "hal" (Whole), the closest modern association being found in the expression "hale and hearty". The same old English word is the root for holy. The association of health-whole-holy is thus historically established. It is even more clear in German: heil (whole, sound); heilig (holy, sacred); heilung (cure, healing). Psychotherapy, then, aims at restoration of wholeness, soundness, and unity in psychic functioning, which to

be radical, consists of all the dynamics, structures, and mechanisms of human consciousness and their expression in behavior. Insofar as psychotherapy seeks health its consists of cures (cura: caring); it excoriates and banishes pathology (pathos: suffering) in a patient or sufferer. Moreover, if health is akin to holiness, psychotherapy must be a movement away from the opposite of holiness (wholeness), which is away from the profane and common. The opposite of holiness is profanity which, as we have seen, is a state of fragmentation.

Ultimately, of course, health is holiness and spiritual wholeness. It is spiritual coherence at an emergent stratum beyond subjectivity, where individuals choose an identity for themselves and align themselves to one another in love. The process of healing accordingly begins at the lowest stratum of the emergent hierarchy but aims at the highest, and therapy therefore pursues the emancipation of individuals into the final stages of emergence on the hierarchy.

Conventional Psychotherapy

The phenomena of retreat, fragmentation, and repression impose themselves on all strata and on all areas of personal existence, because they are fundaments of the group milieu which engenders a state of being shared by everyone in varying degrees. No-one in a symbolic culture is exempt from its influence, since everyone participates in cultural forms and institutions. Everyone participates, more or less, in the mass cultural environment defined and imposed by the media and advertising, for example. Similarly, everyone

participates, usually directly, in the operations and values of educational institutions, legal institutions, religious institutions, or health institutions. The group life of symbolic culture affects every life, because it is the environment in which every life is born and in which it dies.

The primary transmitter of culture is the family. Participation is culture is guaranteed by this fact. As Freud discerned, culture is passed on to each generation by the parents. Indeed, the superego represents a structure of personality in which the culture's definitions, values, and programs for living are deposited. The expectations of the culture for each of its members are instilled in the person through the parents in the first few years of life. The superego accordingly emerges as that part of the person in which group values are represented, in each case subject to specific modifications and adaptations by the parents who transmit them. This last point is important: each superego has its own specificity and uniqueness, varying from sub-culture to sub-culture and family to family. At the same time, the general demands of culture for objectification, retreat from authenticity, and repressive alienation remain constant. These general demands and structures, however, a specified in the particular contexts and experiences of different parents. The parents personify the culture to the child and, in doing so, become a structure of the child's existence in the form of the superego. Freud describes it like this: "The long period of childhood, during which the growing human being lives in

dependence upon his parents, leaves behind it a precipitate, which forms within his ego a special agency in which this parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name super-ego...The parent's influence naturally includes not only the personalities of the parents themselves but also the racial, national, and family traditions handed on through them as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu which they represent. In the same way, an individual's super-ego in the course of his development takes over contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents..." (Freud, 1949, pp. 16-17).

What Freud has given us is an insight into the irrevocable importance of group life in the development of the individual. This fact is crucial to psychotherapy: an individual exists only in a social environment, and this environment---represented through the parents and significant others---remains a structure of the psyche throughout life. Not only that, it is the first determination of psychic organization; without the super-ego, without the incorporation of culture, organisms would simply never become human. Without language or a symbolic group an organism stays at the stratum of reflexive mentality, as cases of feral children have demonstrated. These children exist in pure immediacy (Hegel), undifferentiated into the several dimensions of personhood introduced by the symbolic milieu. Indeed, without language and symbolism, the genotypic human is what Freud calls pure id, which, for our purposes, can be designated as the level of reflexive, instinctive existence in which

subjective consciousness is rooted and from which it emerges in language. The id is then whatever human beings are without symbolic culture. Neonates and feral children are examples of pure id; they are pure instinctual energy whose behavior is determined somatically and whose psychic operations are without consciousness. The id is the "oldest of the mental provinces" containing everything "that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution---above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate in somatic organization..." (ibid, p. 14).

Like the superego, the id is a psychic fixture throughout the entire life of persons. It is not displaced by consciousness, rather, it remains as the set of conditions within which consciousness emerges and operates. The demands of the id, as well as the demands of the superego, are continuous and unchosen; they are the foundations of the psyche. The symbolism of consciousness, consolidated through the superego---that is, the content of culture individualized---comes into alignment with the primitive energy of the id through a third relationary term, i.e., the ego. The ego mediates the demands of culture with the demands of the instincts; it mediates the content of group life with the life of the bio-organism. The ego is a "special organization" acting as "an intermediary between the id and the external world" (ibid, p. 15), and the "external world" at the stratum of subjective consciousness is the symbolic environment. As intermediary, the ego's highest task is to make rational decisions

and predictions, to bring things under conceptual organization, to compute and logically order somatic and symbolic realities. Its purpose is thought, grounded in the somatic life of feeling and instinct (the id), and in the cultural life of language and morality (the superego).

In terms of emergent hierarchicalism, Freud has given us a conceptualization for the idea of strata (the ego equating with the stratum of subjective consciousness, succeeding the stratum of id) and the idea of a cultural milieu (superego). These are undeniably basic realities in any theoretical grounding for psychotherapy. As structural realities, the id, ego, and superego are equations for those anthropological facts uncovered so far in this investigation, but they exhibit a new character when the emphasis is shifted from their theoretical structure to their nature as it is experienced. At this point, the work of Eric Berne advances on Freud, and gives it a new orientation within emergent hierarchicalism. Using Berne's immensely rich suggestions, we can say that the person is a whole system of various sub-systems, existing in a social-cultural environment at some stage on the developmental hierarchy, whose functioning and behavior is experienced in a phenomenological state corresponding to the psychoanalytic structures just mentioned.

All existence is situated in a context or environment, and the environment for subjective consciousness is the symbolic culture or group. The environment is represented in the individual, in the first few years of life, in the superego. It is experienced

phenomenologically as the Parental ego state. The Parental ego state is the synthesis of cultural demands, values, beliefs, and prescriptions for living acquired through a specific family in the first five to six years of life, and as such it is the sum of all forces brought to bear on the child in the process of socialization. In the same vein, the series of strata on the emergent hierarchy prior to subjective consciousness form the id-structure, phenomenologically experienced as the Child ego state. This state is the totality of primitive instinctual energy manifested in the behavior and feelings of the child as it responds to parental, socializing forces. Clearly, if the parental forces were abset the organism would fail to humanize; it would remain pure id, unconsciously responding to the stimulus environment with fear, aggression, play, and so on. Finally, there is the essential structure of subjective consciousness, namely, the ego which mediates the superego and the id. This is the structure which differentiates through language as the "I" or the self, phenomenologically experienced as the Adult ego state. We have already seen that without language and a symbolic environment the rational ego would be an impossibility.

In making the transition from psychoanalytic structures to phenomenological states, the way becomes clear for defining the kind of role group psychotherapy plays in healing as well as the kind of language or approach which would be the most appropriate to it. A few crucial and fundamental theoretical ideas have been brought to light, the most basic of which is this: the subject is a system at

a definite hierarchic stratum whose existence is both indissociable from groups and indissociable from the lower strata of nature. Relations between subjects have a transcendent possibility but they are for the most part pathological. What we now need is a mechanism for describing this pathology and changing it in the direction of health, as that notion has been expounded. That is, we need a LANGUAGE OF DIAGNOSIS, or problem definition, and a LANGUAGE OF CHANGE, or problem resolution. Each of these languages must be fully consistent with the ontoanthropology outlined above, and they must complement each other. A starting point, however, has already been given: the phenomenological realities of the Child, Parent and Adult ego states are the experiential expression of the anthropological structures already discussed.

The way in which a human subject operates and lives in his or her social milieu can be known only by observing his or her transactions with other subjects. From such observation, the structural configuration of subjects is made known as well as their transactional dynamics. Group interaction is accordingly the only available context for diagnosis and assessment in a therapeutic sense, and Transactional Analysis---Berne's method of describing social interaction---is an appropriate therapeutic language for group therapy. In effect, the TA group is a laboratory of human social interaction, where, owing to the intentions and purposes of its members, every action and feeling is full of significance and meaning to an astute observor.

It is commonly observed that groups are therapeutically meaningful because they microscopically represent the larger social world. Yalom (1975), for example, claims that

> Given enough time, every patient will begin to be himself, to interact with the group members as he interacts with others in the social sphere, to create in the group the same interpersonal universe which he has always inhabited. In other words, patients will begin to display their maladaptive behavior in the group; there is no need for them to describe their pathology---they will sooner or later act it out before the group's eyes. This concept is of paramount importance in group therapy and constitutes a key-stone upon which our entire approach to group therapy rests. (pp. 29-30)

More correctly, the group is diagnostically meaningful because it recapitulates the pathology of fallen subjectivity, as well as subjectivity's ontological status of essential being-with-others. The group context of diagnosis is consequently continuous with the essence of subjectivity, i.e., objectified consciousness is a social environment rooted in strata, but the therapy group goes beyond the pathology of ordinary life by intentionally giving it a focus and definition is a coherent therapeutic language. In any case, the group has now been isolated as the initial medium of healing, because it is in a group that individuals are closest to their nature

as participants in the social milieu of mass culture.

Transactional Analysis provides both the descriptive language and the context for psychotherapy, but it does not of itself eventuate in health because it contains no definite methodology for change or personal transformation. It certainly contains the goals of health, but it does not indicate how these goals are to be attained. It does not specify or even indicate interventions which would initiate movement clearly away from the pathology of social interactions toward "awareness, spontaneity, and autonomy". In light of this, TA can be viewed as the necessary condition for individual psychotherapy; in providing the language of assessment and the context for diagnosis it provides the preparation for healing and personal transformation. The case can be put even more strongly, in the now familiar terminology developed in this inquiry. Transactional analysis must give way to individualized psychotherapeutic interventions because the movement toward individual health at the stratum of subjectivity is a movement away from social groups in their everyday mode. Health demands a transition form fallen-ness in mass cultural phenomena of objectification and repression into personal authenticity, autonomy, self-definition and a radically different form of community. The TA group, however, recapitualates the pathology of Das Man, and the rescue of subjectivity from such pathology is first a process of individuation and revolt against cultural norms. Put this way, Transactional Analysis can act as an adequate therapeutic medium only if it contains the seeds of

its own transcendence: it must permit individualized therapeutic interventions aimed at eliminating particular pathologies and, beyond that, the transcendent possibility for everyone to govern his or her own health and wholeness.

Social interactions in a therapeutic group, then, provide diagnostic material; the patient is able to gain awareness in a group of his particular way of being-in-the-world, the awareness being formulated in the language of TA. Assessment is the first stage in the therapeutic process: this is the stage of awareness. Awareness, hoerver, does not in itself bring change or remove problems, and without change TA is likely to degenerate into a pastime called "TA". Transformation and development is engendered not from more interpretations or definition, but from prescriptive interventions which utilize and redirect the patient's energy and behavior. The Brief Therapy (Paradoxical) interventions prove to be extraordinarily fruitful as stimulants for change when they are used adjunctively to the assessment language of Transactional Analysis. In effect, the paradoxical interventions are the medium of individual change after group diagnosis.

Brief Therapy is a therapeutic style and method which evolved principally from the work of Milton Erickson. The style was later elaborated by Haley (1963) and given a theoretical grounding by Watzlawick et al (1974, 1978). Its approach relies heavily on paradoxical and analogic thinking as well as cognitive shifting. Among its principal techniques are (a) symptom prescription and

exaggeration: the patient is asked to consciously and deliberately rehearse and amplify the symptoms, preferably at a specified time, in order to gain control over them; (b) Reframing: the symptom is interpreted in a way which differs from the patient's usual way of viewing it; (c) Double-binding: the patient is put into a no-lose, either-or situation in which he improves no matter what he does; (d) Designating the "problem" as a "solution"; (e) The use of humour.

This section has undertaken to develop a theoretical rationale for group psychotherapy and discover the appropriate ideological and methodological framework for it. The procedure was to inquire into the conditions of pathology and health generally, based on ontoanthropology, and to provide this conception of human nature with a therapeutic language and context. It was found that human nature is constitutionally pathological, since it is inevitably and fundamentally rooted in a social milieu which is for the most part a collective flight from subjective wholeness, individual autonomy, personal freedom, and the imperative for each subject to create its own unique identity. The collective flight from subjective authenticity was represented in the phenomenon of mass culture, with its elements of fragmentation, repression, and retreat into objectified institutions and collectivities. These facts, together with the conception of human nature as a hierarchic structure whose strata and levels associate with the notions of id, ego, and superego, dictated that

the recovery of wholeness-health must commence with the analysis of individual pathology in a group setting. Transactional Analysis presented itself as the appropriate language for such assessment, while paradoxical interventions were posited as the ideal catalysts for changing or removing the pathology uncovered.

It was argued that health is essentially the systematic coherence of subjective consciousness, presupposing health at all the prior strata of the human hierarchic structure. Since subjectivity consolidates itself at the higher stratum of spirit, health accordingly necessitates a break from culture and group life, even though a healthy population would still participate in some communal form. The revolt against existing culture, as a movement toward health, implies the need for the individual to pass through, and become emancipated from, group bonds. Group psychotherapy is therefore only a propaedeutic to health, a transitional phase. Like many other procedures, conventional psychotherapy's ultimate aim is its own demise.

Holistic Psychotherapy: Parting Thoughts

The procedures of group diagnosis and individual prescriptions for change constitute, along with other associated procedures like Gestalt, Assertiveness Training, Psychoanalysis, and family therapy, conventional approaches to healing. Their main purpose is to relieve symptomatic discomfort and dysfunction, bringing the patient into adjustment with consensus reality and the conventional environing

milieu. Inasmuch as the desired adjustments and relief are viewed as necessary conditions for the pursuit of "higher" healing with less orthodox methods and goals, they are part of a legitimate process with legitimate justification. Conventional pathologies require conventional treatments. But inasmuch as they are considered as terminal goals they are incomplete: conventional cures perpetuate conventional reality and its pathologies. They are, as Freud once said of psychoanalysis, designed to help the individual get over his or her personal neurosis so he can better endure the collective neurosis. Conventional psychological therapies must be gone through and passed over (assuming conventional pathologies are present), otherwise the higher and more radical therapies are likely to be pursued from a psychologically deficient base for neurotic reasons. For example, submission to the authority of religious cult leaders who advertise "spiritual growth" and "enlightenment" is just another form of objectification in which identity and belief are dispensed and purchased.

Holistic therapy is radical therapy, insofar as it goes to the root (radix) of human nature and its problems. Holistic healing operates with a conception of human nature in its fullness, and therefore has three aspects: (a) health has a hierarchic structure; (b) human health is defined from the perspective of subjectivity and its transcendent possibilities; (c) the health of subjectivity presupposes a radical transformation of conventional consciousness

as it is defined by mass culture and its institutions. Because these three aspects are so intimately connected, any discussion of holism cannot analyse them in isolation; hence this concluding section will touch on them in criss-cross fashion.

Human reality is a hierarchy of irreducible, emergent levels and strata; health itself is hierarchic, and the means to health are accordingly hierarchic as well. Just as the level of syntax is incapacitated if the lower level of grammar is deficient, so the level of subjectivity is pathological if any of the emergent levels or strata below it are pathological. This hierarchic conception is entailed by principle 19 of Emergent Hierarchicalism. The emergent hierarchic paradigm now permits the formulation of a position sought at the outset of this investigation, a position providing the very thing which was found to be a necessity for contemporary psychology and psychotherapy, i.e., a unifying paradigm for those disciplines. It can now be said that diverse clinical methods---and the theories supporting them---all have limited applicability, defined with reference to a level of functioning on a hierarchic scale. Implied in this notion is the position that there is very little inconsistency across all therapeutic approaches, a fact which becomes apparent once their level of application is discerned. What are now inconsistent and fragmented areas of psychology and therapeutics become unified hierarchically.

Hierarchic Therapy.

The reservoir of theories and practices in psychology and

psychotherapy appears endless. The gamut runs from bioenergetics and nutritional counselling through classical and operate conditioning, cognitive restructuring, and transactional analysis to the existential and spiritual therapies. A reductionist model dictates that only one of the numerous theories and methodologies is the correct one; the undertaking to compare and assess therapeutic methods and theories in terms of coherence, correctness, and efficacy therefore implicitly presupposes a reductionist attitude. A hierarchic model, however, recognizes the validity of all methods and theories, provided their application is restricted to a proper level or stratum of anthropological reality. So, for example, there is no inconsistency between orthomolecular psychiatry and Logotherapy: chemotherapy is not only appropriate but necessary at the N-stratum of biochemical reality, and Logotherapy is not only appropriate but necessary at the higher N-stratum of subjectivity. Absurdities and inconsistencies arise when these levels are not recognized or when one of them is ontologically, nomologically, methodologically, or semantically reduced to a lower one. The effort to treat existential despair with vitamin pills or Tofranil is accordingly bizarre, and, worse, counter-therapeutic. Equally ludicrous, though, is the effort to treat pellagra with authenticity and agapic I-Thou encounter. R.D. Laing and Abraham Hoffer share the same difficulties: each is right at one level but wrong at another.

Numerous attempts have been made to order the natural and social sciences on a hierarchy which establishes levels of knowledge according

to levels of reality. Wilson (1969) has adequately surveyed these efforts. Conspicuously absent, however, are similar attempts to order therapeutic approaches on a hierarchic scale. There appear to be only two such attempts in the literature. Lysloff (1969) argues that treatments for chronic alcoholism can be formulated at any of seven levels, such that the medical and non-medical models of alcoholism can be accomodated at the appropriate level. The most comprehensive attempt to apply hierarchy theory to the healing arts was undertaken by Brody (1973) in a landmark paper which is as interesting as it is mistaken. Brody's "man hierarchy" defines sixteen levels of natural systems as follows: quarks, subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs, systems, levels of conduct and experience (the "person" level), family, community, subculture, culture, society, homo sapiens, and biosphere. The "person" level is not defined and, curiously, the "intriguing question of where consciousness fits into the systems view cannot be discussed here in the depth it deserves" (p. 85). There is also a confusion of levels, the environing milieu (E^m), and environing conditions (E^c) when, as a case in point, culture is assigned to a higher tier of the hierarchy than persons. Culture is the E^m on which persons emerge. Nonetheless, the paper is a solid theoretical contribution to paradigm reformulation, adding substantive weight to proposals for therapeutic eclecticism.

Brody proposes that hierarchicalism is an argument against the "reductionist fallacy" while I have argued against reductionism on other grounds as a propadeutic to the conceptualization of a hierarchic model. This difference aside, some of Brody's points can be added

to what has already been summarized under the rubric of emergent hierarchicalism.

First, the part of the Man hierarchy labelled "person" itself consists of a number of sub-levels. Second, information moves across level interfaces, both up and down the hierarchy. Third, each component system on the hierarchy must be functionally intact in order for the next higher level to function. Fourth, perturbation of the systemic integrity at any level is disease; this perturbation has upward and downward reverberations on the rest of the hierarchy. Fifth, the healing arts embrace the entire span of the man hierarchy.

These points round out one argument for holism in psychotherapy; their full elaboration and refinement can be found in a combination of general system theory, hierarchy theory, and existentialism. The argument entails that there is a hierarchy of therapies which maps onto the hierarchy of N-strata. A scala therapeutica might therefore ascend as follows:

N_1. Unknown, since the properties of N_1 are undetermined. Possible candidates might include Bioenergetics, Prana Yoga, and Reich's Orgone Therapy.

N_2. Therapies at this level are now only being conceptualized. The efforts of the physicists Bohm and Capra are representative.

N_3. The biophysical and biochemical therapies, including traditional approaches such as chemotherapy, nutritional counselling, and ecological psychology, as well as the more esoteric approaches such

as herbalism, acupuncture and reflexology.

N_4. Biological medicine in all its aspects. Nearly all Western psychiatry is rooted at this stratum.

N_5. The mainstream psychological therapies derived mainly from learning theory, including classical and operant conditioning, cognitive restructuring; biofeedback; lifestyle counselling. Psychoanalysis is on the interface of levels N_5 and N_6.

N_6. At the lower n-levels, the interactional therapies such as Berne's transactional analysis, Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry, the family and communicational therapies of Satir and Haley. Also included here would be psychologies aligned with social criticism and reform, of which Marcuse would be representative. At the lower levels of the N_6 stratum, therapy concentrates on the E^m of the subject, which is culture transmitted through the family. At the higher levels, therapy concentrates on the individual, proceeding idiographically, in keeping with the subjective impulse toward self-interpretation and identity choice. Examples of therapy at this level would include Jung's analytical psychology and Rank's version of psychoanalysis. The highest levels of N_6 are occupied by the individualistic, existential therapies. Gestalt therapy and psychosynthesis fit here, below approaches such as Sartre's existential psychoanalysis, Binswanger's Daseinsanalyse, and Frankl's logotherapy. All these therapies can be subsumed under the rubric of "conventional", discussed in the last section.

N_7. The spiritual therapies like Zen Buddhism, Taoism, Yoga.

N_8. Religious action, in which the person transcends subjectivity and

spirituality as a vehicle of divinity. At this point, "health" recovers its original meaning: health, wholeness, and holiness are etymologically and existentially the same thing. It may also be that at this stratum human reality recovers the original nature and lucidly inhabits stratum N_1, thus confirming a Uroboric hierarchy. Examples are Christian agapic love and Buddhist compassion.

The healer, operating within the emrgent hierarchic framework, is a holist, not in the sense that he or she is adept with approaches spanning different areas or dimensions of human subjectivity, but in the sense that he or she can respond to pathology at different levels of reality. At the very least, the holistic healer should be familiar with those levels and approaches above and below his particular level of expertise, so he is able to assign his patients to the appropriate level of therapy. This suggests that holists would band together, each giving emphasis to a chosen N-stratum while remaining deferential to all the others.

Some suggestions and points have been made, all of them incipient and provisional, as a contribution to a new paradigm for psychological inquiry and psychotherapeutic methods, which will hopefully ameliorate their abysmally fragmented status. Even if no more than the anto-reductionist position outlined in the first chapter is accepted enough would have been accomplished to commence further work on a hierarchic paradigm, or something close to it.

Among the most pressing of problems generated by the emergent hierarchic framework is a practical one, viz., making available a

reliable and valid procedure for accurately idolating levels of pthology. No assessment instrument currently exists for determining the N-stratum or n-level at which symptoms should be diagnosed and treated. More important, no instrument exists for defining problems at the appropriate n-level of subjectivity.

Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) in a valiant but, it seems, unsuccessful effort, have attempted to assess levels of development in 55 sub-systems on the D-scale of emotion, using five levels. Apart from their four measures, with all their difficulties, nothing else has been offered. As a possible remedy for this one might propose, without specific elaboration, the development of a Holistic Health Inventory, which simply elicits information about personal functioning at each N-stratum and each of its n-levels, discriminating the relevant dimensions of each level, the value gradient of each dimension, and the degree of integration of all dimensions relative to the entire system.

The biggest problem in this suggestion is to establish criteria for reliably delineating levels of pathology; if the pathological level is not known the therapeutic treatment level is not known either. Simply starting at the lower levels and working upward by elimination will not do, since there is an upward and downward reverberation or influence from and given N(n) to the rest of the hierarchy. For example, a sexual pathology may originate in an abberation of DNA structures at the level of molecular systems. This will have an effect

on the upper levels of the hierarchy. On the other hand, it may originate on the N-stratum of subjective symbolism, having an effect on the lower levels. In both cases, it is detectable as an effect at all or most levels, even though its point of origin is at only one. The problem intensifies when pathology is observed at some n-level of N_6. For example depression at N_6 may be adaptive in a dysfunctional family (n) but it may also be an authentic response to the perceived absurdity and futility of living (n+1). Either way, the entire subjective hierarchy is affected, as well as the lower N-strata. The solution to this problem lies partly in the hands of clinical and experimental research, but for the most part it entails refined conceptual work in the infant field of hierarchy theory. Especially important is the development of formal principles governing the interactions of levels and the transfer of dysfunction across strata and levels.

Coda

A hierarchic model of health is only the first step toward the radicalization of psychotherapy. This step is holistic in that it responds to the whole person, i.e., to all the strata and levels of the person. At the stratum of subjectivity, however, the therapeutic hierarchy is still conventional, because the therapies on that stratum do not explicityly analyze and confront subjectivity's participation in mass culture, not do they approach subjectivity as a system of related bipolar dimensions. At this point, the demand for a new kind

of therapy appears. The ultimate aim of this kind of therapy is de-objectification of the subject and retrieval of subjectivity from its immersion in mass culture. It is consequently a simultaneous change in the subject's consciousness and his social affiliations: the restoration of subjectivity is concurrently a transormation of the environing milieu. No psychotherapy currently exists which responds to all the realities of subjectivity: we do not possess a genuine radical therapy for stratum N_6. Such a therapy would have four stages: first, it would restore subjectivity from mass culture by retrieving its contradictions from objectified institutions (this stage would actually augment anxiety, rather than diminish it); second, it would integrate the various dimensional polarities or contradictions of subjectivity; third, it would integrate all the dimensions of the subjective system into a coherent whole; fourth, therapy would either act on and transform the environing milieu so it promotes transcendence, or it would create new cultural forms as the context in which healthy subjects can grow and thrive.

Restoration. The restoration of subjectivity is a double movement, in which the subject identifies those disjunctive aspects of itself which it has relinquished to culture and the retrieves them back into its own sphere of agency and activity. The identification process also involves a dual movement. Since the first disjunction of consciousness is the mind-body split,expressed as seductive sexuality, the first stage in subjective reinstatement would be the identification of how the subject

objectifies this disjunction and what cultural forms regulate it. The initial task is, then, to identify the cultural institutionalizations of sexuality: how do individuals sexually transact with each other as objects? Radical therapy begins with an analysis of sexuality and how it is usurped by cultural institutions. Psychoanalysis notwithstanding, no systematic therapeutic approach begins with sexuality at the stratum of subjectivity, although directions have been charted. Reich (1974) has written a passionate manifesto for sexual revolution in culture, and Koestenbaum (1974) has initiated a clinical approach for subjective reform. The identification of institutionalized sexual modalities has perhaps been most clearly indicated by the theoreticians of radical therapy. Steiner (1974) and Wyckoff (1977) focus on the role-specific scripts to which men and women are subjected in their cultural indoctrination, but this is still only a beginning. Clinical methods have yet to be evolved for determining how the original symbols of difference are specifically elaborated in individual subjects. Beyond this is the necessity for developing procedures for re-introducing these symbols into personal consciousness, for re-owning one's contradictions.

In the evolution of subjectivity, as we have seen, an indefinite number of bipolar dimensions develop and ramify as the subjective system complexifies its symbolism. The entire system is constructed from these disjunctions and their relations. Subjective restoration proceeds, then, with the identification of an individual's system of polarized dimensions and the location of the cultural institutions in which they are dispersed. No two symbolic systems are the same, and the identification of symbolic dimensions is an idiographic procedure.

The first question in the identification process is "What is the hegemonic dimension in the subject's symbolic system?" and, by implication, "What are the undeveloped dimensions?". For example, subject X may organize his subjectivity along the true-false dimension (being therefore committed to knowledge as his hegemonic value) to the detriment of the beautiful-ugly dimension (therefore impoverished in his experience of aesthetic values), while subject Y may organize his along the right-wrong dimension (committed to morality as a hegemonoc dimension) to the detriment of the pleasure-pain dimension (and the affective value). The actual process of identification is subtle and intricate, requiring refined and delicate methods. Again, Kelly's personal construct psychology provides direction here, but there are other questions remaining, i.e., how does the subject institutionalize his dimensional values? What is the degree of integration of the several value dimensions? Having answered these kinds of questions, the next therapeutic task is to retrieve subjective values, and the contradicitions on which they rest, back into consciousness such that the contradictions are personnally felt and demand a personal solution.

Polar Integration. Subjectivity is a system of contradictions, grounded in the pre-conscious self-other cleavage and the conscious disjunction of mind and body. The polarization of mind and body has been designated as the prototypic symbolization of difference in subjective consciousness, from which all other polarizations ramify as levelled dimensions in the subjective system. Kierkegaard proposes that the basic task of human existence is to reconcile the contradictions of consiousness: there is

an existential imperative to "become spirit", an achievement requiring that the subject "synthesize" its opposite factors in a transcendent movement by which it "leaps" into faith. Such a leap is "fundamental healing" provided by the "Christian therapeutic" (whose opposite would be a repressive submersion in mass culture and objectivity). Using Kierkegaard's extensive elaboration of this idea in Sickness Unto Death, a second therapeutic task, next in line after the task of restoration, can be formulated within an ontoanthropological framework. The work of psychotherapy, following the retrieval of contradiction back into consciousness, becomes that of integrating and unifying opposite factors.

Freud, Kierkegaard, and mythology have been brought together in the conception that the first rupture in consciousness is in the mond-body split, represented in consciousness as sexual interest. The regressive solution to sexuality is seductive manipulation along culturally defined lines. The progressive solution lies in the opposite direction at a higher stratum of the hierarchy. The therapeutic task of integration, commencing with the first disjunction of consciousness, has its point of departure in sexuality; its radical purpose is the synthesis of mind and body, such that their conflict is aufgehoben (Hegel): their synthesis both preserves and annuls their differences. Since the disruption of mind and body is manifest in subjectivity as sexual interest, though, the integrative function of unconventional

therapy must commence with this phenomenon; the process would surely begin by breaking down sexual roles and regulations as they are defined and objectified in the institutions of mass culture. Integrative therapy would transform sexuality and its normal definitions from a relationary medium between objects to an expressive connection between subjects. And it must be remembered that mind and body are symbols of difference in and for subjective consciousness, so the work of psychotherapy is at the stratum of symbolism. It accordingly deals with sexuality's meaning and its relation to subjective identity.

The mind-body split is only the first of an indefinite number of polarizations. A compilation of all subsequent polarizations, applicable to every subject is both undesirable and impossible, because each set of polarizations in a subjective system is unique to the system in which it occurs. In fact, one of the demands of integrative psychotherapy is to decipher the specific and particular modes of polarization in each individual and then provide the means for integrating them. Since consciousness is essentially interest in contradictory categories or factors, the process of conscious healing must involve the isolation of the subject's contitutive bipolar dimensions and the sythesis of the opposites composing them. Techniques and procedures for doing this have yet to be developed.

Global Unification. Subjective psychotherapy is not necessarily a linear sequence of retrieval, integration, and unification. The stage of unification may indeed by the means for achieving the goals of the

integrative stage. Kierkegaard believes, for example, that when the self "related itself to its own self" it thereby resolves its symbolic contradictions. This important consideration notwithstanding, a third stage of unconventional psychotherapy is clearly dictated by onto-anthropology. Its completion would be a supreme achievement for psychotherapy, because it would represent the displacement of subjectivity by the N_7 stratum of [illegible]. It would represent the attainment of Kierkegaard's "infinite self consistency".

Each emergent stratum of the anthropological hierarchy is characterized, overall, as systemic. Subjectivity itself is a system: it is a symbolic system. As an organized system of symbols, categories, and meanings, it conforms to systemic laws and principles. But subjectivity is also a system with a crucial difference, and in this difference resides its most distinctly human property, namely, its self-interrogative nature. Subjectivity has already been disclosed as a phenomenon which encounters itself both as an issue and as the freedom to resolve the issue it finds in itself. No other property is more basic to human nature than this. The discovery of this property is the most shattering existential experience the subject can endure, because through it the subject discovers its ultimate nature: subjectivity, to borrow from Sartre, is primordially a nothingness. It is a void, a nullity, which remains to be filled in. Subjectivity is a system which is impelled to relate itself to itself: it is the phenomenon which must <u>interpret</u> itself to itself, or define itself.

The entire symbolic system, with all its dimensions and their relations, has no intrinsic unifying dynamic other than what it creates for itself. This is not true of any other system: only subjectivity can and must integrate itself as a whole. It does so by creating an interpretation of itself through which it becomes globally unified under a master concept or idea. In essence, subjectvity chooses its fate, imparting to itself consistency and coherence in thought, value, behavior, and feeling. Originally bereft of purpose and meaning, initially a nullity and emptiness, subjectivity unifies itself in the consolidation of all its contingencies and properties into a primary ontological interpretation. By means of this, subjective experience is given an organization and coherence. The act of organization presupposes a commitment, a leap of faith, beyond institutional symbols, beyond the acquired or learned responses at the stratum of mind, and beyond the necessities of biological reality. Having recovered itself from dispersion in false externalities and culturally determined roles, subjectivity must then become a pilgrim and a wanderer in its own interior void and nothingness, creating from that---in an absurd and terrifying leap---its own essence and identity. The farthest psychotherapy can go is to assist in this process and then give itself over to religion. The guidelines and procedures for such assistance can be clinically formulated from Kierkegaard's major works on "becoming a Christian" (1941, 1954).

Communalization. The indissociability of subjectivity from an environing milieu has already been strongly emphasized, and no radical therapy can ignore the environing milieu as a dominant factor in the promotion and maintenance of health. One might say that no therapy is complete unless it contends with the cultural milieu which engenders pathology in its participating subjects: radical therapy is unavoidably political involvement, indeed, it is revolutionary activity in the sense that it withdraws from mass culture and joins in the creation of an authentic community of subjects. Radical therapy cultivates a new environing milieu, not as an extension or transformation of existing institutional forms but as an alternative social structure. This structure would be a genuine emergent environment, a new stratum of social organization, with which subjects could interact in alignment with their emergent properties. An emergent milieu would accordingly exhibit properties and laws which are largely inconceivable within the current framework of mass culture. Curiously, these properties and laws are already given in some of society's oldest forms of collective organization, namely, the monastic religious communities. Using these communities as paradigms, as well as some of the modern secular communal ventures, the architecture of a spiritualized community can be discerned. It would take the form of a therapeutic commune in which the prevailing notions of sexuality, property, family, justice, learning, health, beauty, entertainment, salvation, and consumption will undergo startling changes. It would be an authentic society, in which any

participant would be a concerned socius (companion, ally) in a communal (communa: bound into one) effort to realize and emanate their divinity.

Summary.

1. A social-phenomenological analysis was carried out related to the environment inhabited by subjectivity in its inauthentic mode. This environment, called mass culture, is a system of institutions into which subjectivity externalizes its contradictions in a flight from its anxiety.

2. Mass culture reinforces subjectivity's fragmentation, repression, and retreat. Conventional psychotherapy, in the medium of the group, diagnoses these pathologies and cures them.

3. Unconventional therapy commences with the invocation of healing at all strata of the emergent hierarchy. It proceeds by addressing itself to the essential properties of subjectivity one its "normal" pathologies have been ameliorated.

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CONCLUSION

This inquiry has now found a natural resting spot, and can be brought to an end. It has followed a single trail of thought to completion, having brought several themes and concerns together along the way. In its evolution, it has conformed to my notion of what psychology ought to be and, perhaps, what psychology is now becoming. Ironically, it has discussed emergence and hierarchy and, in doing so, seems to have emerged as a new paradigm itself on a hierarchy ofpsychological models. This conclusion will be a somewhat personalized summary of what it has accomplished and what it points to.

A conclusion to a theoretical enterprise such as this one, surely, ought to do more than periphrastically summarize its major results or conclusions. The "results", in any case, are embedded in the comprehensive metaphor my thinking has produced. From one point of view, when I am asked to draw conclusions about the paradigm proposed here, I can only point back to the total picture I have painted and say "This is another way of <u>seeing</u>, another conceptual perspective. You must draw your own conclusions". But from another point of view, a number of comments can be made about my theoretical model which, while not leading to conclusions of the type one anticipates in an <u>experimental</u> treatise, nonetheless point to the kinds of <u>theoretical</u> conclusions an interested reader could draw. Rather than listing the conclusions at which this work has arrived,

thus imparting a sense of finality and termination to it, I should like to discuss the accomplishments the investigation might stimulate. Consequently, this inquiry will conclude with a very brief summary of its major moments, followed by a list of appropriate general observations.

The preceding pages have sought to construct a comprehensive paradigm for the guidance of thought and action by assimilating personality theory and developmental psychology into each other, heedful of Angyal's remark that "there is needed not a mere combination of the results of those sciences which study single aspects of the person but an entirely new science which must develop its own set of concepts" (1941, pp. 4, 19). Any potency or originality in the paradigm lies largely in its synthesis of evolutionary intuitions, existentialism, and social phenomenology into a hierarchic model. As the term 'ontoanthropology' indicates, this new science is transdisciplinary and, while it could be developed within a number of academically (or administratively) defined disciplines, it naturally falls to psychology and psychological therapy as a responsibility.

What is at first blush a disconnected series of arguments and analyses has in effect been a single evolving position and a simple proposal. The statement of this position began by confronting a basic problem in personality theory, apparent since its inception: to provide a framework for an unquestionably human psychology without

abrogating or ignoring the existing validity of its several methodologies, perspectives, and models. Facing this problem meant the elimination of the philosophy of science which reductionistically disposes of the distinct and unique properties of human nature, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of those properties in terms of which reductionistic science typically discusses human reality. The problem was responded to in the following way.

Chapter One. The reductionist position which says that human being is only a sophisticated biophysical system was rebutted, The rebuttal took the form of, first, a direct attack on a reductionist argument and, second, an outline of the practical consequences of reductionism. The requirements for a human developmental personality theory were then designated.

Chapter Two. The idea was then developed that there are levels of reality, called strata, of which the physical, vital, and mental are only three. Following a historical outline and examples of levels, the conception of developmental levels was spelled out in a new paradigm called emergent hierarchicalism, which adds the element of developmental emergence to the concept of levels. It was stipulated that personality theory ought to be concerned with the distinctly human level while recognizing the existence of others. That is, personality theory must state the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person. These conditions are outlined in the chapter's final section.

Chapter Three. Emergent Hierarchicalism was formulated in some detail, such that a distinctly human level was secured. Once secured, chapter three was dedicated to an analysis of this level. A new interpretation of Kierkegaard's phenomenology of subjectivity laid bare some of the elemental structural and existential properties of human consciousness. Kierkegaard was proposed as a thinker who has come closer than any other to describing the essential nature of the person stratum. Three points stand out in my reconstruction of his phenomenology: 1) human being is initially an ontological dismemberment of body and mind; 2) the dismemberment opens up in the symbolism of consciousness; 3) persons collectively attempt to restore their prelapsarian unity by objectifying themselves into the environment of mass culture.

Chapter Four. Based on a synthesis of dominant ideas in mythology, Jaynes, Neumann, and Freud, this chapter attempted to retrace the emergence of the person stratum (subjectivity) in racial and individual history. The retracing was taken to be a historical verification of Kierkegaard's major anthropological formulations. The historical account of the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of subjectivity supports the view that persons emerge as disjunction, symbolically represented in the mind-body split, expressed as sexual interest. This disjunction has the radical freedom to interpret and define itself, but this freedom entails anxiety, and the anxiety is repressed in the attempt to return to the unity and immediacy which preceded subjectivity's emergence.

Chapter Five. Subjectivity flees from its nature in seeking a return to an earlier state of non-disjunction. This flight is into objectivity, effected through the process of objectification into the institutions of mass culture, a pathological state. Using data from previous chapters and the analysis of mass culture, group psychotherapy was isolated as the initial medium for ameliorating the natural pathology of the human condition, and for assisting the subject toward health and wholeness. A theory of conventional psychotherapy was outlined for removing the dysfunctions imposed by the social collective, followed by a theory of unconventional therapy---based on the emergent-hierarchic paradigm---by which the subject regains its essence and passes beyond it into multi-levelled health.

The emergent-hierarchic paradigm, the analysis of subjectivity and its environment, and a theory of healing together form a science of human nature which I have called Ontoanthropology. Ontoanthropology's intentions are quite close to those of what has hitherto been called "philosophical anthropology", except that the former adds the components of historical evolution and hierarchic levels to the latter.

What does this inquiry accomplish? I propose the following observations.

1. Several aspects of ontoanthropology clearly invite and define further research, some purely theoretical, some strictly empirical. For example, I have carried out no investigation into the higher

levels on the emergent hierarchy. The analysis of N_7 alone would occupy an entire volume. Moreover, the laws of emergence and dimensional relation need refined formulation. How do strata and levels interact? How are levels identified? How do lower-levelled laws condition higher-levelled operations? These are all conceptual problems for hierarchy theory. Other aspects of ontoanthropology also contain conceptual problems. What, for example, counts as an institution? Are there as many institutions as there are objectifications ? How is sexuality objectified in actual fact? Strictly empirical research is also opened up, especially in the areas of ancient history and mythology. Empirical methods for hierarchic therapy must be developed and tested. The research possibilities appear endless.

2. Ontoanthropology has pragmatic potency as a comprehensive organizer and guide for thought and activity. It is a world-view, a total metaphor, a system for making the world (and being-in-the-world) coherent. As a way of thinking and seeing, I believe it has heuristic and explanatory value; it is a paradigmatic framework into which all aspects of experience and action can be fit.

3. The hierarchic scale, so central to the paradigm, is a profoundly simple instrument for unifying psychology and psychotherapy. Oppositions no longer need to exist between "schools" of psychology or therapeutics, at least in regard to several historically divisive canons. All methods, doctrines, and languages can now be assigned to a place on

a hierarchy AT THEIR APPROPRIATE LEVEL OR STRATUM. No level needs to be considered any "better" than any other.

4. Ontoanthropology demonstrates the need for developmental psychology and personality theory to be fused into a single discipline. Developmental psychology is of little use, ultimately, if it does not narrate the development of persons, while personality theory is empty without an accounting of the person's evolutionary history. Ontoanthropology defines personality and developmental psychology as indissociable.

5. Hierarchic theory, the phenomenology of subjectivity, and the analysis of mass culture (still incomplete in their elaboration) are aspects of ontoanthropology which, I would say, are epistemologically adequate. That is, these areas are subject to verification and disconfirmations, and ontoanthropological conclusions can accordingly be amended in light of new empirical and analytic findings. Investigators in the infant field of hierarchy theory, especially in cybernetics and geometry, have demonstrated this. In any case, ontoanthropology, unlike many other paradigms or philosophical models, is responsive to the epistemological demand that it actually issues in knowledge of a humanly useful sort.

6. The ontoanthropological paradigm opens the way for traditional psychology to study distinctly human reality, and it gives an indication of what that study may be. Its multi-levelled approach, while denying behaviorism and physiology their reductionist

proclivities, also tempers the misdirected efforts of "humanists" to stake out an exclusive (and often sclerotic) domain for humanistic psychology.

7. In the course of developing my position I was forcibly struck by the insight that comprehension of a thing's essence begins in the understanding of its genesis, its origins. This is included as an observation on the inquiry's accomplishments because (I believe) it generalizes to nearly every phenomenon, including word meanings. This insight originally belongs to Vico, but Heidegger and the great contemporary physicist Bohm also share it.

8. Another personal realization for me in the course of thinking this project through, which I should like to argue at greater length in another context, revolves around the genius of Freud. My treatise has hopefully vindicated the claim that Freud's analysis of anality and sexuality---and its role in the emergence of subjectivity---as well as his alignment of the id and the environing culture, is profoundly insightful. Again, an entire volume could be devoted to it. Equally important, Freud heavily supports, with clinical data, the insights of the great thinker Kierkegaard.

9. Another important accomplishment of this work has been the provision of a new interpretation, or reconstruction, of Kierkegaard's anthropology. In expanded form, this interpretation could stand on its own as a major scholarly contribution to the history of ideas. To my knowledge, such a synthesis of Kierkegaard's major ideas has

yet to appear in the published literature.

10. Ontoanthropology has provided a starting point for the exposition of a new working model for therapeutics. The model has been hinted at elsewhere, but has received no systematic expression. Its intent is holistic and integral, with a difference. Rather than placing therapeutic approaches side-by-side and integrating them into a single composite concept of health, it ranks these same approaches on a hierarchic scale of applicability, defining health sequentially and developmentally.

11. Finally, ontoanthropology presents itself as the basis for a master science, retrieving many of philosophy's lost concerns with the nature of man while aligning them with psychology's empirical restraints. Such a master discipline would of necessity continue to develop nearly all of psychology's current "areas". such as learning, development, cognition, social theory, and personality theory. But it would, while elevating these areas to essential human development, learning, and so forth, at Stratum N_6, incorporate those disciplines now functioning in relative independence at both the lower and higher strata of the emergent hierarchy.

I make no claims to conclusiveness or finality in this work. I have tried to germinate a paradigmatic idea, not to verify an existing one. The theory is tentative in many ways, especially in the final stages of its expression in Chapter Five, I realize that it is a skeleton with little flesh, and that it raises more questions and

problems than it answers. But that, as Kuhn (1962) has so brilliantly argued, is not only an invariant feature of paradigms but one of their most important purposes as well.

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